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Abstract 
 
Rankings reveal important information about relative performance in competitive 
settings. Despite their widespread use, relatively little about their psychological impact on 
individuals’ decisions and behaviours is known. Such a limited understanding of both the 
beneficial and detrimental effects of rankings may lead to undesirable and unintended 
consequences. In this thesis I try to fill that gap by investigating how rankings can affect our 
judgment in four main areas. First, I explore the effect of rankings on the perceived potential 
of performance improvement and how this influences individuals’ aspiration levels. I also 
identify a factor that moderates this effect. Second, I examine the role of rankings in a 
competition between two commensurate rivals by exploring the relationship between 
rankings and predicted winning probabilities, and how this judgment is shaped by 
competitors’ inferences about relative capabilities. Third, I explore the role of rankings on 
pay requests, and show how this effect is mediated by personal entitlement and moderated by 
the pay level of similarly ranked others. Finally, I show how rankings influence the decision 
to cooperate with similarly-ranked rivals under gain and loss situations. 
The results suggest that the judgments and decisions of high-ranking individuals vary 
markedly from those of low-ranking individuals. Specifically, high-ranking individuals – in 
contrast to lower-ranked individuals – tend to set lower aspiration levels, predict lower 
winning probabilities when competing with commensurate rivals, demand higher pay, and are 
more sensitive about their cooperation decisions when the situational contexts change. I end 
with a general discussion of the findings, their theoretical and managerial implications, and 
suggestions for future research. 
Keyword: rankings, competition, social comparison, aspiration level, winning probability, 
entitlement, prospect theory, cooperation, social decision making. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation and Research Questions 
Rankings enable the direct comparison of competitors and help facilitate our decision 
making process. As a result, they have become increasingly common across many different 
domains. For instance, judgment about the quality of universities is often based on the 
rankings published in Business Week or in the US News and World Report. In business, 
relative corporate performance and perceptions of esteem are often judged based on their 
Fortune 500 ranking. Forced-rankings or tournament compensation systems, which rank 
employees’ performance relative to their colleagues, have been implemented in several large 
companies, such as Microsoft and Dell, in order to help them evaluate and pay their 
employees. The world of sport also uses rankings to present and evaluate athletes’ 
performances. 
A position within rankings implies competence, which in turn can lead to different 
payoffs. For instance, the average salary increase of MBA students graduating from the top 
ten business schools is approximately 30% higher than the average salary increase of students 
graduating from the bottom ten business schools (Global MBA Ranking, 2013). Similarly, 
the earnings of star athletes are more than ten times higher than the average earnings in their 
respective sport (Allen et al., 2012). Additionally, the top ten websites appearing on the first 
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page of Google’s search results received 89.71% of all click-through traffic, as compared to 
the next ten results (usually appearing on the second page), which received only 4.37% 
(Bullas, 2010). 
Despite the widespread use of rankings and the importance of rank positions, 
relatively little is known as to how rankings affect people’s judgments and decisions. The 
previous literature has identified some factors that can be influenced by rankings, including 
well-being (Boyce et al., 2010; Clark et al., 2009), competitive behaviour (Poortvliet et al., 
2009; Garcia and Tor, 2007; Garcia et al., 2006) and power (Keltner et al., 2003; Gilbert and 
Miles, 2000).  
However, in many fields where rankings are used, there exist other fundamental yet 
important judgments and decisions which can potentially be influenced by rankings. For 
instance, judgments which are critical in competitions are the setting of one’s aspiration level, 
the assessment of relative capabilities and the estimation of one’s likelihood to win (e.g. 
Windschitl et al., 2003). These judgments are fundamental to various kinds of decision such 
as the level of effort and time required to prepare for a competition, the decision to enter a 
new market, to apply for a job, or to bet on a contest. It is therefore worth exploring how 
these judgments can be influenced by rankings. In addition, in the field of management, 
employee entitlement is a core concept (Naumann et al., 2002); failure to fulfil employee 
entitlement could lead to counterproductive behaviour which might subsequently harm 
organisations’ interests (Paul et al., 2000). Since ranking systems have been implemented in 
many organisations, it is critical to understand whether or not they influence employee 
entitlement. Similarly, cooperative behaviour is also at the heart of management success 
(Smith et al., 1995). With organisations attempting to promote cooperation and teamwork to 
increase their performance, particularly at times of crisis, it is important to explore whether or 
not rankings promote or inhibit the cooperation intentions of individuals.  
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1.2 Summary of Thesis and Main Findings 
In this thesis I seek to explore the effects of rankings on four important judgments: 
aspiration level, predicted winning probability, pay entitlement, and cooperation intention. 
The rationale behind these selected judgments is based on the literature review of why 
rankings matter, as discussed below.  
People are affected by rankings for two main reasons: the desire to be better than 
others in the dimension being ranked and the rewards associated with rankings (to be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2). The first reason prompts individuals to compare themselves 
with others. This comparison can be made against one specific person or all individuals being 
ranked. By comparing oneself with all individuals, he is likely to see how he performs 
relative to others. The motivation to perform better than others will then lead him to focus on 
upward comparison, and as a consequence, he will see how his performance can be 
improved. This eventually influences his aspiration level. On the other hand, individuals may 
compare themselves specifically to just one person. In this case, individuals are likely to 
estimate their capabilities relative to the capability of the other person. As self-assessment is 
likely to be overrated whereas the assessment on others are often accurate (Epley and 
Dunning, 2000), individuals are likely to perceive themselves superior than others who have 
similar performance. This could eventually affect their predicted winning probability against 
a comparison person. 
The second reason, the rewards associated with rankings, creates an expectation of 
how much one should receive when occupying a certain rank. This in turn influences their 
pay entitlement. Additionally, as the competitive feelings between those with similar 
performance or ranks are particularly strong (Tesser, 1988), when individuals with similar 
ranks receive different rewards, the strong competitive feelings could affect their decisions to 
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cooperate with their commensurate rivals. Figure 1.1 summarises the rationale behind the 
selected factors. 
Figure 1.1: Rationale Behind the Selected Factors 
 
 
As shown in Figure 1.1, the four factors are connected to one another through the 
selection process. In addition to this process, the selected factors are also related to one 
another through social comparison. Specifically, social comparison is one of the main factors 
that drive the aspiration level and pay entitlement: individuals are influenced by others’ 
performance when setting their aspiration level, and are influenced by others’ pay when 
evaluating their own pay. Additionally, social comparison intensifies competitive feelings 
between two commensurate rivals, and these competitive feelings in turn affect cooperation 
decisions. Lastly, as individuals make a social comparison, they are motivated to view 
themselves as positively as possible but tend to view others accurately (self-enhancement). 
Consequently, they are likely to perceive their capabilities to be better than others. This can 
subsequently influence the predicted winning probability.  
Even though past research has shown how social comparison is associated with the 
four factors (as discussed in Chapter 2), it has yet explore how rankings interact with social 
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comparison, which in turn affects the selected factors. As rankings are ubiquitous, 
understanding the effects of rankings on these factors could help individuals, as well as 
organisations, be aware of how rankings can affect their judgments, and perhaps be able to 
minimise the unintended consequences arising from the use of rankings. This thesis thus 
seeks to investigate the effects of rankings on these factors. 
The rankings in this thesis refer to performance rankings, i.e. individuals’ 
performance in a task is described in terms of relative ranks (e.g. #3 out of 200), rather than 
scores or percentiles. To test hypotheses, I predominantly use the decision-making approach 
together with field, experimental and behavioural studies. To show the robustness of the 
effects, the studies in each chapter are varied in both scenarios and samples used. This thesis 
is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature. Chapter 3 explores the 
relationship between rankings and individuals’ aspiration levels. Chapter 4 analyses how 
individuals’ perception of winning a competition varies as a function of relative rank. Chapter 
5 investigates the effect of rankings on pay entitlement. Chapter 6 shows how the cooperation 
decisions of individuals from different ranks are influenced by situational contexts and 
frames. Finally, chapter 7 discusses the implications and future research directions. 
In my thesis I present four main findings. First, rankings are associated with 
individuals’ aspiration levels. Since high-ranking individuals, as well as those with no 
ranking information, consider they have less possibility of improving their performance, they 
tend to have lower aspiration levels than low-ranking individuals. This effect is moderated by 
self-efficacy such that the aspiration level of individuals with high self-efficacy tends to be 
more strongly influenced by rankings than that of individuals with low self-efficacy. Second, 
rankings are associated with predicted winning probability. Higher-ranked individuals 
perceive a lower discrepancy between their capabilities and those of similarly ranked rivals’, 
which in turn leads to lower predicted winning probabilities. Third, rankings influence pay 
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requests through feelings of entitlement. Higher-ranked individuals demand higher pay 
because they feel more entitled. This relationship is moderated by the pay level of a similarly 
ranked person, such that the ranking effect on pay request is more pronounced when the pay 
level is high rather than low. Fourth, the cooperation decisions of high-ranking individuals 
are more sensitive to situational contexts (gain vs. loss) or frames (positive vs. negative) than 
those of low-ranking individuals. The first group decides to cooperate with similarly-ranked 
rivals more when in the context of loss or negative frame than gain or positive frame, 
whereas the cooperation intention of the latter does not change in both contexts. This 
difference in cooperation decisions is driven by the difference in competitive feelings towards 
rivals. 
1.3 Contributions 
1.3.1 Theoretical Contributions 
The previous literature on the influence of rankings on judgements and behaviours has 
shown how rankings can be used as a standard that creates unequal competitive feelings 
across rankings (Poortvliet et al., 2009; Garcia and Tor, 2007; Garcia et al., 2006), as a signal 
of success and power (Keltner et al., 2003; Gilbert and Miles, 2000) and as a determinant of 
well-being (Boyce et al., 2010; Clark et al., 2009). This thesis contributes to this body of 
literature by showing how individuals use rankings as a tool to infer their potential to 
improve their performance, relative capabilities, entitlement, and competitiveness. In turn, 
these four judgments influence related decisions. As a result, I also contribute to four other 
related fields.  
First, this research introduces another factor that determines the level of aspiration. 
Previous research in this area has suggested that the level of aspiration is determined based 
on individual traits (Sears, 1941; Frank, 1935), the discrepancy between reference points and 
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current performance (Cyert and March, 1963), and the attractiveness of the aspiration level  
(Wofford et al., 1992; Riedel et al., 1988; Campbell, 1982). In this thesis I show that the level 
of aspiration can also be influenced by the perceived potential to improve, which can be 
inferred from rankings.  
Second, the thesis advances our understanding of the factors that determine the 
predicted winning probabilities. Past research has suggested that in estimating one’s skill 
relative to others, and predicting competition outcomes, individuals are influenced by non-
motivational factors, namely the differential information between themselves and others (e.g. 
Kruger et al., 2008) with an egocentric focus on the information of their own side (e.g. 
Windschitl et al., 2008). In this thesis I show that individuals can also be influenced by a 
motivational factor, namely self-enhancement, as measured by the perceived relative 
capabilities inferred from rankings. 
Third, past research on entitlement has focused on gender difference, rather than 
performance feedback, as a determinant of pay entitlement (e.g. Pelham and Hetts, 2001; 
Major and Forcey, 1985). However, as employees’ pay is often based on their performance 
(Prendergast, 1999), it is important to explore whether or not their feelings of pay entitlement 
are influenced by performance feedback. Understanding this could help reduce the chance of 
unfulfilled entitlement, which could lead to counterproductive behaviour in the workplace 
(e.g. Fisk, 2010).  In this thesis I contribute to this line of literature by revealing how ranking 
feedback influences employees’ pay requests. 
Fourth, previous literature on the effect of rankings on competitive behaviour has 
suggested that individuals in high and low ranks are equally competitive and less likely to 
cooperate with similarly-ranked rivals (Garcia and Tor, 2007; Garcia et al., 2006). In this 
thesis I argue, using empirical evidence, that this finding is not universal since it depends on 
the situational context (gain vs. loss) or frames (negative vs. positive).  
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1.3.2 Managerial Practices 
This research offers several important insights as to how rankings can influence 
judgment and behaviour. The findings benefit particularly practitioners who either use or 
consider using rankings as a form of performance feedback. First, the findings that ranking 
information helps low-ranking individuals perceive higher potential to improve and set higher 
aspiration levels suggests that organisations can use rankings as a way to stimulate 
individuals with low performance to set higher aspiration levels. For instance, rather than 
informing employees only their absolute performance, managers could also inform their 
ranks within a comparison group to help them see how much they can improve, and 
subsequently increase their aspiration levels. Rankings, however, may have less effect on low 
self-efficacy individuals because they tend to set relatively low aspiration levels even when 
they occupy low ranks. Consequently, organisations may need to particularly encourage this 
type of individuals to set higher aspiration levels.  
Second, rankings may inhibit cooperation intentions, which may be an issue for 
organisations promoting teamwork. However, cooperation intentions among high-ranking 
individuals can be promoted by framing situations or payoffs in terms of loss rather than gain. 
For instance, rather than describing the benefit their potential partner will gain from 
cooperating with them, it may be more effective for individuals to describe the loss their 
partner can reduce. This helps increase the chance that the partner will agree to cooperate. 
Nevertheless, as low-ranking individuals tend not to cooperate, regardless of the frame types, 
organisations may still need to provide incentives, particularly to those with low ranks, to 
induce their cooperation behaviour. 
Third, understanding the influence of rankings on pay entitlement helps organisations 
learn more about employees’ pay expectations. Specifically, it is important to pay high-
ranking employees similarly to the pay of other highly-ranked colleagues. However, for low-
22 
 
ranking employees, it depends on whether or not they believe the pay of their similarly-
ranked colleagues is justified. This understanding enables organisations to not overpay or 
underpay either their own employees or prospective candidates. Overpayment can lead to 
unnecessary costs whereas underpayment can result in employees’ dysfunctional behaviour 
counter to an organisation’s interests, or else result in organisations losing attractive 
candidates to rivals.  
The findings in this thesis also benefit individuals who are being ranked by helping 
them become aware of how rankings can influence their judgments and decisions. For 
example, the findings show that individuals may use rankings to infer their capability relative 
to their rivals’. This inference, however, may be biased in certain individuals, leading to an 
overestimation of their prediction of competition outcomes. Specifically, unlike high-ranking 
individuals, low-ranking individuals believe their capability is superior to similarly-ranked 
competitors’. Consequently, low-ranking individuals are likely to predict relatively high 
winning probabilities, which could subsequently influence other decisions, such as the 
decision to enter a competition in the first place. Additionally, the finding that high-ranking 
individuals feel less competitive in a loss-framed rather than a gain-framed situation suggests 
that high-ranking individuals who want their rivals to cooperate with them may need to frame 
the payoff negatively rather than positively to increase the acceptance chance of their rivals. 
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Chapter 2  
2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Social Comparison 
In order to evaluate something, judging whether it is good or bad, big or small, heavy 
or light, we often do so by making a comparison. Comparisons can be made against various 
standards including standards in the past (e.g. Conway and Ross, 1984), potential alternatives 
of outcome (e.g. Miller and Turnbull, 1990) or objective standards (Festinger, 1954). One 
common type of comparison is social comparison (Wood, 1989), which refers to the 
comparison of our attributes, skills or abilities with those of others. Social comparison occurs 
relatively frequently in daily life, and shapes the way people perceive themselves 
(Mussweiler, 2003a, 2003b; Wood, 1989). For instance, people usually compare themselves 
with their best friends in order to judge their level of cheerfulness (Mussweiler and Ruter, 
2003). Students’ reaction to their grades depends largely on the grades of their classmates’ 
(Felson and Reed, 1986). The way people perceive their career is influenced by the career of 
their colleagues (Bernstein and Crosby, 1980). An individual’s happiness also does not 
depend on their own income, but rather the incomes of others (Easterlin, 1995). 
Festinger (1954) suggests that social comparison be used as an alternative comparison 
choice for people when objective standards for making a comparison are not available. 
However, subsequent research (e.g. Buunk and Gibbons, 2007; Klein, 1997) indicates that 
Festinger (1954) might understate the power of social comparison. Specifically, people tend 
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to compare themselves with others even when objective standards are available. For example, 
Klein (1997) has shown that individuals whose risk level of a car accident is high (60%) but 
lower than average (80%) identified themselves as a safer driver, and were less concerned 
and less likely to change their behaviour than those whose risk level is low (30%) but higher 
than average (10%). In another study, participants performed an ability task and were given 
both absolute and relative feedback. They were then asked whether, in order to win a prize, 
they would like to perform the same ability task again and reach a certain score, or to 
participate in a chance task. If relative standards are unimportant in the presence of objective 
standards, participants with a good performance in absolute terms, regardless of their relative 
performance, should choose the ability task more often than those performing poorly. 
However, Klein (1997) found that those whose performance from the first task was above 
average (regardless of their absolute performance, high or low) were more likely to choose to 
repeat the same task. These findings suggest that even when objective standards are available, 
people still compare with their peers. 
Perhaps the interest in social comparison information happens subconsciously. Gilbert 
et al. (1995) argue that social comparison occurs automatically, whether we intend it or not. 
For example, by being subliminally primed with a young person, participants have a younger 
perception of themselves compared to being subliminally primed with an elderly person 
(Stapel and Blanton, 2004). Similarly, participants who were subliminally exposed to a high 
degree of aggressiveness rated themselves more aggressive than those who were primed with 
a lower standard (Mussweiler et al., 2004). 
Automatic social comparison is subsequently followed by “a more systematic and 
thorough review of the target vis a vis self” (Buunk and Gibbons, 2007). For instance, upon 
hearing about the enormous success of somebody’s career, individuals may initially engage 
in an automatic social comparison, which in turn produces unpleasant feelings about 
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themselves. However, as they subsequently reflect on the advantages that the person may 
have (e.g. luck, talent), or the reasons why the person is successful (e.g. he/she is hard-
working), these initial negative feelings become less intense. This reasoning may alter their 
initial views, and enable individuals to be more rational in their judgment (Buunk and 
Gibbons, 2007). 
Research has shown that the intensity of social comparison in this reasoning stage 
depends on situations. In other words, there are certain situations which promote the desire 
for social comparison more than others. For example, the need for social comparison is 
particularly strong in times of uncertainty, stress, or change (Buunk, 1994; Festinger, 1954). 
By learning how others facing similar experiences are faring, individuals feel more 
comfortable and a greater sense of relief (Locke and Horowitz, 1990). Competitive situations 
are also likely to intensify the need for social comparison (Gibbons and Buunk, 1999). Where 
individuals have to compete against one another in order to win, they tend to compare 
themselves more against others rather than focusing on themselves or on objective standards 
(Klein, 1997). 
2.1.1 Purposes of Social Comparison  
Social comparison occurs for many reasons and has many different purposes. The 
main purpose suggested by Festinger (1954) is to serve the need to learn more about the self. 
Specifically, he asserts that people have a desire to accurately evaluate themselves and to 
understand more about their own abilities and opinions. A comparison with others provides 
the opportunity for them to do so. A further purpose of social comparison is to build and 
maintain a positive self-image. This is especially true when comparing against “inferiors”, 
which can lead people to develop a positive view of themselves (Wills, 1981). Failures might 
even turn into successes when compared to worse performances (Corcoran et al., 2011). For 
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this reason, social comparison can help preserve self-esteem and make people feel valuable. 
The third purpose of social comparison is to serve the need for self-improvement (Taylor and 
Lobel, 1989). By comparing with “superiors”, people can learn and improve their practices in 
order to perform better (Corcoran et al., 2011). Students, for example, are likely to compare 
themselves against those who have performed better, and who they perceive can help them 
improve (Huguet et al., 2001). 
The first three purposes serve as strategic reasons for people who deliberately make 
comparisons with others. However, the existence of spontaneous social comparison suggests 
that social comparison might also occur for non-strategic proposes. According to Corcoran et 
al. (2011), these purposes are to effectively communicate and efficiently use limited cognitive 
resources.  
Social comparison information can help people communicate effectively with others 
(Corcoran et al., 2011). For example, people will interpret the sentence “Smith is athletic” 
differently, depending on their background and their subjective definition of “athletic”. To 
create mutual understanding it may be necessary to describe and elaborate upon various 
dimensions of Smith’s athletic abilities (e.g. his weight, how fast he can run). However, it is 
both easier and more effective to communicate that “Smith is athletic” by comparing Smith 
with a relevant and common standard such as university or Olympic athletes. By 
communicating using a comparison, the other person can understand more precisely how 
athletic Smith is. Relative comparisons therefore help to serve the purpose of communication, 
i.e. that incoming information can be properly interpreted and outgoing information can be 
effectively conveyed. 
Automatic social comparison can also help people make efficient use of their limited 
cognitive resources (Corcoran et al., 2011). In order to determine one’s level of success, for 
example, it may be necessary to consider several aspects related to success, such as past 
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achievements, income, savings, living conditions, and even grades in school. Considering and 
processing all this information requires considerable cognitive effort. However, success can 
easily be judged by comparing it with the success of friends, which requires only the 
comparable information that they have in common. For example, savings information or 
school grades of friends might not be available, and thus are not included in the comparison. 
Consequently, this limits the amount of information one has to process, enabling remaining 
cognitive resources to perform other tasks.  
2.1.2 Comparison Targets  
In order to make an accurate evaluation of the self, people select comparison 
standards which are similar (Festinger, 1954). In this instance, this refers to the similarity in 
related attributes, such as age, sex or experience, rather than the critical dimension, such as 
performance or outcomes (Wheeler, 1966). Comparing performance or outcomes with those 
who have dissimilar attributes provides little information about the self (Gastorf and Suls, 
1978). For example, comparing the skills of a chess novice with the skills of an expert does 
not convey much information about how skilful the novice is. Even though the expert can 
perform much better than the novice, this does not necessarily mean that the novice is 
unskilled. Performance difference in this case is the result of difference in experience, rather 
than a difference in skill. 
In addition to choosing similarities to compare, people can also choose to compare 
upwards and downwards, depending on the purpose of the comparison. An upward 
comparison – a comparison with those who are superior – serves a self-improvement purpose 
(Gibbons and Buunk, 1999). To serve this purpose, comparison targets are often those whose 
performance is slightly (as opposed to considerably) better (Corcoran et al., 2011). 
Performance can then be improved by the increase in self-efficacy (e.g., Vrugt and Koenis, 
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2002). However, upward comparison can lead to lower self-evaluation (Collins, 1996; Taylor 
and Lobel, 1989) and induce negative feelings such as dissatisfaction, anger, envy and 
jealousy (Tesser et al., 1988), particularly if individuals focus on the fact that they are inferior 
to their comparison targets (Buunk et al., 1990). For these reasons, upward comparison is 
sometimes avoided and individuals choose to compare downwards instead (Will, 1981). 
A downward comparison – a comparison with those who are in an inferior position – 
serves a self-enhancement purpose. Thinking they are better than others makes people feel 
good about themselves, and thus helps protect and improve their own self-view (Wills, 1981). 
A person whose self-view is likely to be threatened tends to engage in this type of 
comparison (Wills, 1981). For instance, a woman who is depressed with breast cancer tends 
to compare herself against those who have a worse condition (Wood et al., 1985). Individuals 
experiencing failure also will be more eager to learn about others’ performance when they 
expect it to be poor than when they expect it to be good (Pyszczynski et al., 1985). 
Even though it seems that upward comparison is often associated with negative affect, 
and downward comparison with positive affect, this is not necessarily the case. Buunk et al. 
(1990) argue that both comparison directions can produce both positive and negative feelings. 
By comparing upwards, people can learn either that they are worse than others, or that there 
is a possibility for them to be better. Similarly, by comparing downwards, people can learn 
either that they are better than others, or that there is a chance they may get worse. In both 
types of comparison, the affective responses from the comparison are likely to depend on the 
aspect of comparison which is more salient. For instance, if people perceive that the 
outcomes are out of their control and thus it is unlikely for them to improve, comparing 
upward will induce negative feelings. On the contrary, if people see there is a chance of 
improvement, upward comparison will lead to positive responses.  
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2.1.3 Multiple Comparison Targets and Rankings 
In addition to comparisons with people with similar attributes or comparing upwards 
or downwards, research has also shown that people are also concerned about the end point of 
the distribution. Wheeler et al. (1969) demonstrated that when individuals learned about their 
own performance and their position within a comparison group, but were not informed about 
the range of group’s performance, they attempted to estimate the range by asking to see the 
score of the best performers rather than the performance of those who occupied a similar 
rank. However, once they had been able to estimate the performance range, they then became 
curious to learn about the performances of those ranked nearby. 
Concern for the endpoint suggests that individuals may take into account multiple 
comparison targets to arrive at their judgments or decisions. Specifically, when multiple 
comparison targets are available, individuals may compare their performance with not only 
one comparison target, but with a range of targets within the distribution
1
. Multiple 
comparisons may lead individuals to be concerned about their position within the 
distribution. This concern for rank has been shown in various studies (e.g. Boyce et al., 2010; 
Powdthavee, 2009; Brown et al., 2008). For example, Brown et al. (2008) illustrated that 
people’s satisfaction regarding their income depends not only on their relative income but 
also on the position of their income relative to the comparison group. An increase in income 
alone will not necessarily increase happiness if it does not increase the individual’s rank. In 
other words, an individual’s happiness will increase only when their rank increases (Boyce et 
al., 2010). 
  
                                                 
 
1
 This concept is similar to the Range Frequency Theory (Parducci, 1965), which states that judgement on an 
item is dependent on its position or rank within its comparison set. 
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2.2 The Psychology of Rankings 
Rankings are found in so many situations in people’s everyday lives that it would 
appear to be an essential component of our society. For example, an organisation’s structure 
is often hierarchical. Decision making processes also involve the use of rankings, ranging 
from the least desirable options to the most desirable ones. People’s interest in rankings is 
also reflected in their widespread use across various sectors including the worlds of 
academia, sport, and business. The extensive use of rankings suggests that rankings matter to 
humans far beyond their use as a tool serving informational purposes. 
2.2.1 Why Do Ranks Matter? 
Ranks serve as a signal of quality (Huberman et al., 2004). Attaining high ranks 
conveys higher qualities and competences and, therefore, the benefits and rewards for such 
achievements are relatively high. For example, since male attractiveness is dependent on 
social rank, higher-ranked males are likely to attract more females (Powdthavee, 2009). 
Additionally, highly-ranked employees earn much more than those of lower rank, a gap 
which is increasing. Specifically, in 2000 the average income of an American CEO was 531 
times higher than the income of the average worker, compared to 1980 where the differential 
was a factor of 42 (Frank, 2005). Similarly, the real income of the top one-percent of US 
earners has more than doubled since 1979, whereas median US real income has remained 
relatively constant  (Frank, 1999). These lucrative incomes in turn accentuate the importance 
of attending top universities, which is one of the main factors in obtaining highly-paid 
positions (Frank, 1999). As a consequence, universities compete to attain a higher rank in 
order to attract the best students.  
Achieving a high rank is also associated with power. Lower-ranked individuals were 
ready to conform to the opinions and beliefs of higher-ranked individuals, even when it was 
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to their own disadvantage (Ridgeway et al., 1998). In negotiation, high-ranking individuals 
gain higher benefits than their low-ranking counterparts (Ball and Eckel, 1996). Similarly, 
higher-status individuals are able to sell their products to lower-status individuals at a higher 
price than vice versa (Ball et al., 2001). Those in high ranks are also perceived and treated 
more favourably than those in low ranks by, for example, being respectful or cooperative 
(Heffetz and Frank, 2008; Weiss and Fershtman, 1998). 
Perhaps another reason why rank matters is that individuals enjoy feeling superior. 
More precisely, an individual’s utility increases as they become better than others in the 
dimension they value. As such, they feel competitive towards others (Clark and Oswald, 
1998), and are willing to increase their effort to protect themselves from being below 
average, and to increase their chances of being better than average (Kuhnen and Tymula, 
2012). They are even willing to take more risk if the outcome associated with the risky option 
may provide an opportunity to improve their position which the certain outcome cannot do 
(Hill and Buss, 2010). 
The preference for being better than others leads to endless competition until they 
become the best. Obviously, any tool that highlights this comparison, including rankings, is 
likely to induce competitive feelings and influence judgment and behaviour. For instance, 
Tran and Zeckhauser (2012) and Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011) showed that ranking 
feedback lead individuals to work harder and obtain better performance overall. Even when 
the ranking feedback does not lead to financial rewards, individuals tend to sabotage the 
performance of others in order to improve their rank (Charness et al., 2010). Kuhnen and 
Tymula (2012) also demonstrated that by simply telling individuals that ranking feedback 
may be available is enough to increase productivity i.e. solving more problems.  
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2.2.2 The Effects of Rank on Judgement and Behaviour  
The rewards from achieving a high rank, as well as the desire to be better than others, 
motivate people to try and achieve a higher rank. In turn, this motivation influences different 
kinds of judgment and differentiate the behaviour of those in high ranks from those in low 
ranks. 
2.2.2.1 Life Satisfaction 
Research has consistently shown that individuals’ satisfaction in life depends on their 
rank position within a comparison group such as family, neighbours, or colleagues (Boyce et 
al., 2010; Clark et al., 2009). Specifically, individuals tend to compare their incomes with 
each comparison target in the group. This comparison, however, is not symmetric (Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005) since upward comparisons (i.e., the number of higher earners) are weighted 
more than downward comparisons (Boyce et al., 2010). This implies that higher-ranked 
individuals tend to influence the judgment of one’s income more than lower-ranked 
individuals. Each comparison that an individual is better (worse) than another will increase 
(decrease) satisfaction (Boyce et al., 2010). In other words, an individual’s satisfaction will 
increase when their rank increases (Clark et al., 2009).  
2.2.2.2 Attempt to Improve or Protect Ranks 
Low-ranking individuals strive hard to improve their rank. Kuziemko et al. (2011) 
demonstrate that because individuals are averse to being ranked last, those in the penultimate 
position tend to choose options that prevent them from falling into last place, and those in last 
place tend to choose options that enable them to improve their position. In one of their 
experiments, when individuals were asked to choose whether they wanted to receive a 
guaranteed payment or to play an equal expected-value lottery, individuals in the last two 
positions were more likely to play the lottery than others. Kuziemko et al. (2011) explain that 
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individuals in last place do so because the lottery provides them an opportunity to improve 
their rank whereas individuals in penultimate place do so in order to protect their position. 
Similarly, in another experiment, individuals are asked whether they wish to give an 
additional $2 to the person whose rank is just below or above their own. Their respective 
ranks will decrease if they give $2 to the rank below. Kuziemko et al. (2011) found that those 
in second-to-last position are more likely to give the money to the one above them while 
other ranks tend to give it to the one below.  
Not only do people in the low ranks attempt to improve their positions, but people in 
the high ranks strive hard to protect theirs. For instance, Cummins (1999) shows that those 
near the top attempt to protect their position and their access to competitive resources by 
closely monitoring the cheating behaviour of lower-ranking individuals’. Clark et al. (2010) 
show that higher-ranked individuals exert more efforts on their job than lower-ranked 
individuals. The over time working hard to protect their position at the top results in an 
increase in productivity compared to those near the bottom (Kuhnen and Tymula, 2012). 
Similarly, Hannan et al. (2008) also demonstrated that ranking feedback improves the 
performance of high-ranking individuals more than the performance of low-ranking 
individuals.  
2.2.2.3 Interaction with Others 
 Viewing themselves as inferior, lower-ranked people tend to have feelings of 
powerlessness and self-blame (Gilbert and Miles, 2000). As a result, they tend not to argue or 
defend themselves when being criticised by individuals in a higher position (Fournier et al., 
2002) and often experience depression (Gilbert et al., 2002) and shame (Cheung et al., 2004). 
In contrast, high-ranking individuals tend to view themselves as successful and in a group are 
more likely than others to be independent, display self-centred behaviour (Keltner et al., 
2003), and blame others (Gilbert and Miles, 2000). Having a high rank communicates 
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success, which increases pride and confidence (Sloman et al., 2003). In turn, when criticised 
by subordinates, high-ranking individuals tend to argue (Fournier et al., 2002). Those who are 
near the top, as judged by independent observers, also appear to be more competitive than the 
ones near the bottom (Chen et al., 2011). 
2.2.2.4 Competitive Behaviour 
High-ranking individuals are less likely to cooperate with their similarly-ranked 
partners (Poortvliet et al., 2009; Garcia and Tor, 2007; Garcia et al., 2006). Specifically, they 
are less willing to trade-off the financial gain from cooperation with their commensurate 
rivals in order to preserve their ranks (Poortvliet et al., 2009; Garcia and Tor, 2007; Garcia et 
al., 2006). In Study 3 of Garcia et al. (2006), individuals are asked to choose whether they 
want to cooperate with similarly-ranked rivals. Their profits from cooperation will increase 
but be less than their rivals, which in turn threatens their rank. Garcia et al. (2006) find that 
those near the top are less likely to choose to cooperate when compared to those far away 
from the top. This is because as individuals get closer to the top, or the standard in general, 
the social comparison becomes more intense and competitive feelings towards rivals are 
stronger. 
Nevertheless, the bottom also serves as a standard, which people tend to avoid since 
they dislike being ranked last. Consequently, the social comparison concern is also intense 
among those near the bottom, leading them to be competitive and display similar behaviour 
to those near the top (Garcia et al., 2006). Poortvliet et al., (2009), however, argue that the 
competitive behaviour of low-ranking individuals is manifested only when individuals pursue 
performance goals (i.e. when focusing on competing with others). Since performance-goal 
individuals focus on outcompeting others, they are less likely to cooperate if others benefit 
from cooperation more than they do. On the other hand, low-ranking individuals with 
mastery goals (i.e. focusing on self-improvement or improving their own performance) are 
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more likely to cooperate even though others benefit more from the cooperation. The reason 
for this is that the opportunity for self-improvement is high when individuals have a low rank, 
enabling mastery-goal individuals to focus on their own benefits stemming from cooperation 
rather than the differential benefits. However, as their ranks increase, the room for 
improvement diminishes. Mastery-goal individuals are then less committed to self-
improvement (Nicholls, 1984) and so redirect their attention to competing with their 
competitors (Tesser et al., 1988). This, in turn, makes both mastery-goal and performance-
goal individuals become more competitive when they are in high ranks.  
Additionally, Garcia and Tor (2007) suggest that competitive behaviours are 
displayed only when rank is threatened. Specifically, high- or low-ranking individuals are 
willing to cooperate with their commensurate rivals, and tolerate the social comparison pain 
from cooperation by letting the rivals gain better benefits, if this does not change their rank. 
Garcia and Tor (2007) conclude that it is the upward comparison in scale (i.e. rankings being 
threatened), rather than the upward comparison in task (i.e. performance being threatened), 
that is necessary to initiate competitive behaviour of those near the standards, i.e. near the top 
or the bottom of rankings. 
Even though past literature has identified various kinds of behaviour that can be 
influenced by rankings, our understanding of the effects of rankings is still limited. Without a 
thorough understanding, the extensive use of rankings may result in undesirable and 
unintended consequences. As shown in Figure 2.1, this thesis extends the past literature by 
examining how rankings influence 1) individuals’ aspiration levels, 2) predicted winning 
probabilities, 3) pay entitlement, and 4) cooperation decisions in different situational contexts 
and frames. In the next four sections, I review relevant literature on these four areas. 
 
  
36 
 
Figure 2.1: Literature Map 
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2.3 Aspiration Levels 
The term “aspiration level” was initially defined by Hoppe (1930) as “the 
expectations, goal-settings or demands in connection with one’s own future performance” (p. 
10)
2
. This definition, however, was ambiguous and hard to operationalise. Consequently, 
subsequent definitions of the term have provided a more precise meaning. For example, 
Frank (1935) referred to it as the “level of future performance in a familiar task which an 
individual, knowing his level of past performance in that task, explicitly undertakes to reach” 
(p. 119). For Siegel (1957), it is “the notion of level of aspiration is invoked in reference to 
the goal-striving behaviour of an individual when he is presented with a task whose outcome 
can be measured on an achievement scale. Level of aspiration refers to the particular 
achievement goal for which the person strives.” (p. 253). Schneider (1992) regarded 
aspiration level as “the smallest outcome that would be deemed satisfactory by the decision 
maker, given the current choice situation” (p. 1053). From a cognitive perspective, aspiration 
level can also be viewed as an attempt of individuals to combine and process the available 
information in order to form an expectation about their future performance, and eventually 
the level of aspiration (Meyer and Gellatly, 1988).  
These definitions all had one thing in common, namely the specific level of 
performance that individuals want to achieve in a task. Using this definition, the level of 
aspiration can be perceived as equivalent to the “desired goal state” (Campion and Lord, 
1982; Locke et al., 1981). In fact, research into the level of aspiration and goals are closely 
related, and the two terms are often used interchangeably (e.g. Campell, 1982; Locke et al., 
1970). For this reason, this thesis considers aspiration level as being similar to goal level, and 
as such reviews the related literature in both areas. 
                                                 
 
2
 The original quote was in German and was translated into English by Gardner (1940), p. 61. 
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2.3.1 Determinants of Aspiration Levels 
The determinants of aspiration level or goal level can be summarised and categorised 
into three groups, namely individual traits, performance feedback, and the attractiveness of 
aspiration levels.  
2.3.1.1 Individual Traits 
Early literature on aspiration levels considers it to be an individual trait (e.g. Sears, 
1941; Frank, 1935) subject to considerable individual differences. Frank (1935) asserts that 
the level of aspiration is derived from individuals’ characteristics, which are relatively stable 
and task-independent. In other words, individuals’ performance standards (i.e. aspiration or 
goal levels) in any task tend to be generic, and can be applied in many situations (Bandura, 
1976).  
Frank (1935) argues that there are three needs within each individual that influence 
aspiration levels. The first is the accurate prediction of future performance level, the second is 
the need to seek success, which leads to a high level of aspiration regardless of current 
performance, whilst the third is the need to avoid failure, which leads to a level of aspiration 
below future performance. Which of these three needs is dominant, and determines the 
direction and degree of the discrepancy between the level of aspiration and current 
performance depends on the type of person (Frank, 1935). An individual who is likely to 
keep "his feet on the ground" has a tendency to keep his new aspiration level similar to the 
level of current performance. An individual who likes to has “his head in the clouds" tends to 
have an unrealistically high level of aspiration. An "ambitious" individual is likely to have a 
reasonably high level of aspiration. Finally, a "cautious" individual is likely to make his level 
of aspiration lower than his current performance.  
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Similarly, Sears (1941) treats aspiration level as an individual trait, linking it to 
motivation. Specifically, individuals who have a strong drive to succeed tend to set their 
aspiration levels higher than their current performance. However, individuals who tend to be 
insecure and self-protective tend to set their aspiration levels lower than their current 
performance. VandeWalle et al. (2001) also suggest that goal orientation influences 
aspiration levels. Individuals who focus on learning and developing competence (a learning-
goal orientation) tend to set a high goal or high level of aspiration. On the other hand, 
individuals who focus on avoiding negative judgment (an avoiding-goal orientation) are 
likely to set a low level of aspiration.  
2.3.1.2 Performance Feedback 
Aspiration Level Based on Current Performance 
Performance feedback motivates individuals to set an initial level of aspiration or goal 
(Latham and Yukl, 1975). More precisely, performance feedback or feedback from similar 
tasks serve as a basis that individuals use to infer their ability and make a forecast about their 
future performance, from which an aspiration level can be formed (Vrugt and Koenis, 2002; 
Campion and Lord, 1982; Erez, 1977; Lopes, 1976; Wilsted and Hand, 1974).  
An aspiration level can be higher or lower than current performance. A level of 
aspiration which is higher than current performance motivates individuals to strive harder, 
whereas one which is lower than current performance tends to relieve stress and anxiety 
about performance (Frank, 1941). However, the common approach of using feedback as an 
informative clue about performance improvement, such as in training or coaching (Quaglia 
and Cobb, 1996; Frank, 1941), suggests that individuals given feedback are generally 
motivated to perform better in the future. As a result, it is suggested that the level of 
aspiration is generally adjusted to be slightly above the current performance, with the aim of 
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improving performance (Campion and Lord, 1982; Simon et al., 1954; Hertzman and 
Festinger, 1940).  
Aspiration Level Based on Success and Failure 
 Due to a limited capacity for processing information, individuals adjust their level of 
aspiration in response to feedback by categorising a continuous outcome, relative to a 
reference point, into a success or a failure (Frank, 1935). Performance at or above the 
reference point is perceived as a success whereas performance below this point is perceived 
as a failure (Quaglia and Cobb, 1996). A reference point may be either past performance, the 
current level of aspiration, or the performance of others (social performance).  
Past Performance and Current Aspiration Level as a Referent Point 
Where the reference is past performance, individuals tend to increase their level of 
aspiration as their performance improves (i.e. a success), and decrease it as their performance 
declines (i.e. a failure) (Vance and Colella, 1990; Cyert and March, 1963). Vance and Colella 
(1990), for instance, show that when receiving positive feedback, individuals aimed to further 
improve their performance by increasing their goals. 
Where the current aspiration level is the reference point, the discrepancy between 
current performance and current aspiration tends to have a positive effect on the level of 
future aspiration (Lant, 1992; Steisel and Cohen, 1951; Pennington, 1940). Specifically, 
individuals tend to adjust the aspiration level upwards when the current performance is equal 
to or higher than the current aspiration level, and downwards when the current performance is 
lower than the current aspiration level (Campion and Lord, 1982; Simon et al., 1954; Child 
and Whiting, 1949; Pennington, 1940).  
 The current level of aspiration can also act as an anchor by itself, and can be used by 
decision makers in an organisation to form their new level of aspiration (Mezias et al., 2002). 
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Based on anchoring and adjustment heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), an 
individual’s subsequent judgment tends not to deviate much from the anchor (Cyert and 
March, 1963). Hence, it is likely that the high level (low) of current aspiration, which serves 
as an anchor, will be followed by a relatively high (low) level of aspiration in the future. 
Evidently, Lant (1992) has shown, using classroom simulations, that the current aspiration 
level positively influences the future aspiration level. 
By categorising performance feedback based on these two referent points, it has been 
suggested that successes and failures are often followed by a respective increase or decrease 
in aspiration level. Nevertheless, some individuals may not react to feedback in this manner, 
i.e., they tend to respond to a success by lowering their level of aspiration or to a failure by 
increasing it (Moulton, 1965). Researchers have offered many explanations for this atypical 
shift in aspiration level. For example, Atkinson (1957) suggests that this effect is the result of 
the differences in an individual’s motivation to achieve successes and avoid failures. 
Individuals who fear failure and have low achievement motivation are more likely to react 
atypically, i.e., by raising their level of aspiration after a failure and lowering it after a 
success (Moulton, 1965).  
Niemivirta (1999) contends that the atypical shift of aspiration level is connected to 
the different ways in which people perceive the controllability of situations, i.e. the level of 
control over actions, outcomes, or the external environment. For example, if individuals 
perceive a task as being outside their control (i.e. it happens by chance) they may attribute 
their past successes to luck, and may believe that they will not be lucky in the future. 
Consequently, they lower their goals, meaning that the level of aspiration is likely to change 
in an atypical manner. On the other hand, if individuals believe that their success is the direct 
result of their skills – a factor which is relatively stable and controllable – they may expect to 
perform similarly well in the future. In such situations they may raise their goals.  
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Social Performance as a Referent Point 
Where information is available, individuals also take the performance of others into 
account when forming their own level of aspiration. Specifically, their level of aspiration 
tends to form in the direction that decreases the gap between their own performance and the 
performance of others. For example, Festinger (1942) and Gould and Lewis (1940) show that 
when participants learned that their performance was below the performance of a fictitious 
group of people who performed the same task, the discrepancy between their current score 
and their expected score, which represented the level of aspiration, increased. Since future 
performance is positively correlated with the level of aspiration (Zander and Newcomb, 
1967; Dey and Kaur, 1965), the increase aims to improve future performance, in turn 
reducing the gap between self-performance and the performance of others. On the contrary, 
when participants learned that their performance was above average, the discrepancy between 
their score and the expected score decreased. Additionally, Hilgard et al. (1940) and 
Anderson and Brandt (1939) demonstrate that the difference between the aspiration score and 
the current performance score was positive in children who performed lower than the 
average, but negative in children who performed above average. This suggests that below 
average children tended to increase their level of aspiration whereas above average children 
tended to decrease it. Chapman and Volkmann (1939) also suggest that individuals tend to 
adjust their level of aspiration based on their perception of the skill level of the comparison 
group. The level of aspiration is lower when individuals are told about the performance of 
those whom they regard as superior compared to an identical performance by those whom 
they regard as inferior.  
2.3.1.3 Attractiveness of the Aspiration Level 
Individuals choose their level of aspiration by evaluating the attractiveness of each 
possible aspiration level, and then select the most attractive one. One factor that determines 
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the attractiveness of each aspiration level is the probability of achievement (Oettingen et al., 
2001; Wofford et al., 1992; Campbell, 1982; Hilgard, 1942). Aspiration levels perceived as 
being impossible to reach are less likely to be selected (Oettingen et al., 2001; Campbell, 
1982). Evidently, Locke (1968) shows that individuals tend to accept the goals set by the 
experimenters only if they think those goals can be achieved. Additionally, the adjustment of 
the aspiration level based on success and failure (Moulton, 1965; Child and Whiting, 1949) 
suggests that feedback influences the perceived probability of goal attainment, which in turn 
determines the level of aspiration (Feather and Saville, 1967). Another factor that influences 
the attractiveness of each aspiration level is the perceived value of the outcome (Wofford et 
al., 1992; Hilgard, 1942; Frank, 1941). Incentives such as rewards for a particular 
performance level or praise from others can motivate individuals to aim for higher levels of 
aspiration and to have more commitment (Riedel et al., 1988).  
2.3.2 The Effects of the Aspiration Level on Performance 
The level of aspiration, or goal, is a target for individuals to achieve. Individuals with 
a specific goal tend to exert more effort and perform better than individuals with no goal. For 
example, Kausler (1959) provided one group of participants with a sample arithmetic test and 
asked them to state their level of aspiration (i.e. how many maths problems they thought they 
could solve) prior to doing the actual test. The other group of participants was also given the 
sample test but was not asked to state their level of aspiration. Kausler (1959) found that the 
group required to indicate their level of aspiration performed better than the other group,  
having controlled for mathematical ability.   
Additionally, individuals adjust their effort to match with the difficulty of the goals 
(Bryan and Locke, 1967). Individuals consider the goal, or the level of aspiration to be a 
“psychologically neutral point of reference” (Heath et al., 1999), and react differently when 
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performance is below and above the goal. Specifically, they tend to increase their level of 
effort and are more motivated to work as their performance approaches their goals, and lower 
their level of effort as their performance moves beyond their goal levels (Heath et al., 1999). 
Hence, for two individuals who have the same performance but different goals, the one 
whose performance has reached his goal (i.e. having a lower goal level) is less likely to work 
one unit harder to achieve better results. However, the other, who has the same performance 
but has yet to reach their goal (i.e. having a higher goal level), is motivated to work harder in 
order to achieve it. 
As a result, if all other factors are equal, individuals with higher goals are more likely 
to outperform those with lower goals. For example, Dey and Kaur (1965) asked participants 
to perform a letter cancellation task, with one group assigned a high output goal and the other 
a low output goal. The first group achieved a higher output than the second. Similarly, Zander 
and Newcomb (1967) tested the effect of goal setting in a field study in communities who 
were trying to fundraise, and found that communities whose goals were higher than their 
performance in the previous year raised more money relative to their previous performance 
than communities whose goals were below their previous performance. Locke (1968) notes, 
however, that even though individuals with difficult goals outperform those with easy goals, 
the former tend to reach their goals less frequently than the latter.  
However, in the case that goals are assigned by someone else, the goals will increase 
performance only when they are accepted by the performers (e.g. Erez and Zidon, 1984). 
Individuals who are assigned difficult goals tend to reject them more often than those 
assigned easy goals (Locke, 1968). However, once the goals are accepted, individuals are 
motivated to try as hard as possible to achieve them. Individuals who abruptly stop working 
towards their goals are often those who believe that the goals are impossible to reach, and 
subsequently abandon them (Locke, 1968).    
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Since goals or aspiration levels play a crucial role in predicting performance, it is 
important to understand how they are formed. Research in this area has been scarce 
(Oettingen et al., 2001; Karoly, 1993) and that which has been conducted has focused mainly 
on individual traits, the discrepancy between current performance and reference points, and 
the attractiveness of the aspiration level as determinants of aspiration level. This thesis 
contributes to the literature by introducing another determinant of the aspiration level, the 
perceived potential to improve, which can be inferred from an individual’s rank.  
2.4 Comparative Performance Prediction 
Comparative performance prediction, or the evaluation of one’s performance relative 
to that of others, plays a crucial role in decision making in competitions. As in most 
competitions, two or more parties compete over the same issue, determining the outcome 
requires predicting not only one’s own performance, but also the performance of competitors. 
These predictions, however, are far from straightforward. Research has consistently shown 
that predictions or evaluations of the self are likely to be different from either predictions or 
evaluations of others by the self (Moore, 2007; Pronin et al., 2002; Epley and Dunning, 2000; 
Krueger, 1998) or predictions or evaluations of the self by others (John and Robins, 1994). 
2.4.1 Egocentric Focus in Comparative Performance Prediction 
One widely-documented finding is that when predicting the outcomes of a  
competition, people tend to be egocentric, focusing solely on themselves (e.g. their own 
capabilities, achievements, and strengths) and ignoring (or at the least paying less attention 
to) their competitors (Radzevick and Moore, 2008; Moore and Kim, 2003; Windschitl et al., 
2003). For example, both Windschitl et al. (2008) and Windschitl et al. (2003) show that 
participants’ perceived likelihood of beating a competitor who undertook an identical task 
depended on their perceived capabilities to do the task rather than their perception of their 
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competitor’s ability in the task. Evidence of excessive focus is found also in a decision to 
enter a competition. Moore et al. (2007) show that in deciding whether or not to enter a 
potential market, potential entrants tended to think mostly about their own strengths and 
weaknesses, and barely mentioned their competitors’ strengths and weaknesses.  
One reason why people are egocentric is that they have more information about 
themselves than others. Differential information makes knowledge about oneself more 
salient, easier to access (Kuiper and Rogers, 1979; Ross and Sicoly, 1979), and more reliable 
(Windschitl et al., 2008). For example, Kruger et al. (2008) asked participants in the 
computer lab to predict the winning probability when someone they were familiar with (e.g. a 
high school acquaintance) competed with someone sitting next to them in the lab (a co-
participant). The authors argued that as individuals have more knowledge about their 
acquaintances than their co-participants, they tend to focus on the strengths and weakness of 
acquaintances more than co-participants, and so based their likelihood judgment on this 
information. As a consequence, the likelihood judgment was a function of the knowledge 
participants have on their acquaintance rather than the knowledge of their co-participant. 
Additionally, Radzevick and Moore (2008) showed that even when individuals predict the 
winning probability of a competition between two teams whom they know equally, they are 
more likely to seek out information regarding their own assigned team than information 
regarding the other team. The eventual result of this is differential information between the 
teams, and a subsequent egocentric focus on their own team. This finding also suggests that 
the egocentric tendency does not necessarily apply only to the excessive focus on the self. 
Individuals also tend to pay too much attention to a focal actor, which can be their own team 
or someone else with whom they are familiar. This more generalised egocentric effect is 
often referred to as myopic focus (Radzevick and Moore, 2008). 
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The egocentric focus can be minimised by acquiring more information about others 
(Moore and Small, 2007). Kruger et al. (2008) demonstrated this by asking participants to 
ascertain the likelihood of victory in a hypothetical war between their fictitious army and 
another army. The result suggested that when participants were given a larger amount of 
information about their competitor army, they tended to focus less on their own army.   
 Since individuals focus excessively on themselves rather than others when predicting 
competition outcomes, they overestimate the competition or their relative standings when 
their own side (e.g. absolute strength) is strong compared to when their own side is weak 
(Kruger et al., 2008; Radzevick and Moore, 2008; Kruger and Burrus, 2004; Moore and Kim, 
2003; Windschitl et al., 2003; Kruger, 1999). Radzevick and Moore (2008) showed that when 
predicting the winning probability between two sport teams who were equally strong (e.g. in 
the major league), people tended to predict that their team had a higher chance of winning 
than when the two teams were equally weak (e.g. in a minor or women’s league). 
The self-focus behaviour also leads people to inappropriately adjust for the effect of 
competition difficulty on the self and others (Windschitl et al., 2008; Moore, 2007; Moore 
and Cain, 2007; Moore and Kim, 2003; Windschitl et al., 2003). Specifically, individuals’ 
assessment regarding their own performance is likely to be more extreme than their 
assessment regarding the performance of others (Moore and Cain, 2007). Seeing the task as 
easy (hard) results in them thinking they are very good (bad) at the task, and in turn leads 
them to seeing others as being less so. Consequently, people predict a higher chance of 
winning when the task is perceived as easy, despite the fact that other competitors can also 
perform relatively well. On the other hand, people predict a lower chance of winning when 
the task is perceived as hard, even though other competitors may also perform relatively 
poorly (Moore and Kim, 2003). This overestimation of winning in a simple task, and 
underestimation of winning in a hard task, influences the decision to enter a market 
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competition (Moore and Cain, 2007; Moore et al., 2007). Moore and Cain (2007) show that 
even though people were able to anticipate many entrants in an easy market, they still decided 
to enter confidently. However, in a difficult market, even though people forecasted there 
would be a low number of entrants, they still decided not to enter. 
In addition to the difficulty of the competition, people also inappropriately adjust 
upon the introduction of shared benefits (e.g. giving extra time in an exam for the entire 
class) and shared adversities (e.g. giving more unrelated work to complete prior to an exam). 
Specifically, they will focus intensively on how much they would gain from the shared 
benefits, or how much they would suffer from shared adversities, focusing less on how these 
benefits or adversities would also affect others (Windschitl et al., 2003). As a result, 
Windschitl et al. (2003) show that participants increased their chance of winning when a 
shared benefit was introduced and reduced their chance of winning when a shared adversity 
was introduced, despite the fact that these shared benefits and shared adversities would affect 
the entire group of participants.   
These prior works have investigated the impact of non-motivational factors, i.e. the 
excessive focus on the self or their own team and the differential information between the self 
and others, on comparative performance prediction in competitions. In fact, when making a 
comparative judgment, motivational factors, particularly self-enhancement, can also play a 
crucial role.  
2.4.2 Self Enhancement Bias in Comparative Judgment 
People in general are self-enhanced, meaning that they are motivated to evaluate 
themselves as favourably as possible (Moore and Small, 2007; Taylor and Brown, 1994, 
1988; Shrauger, 1975). This is perhaps because maintaining a positive image of self is a way 
of protecting, and indeed increasing, self-esteem (Sedikides and Gregg, 2008), an important 
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factor for general well-being (Tesser, 1988). Self-enhancement can be achieved by 
augmenting the positive aspects of self, and by preventing negative information from 
harming the self (Sedikides and Gregg, 2008). Since the unpleasant emotions arising from 
receiving negative feedback are stronger than the pleasant emotions from receiving positive 
feedback, protecting oneself from negative feedback seems to be a more urgent priority than 
elevating positive feedback (Baumeister et al., 2001). As a result, people are more motivated 
to avoid becoming the undesirable self than to try and become the desirable self (Heppen and 
Ogilvie, 2003; Carver et al., 1999). Gramzow et al., (2003) demonstrated that students with 
low GPAs, when asked to report their past GPAs at the beginning of the new semester, 
tended to exaggerate their actual marks more than high-scoring students. The exaggeration 
level, which represented the degree of self-enhancement, was measured by the difference 
between reported GPA and actual GPA. Acknowledgement of low actual GPAs could 
negatively affect students who performed poorly, and therefore these students try to avoid 
this by reporting higher-than-actual GPAs. However, since high-GPA students had already 
experienced a positive effect, the additional utility gained from elevating their actual GPAs 
was less than low-GPA students, making it less necessary for high-GPA students to elevate 
their actual scores. 
Self-enhancement bias can be looked at from two perspectives, namely comparing the 
self-rating and the rating of others by the self, and by comparing the self-rating and the rating  
 
of the self by others (Kwan et al., 2004).  
From the first perspective, self-enhancement bias refers to the differential view of 
individuals on themselves and on others. This method of measuring self enhancement 
emanates from social comparison research (Festinger, 1954), which focuses on individuals’ 
drive to compare with others. Generally speaking, self-enhanced individuals are those who 
view themselves more favourably than they view others (Kwan et al., 2004). 
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Research has consistently shown that across multifarious traits and abilities, people 
evaluate themselves more favourably than they evaluate others (Brown, 1986; Alicke, 1985), 
particularly in those aspects which they consider more desirable and valuable (Messick et al., 
1985). For example, individuals perceive themselves to be fairer than others (Messick et al., 
1985), see their marriage as being better than others’ (Buunk and VanYperen, 1991), consider 
themselves more skilled at driving a car (Svenson, 1981), and are less susceptible to biases 
(Pronin et al., 2002). The tendency to positively view oneself as superior than others is also 
manifested when individuals predict the likelihood of experiencing desirable and undesirable 
events. For instance, people believe they are less vulnerable to victimisation (Perloff and 
Fetzer, 1986) and health problems (Weinstein, 1982) than others, but are more likely than 
others to love their postgraduate job and to live beyond 80 (Weinstein, 1980).  
There are two possibilities that can explain the self-superior view. First, individuals 
hold an accurate view of self but a negative view of others. Second, individuals hold a 
positive view of self but an accurate view of others. Epley and Dunning (2000) have 
suggested that it is actually the second possibility that leads to self-superior views, since the 
rating of others tends to be more accurate than the rating of self. In one of their studies, one 
group of participants was asked how much of the money earned from participating in the 
study they were willing to hypothetically donate to charity, and how much they thought their 
peers would donate. The other group was asked how much they would actually donate. The 
results showed that the prediction of peer donation was much closer to the actual donation 
than the prediction of self-donation, suggesting that assessments on peers were more accurate 
than assessment on self. 
From the second perspective, self-enhancement is measured by comparing the 
evaluation of self and the evaluation on self by others. Kwan et al. (2004) suggest that this 
way of measuring self-enhancement came from Allport (1937) and his concept of self-
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insight, defined as “the relation between what a man thinks he is to what others (especially 
the psychologist) think he is” (p. 221). According to this view, self-enhanced individuals are 
ones who perceive themselves more favourably than others perceive them. Subsequent 
research has provided evidence that people were also self-enhanced according to this view 
(e.g. John and Robins, 1994). For example, John and Robins (1994) asked participants to 
perform a group interaction task, getting them to evaluate their own performance as well as 
that of their peers. The participants’ performances were also evaluated by the trained 
psychologist observers. Self-evaluation, peer-evaluation, and evaluation by the observers 
were then compared. The results suggested that individuals tended to evaluate their own 
performance slightly better than they were evaluated by their peers and the observers.   
Even though the previous literature has investigated how self enhancement influences 
comparative judgment, the role of self enhancement in predicting competition outcomes has 
yet to be explored. Competitions, particularly those involving ranking feedback, normally 
foster the role of social comparison, which in turn provides the opportunity to self-enhance. 
Hence, it is likely that the prediction of competition outcome (i.e. the likelihood of winning) 
will be influenced by self-enhancement. As self-prediction of competition outcomes can 
subsequently affect confidence and influence the decision as to whether to enter a 
competition e.g. whether or not to enter a potential market (Moore, 2007; Moore and Cain, 
2007), the understanding of how self-enhancement affects this prediction could help 
individuals make a less biased decision. This thesis contributes to this understanding by 
examining how people in different ranks can be self-enhanced, and how this affects the 
prediction of winning probability.   
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2.5 Pay Entitlement 
Entitlement refers to an individual’s expectation or belief that they are owed a benefit, 
reward, payment or privilege (Major, 1993; Lerner, 1987). An individual may feel entitled to 
certain things because of their identity, qualifications or achievements (Lerner, 1987), and 
this feeling of entitlement influences their evaluation as to whether their outcomes are fair or 
just (Campbell et al., 2004).  
 Although entitlement is generally considered the result of individuals’ beliefs or 
expectations, the what of expectation varies across areas (Naumann et al., 2002). From a legal 
perspective, entitlement is viewed as an individual’s legal and economic right (e.g. da Silva 
Cornell, 1994): the law, rather than the individual, is the antecedent of entitlement. Where 
there is a dispute, it is generally resolved via the legal system (Naumann et al., 2002). Marxist 
theories hold that people are entitled to what they need, rather than what they achieve 
(Naumann et al., 2002). For instance, an individual with two children should earn more than a 
single person without dependents because the parent needs to support his or her family. 
Marketing research views entitlement as a customer expectation regarding the services and 
products firms should provide (Boyd III and Helms, 2005). Management literature, and 
equity theory (Adams, 1963) in particular, views entitlement as the earnings (e.g. salary or 
rewards) resulting from an individual’s input or contribution. Specifically, income 
entitlement is perceived as the pay that individuals expect to receive as compensation  
 
for their work (Moore, 1991). This view of entitlement is the focus of this research.  
2.5.1 Determinants of Income Entitlement 
An individual’s sense of income entitlement hinges critically on comparison processes 
(e.g. Major, 1994). Researchers have identified two major comparison approaches that 
individuals use to determine pay entitlement. First, it is suggested that individuals use their 
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past income as a basis to evaluate their current pay (Major, 1989; Pritchard, 1969). Secondly, 
individuals use the income of others to judge the fairness of their pay (Pelham and Hetts, 
2001; Bylsma and Major, 1992; Major and Forcey, 1985). 
The self-comparison approach maintains that individuals use their past income or 
expectation of their future income to evaluate their current income and shape their sense of 
entitlement (Moore, 1991; Major, 1989). For example, despite similar educational 
backgrounds and experiences, women typically earn less than men (Levitan et al., 1971), 
meaning that their self-comparison standard is lower. As a result, women feel less entitled to 
the same pay as men (Major, 1994). However, Major (1994) argues that individuals use this 
approach only when the information regarding others’ income is unavailable or not salient, or 
when comparison targets are too dissimilar. In other words, individuals preferred to compare 
with others rather than compare with their past income. Evidently, Austin et al. (1980) found 
that when providing individuals with information regarding their past income and that of 
others, individuals focus on the incomes of others more when rating their satisfaction and 
considering the fairness of their pay. 
The social comparison approach argues that individuals compare and evaluate their 
salary against the salaries of others in order to judge the fairness of their pay (Major and 
Forcey, 1985; Adams, 1963; Festinger, 1954). Individuals, however, tend to have a specific 
pattern as to how they choose their social comparison target, i.e. they tend to compare their 
earnings with people who are similar to them, or else who are in a similar situation (Major, 
1989; Major and Testa, 1989). Women and men, for example, tend to have different 
comparison groups (Major and Forcey, 1985). When given a choice, both sexes chose to 
compare their incomes with the average income of the same sex as opposed to that of the 
opposite sex or indeed the combined average income of both sexes (Major and Forcey, 1985). 
Zanna et al. (1975) argue that this comparison behaviour may be the result of the availability 
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and salience of information, and may also stem from the similarity of the characteristics of 
colleagues of the same sex. This, in turn, creates gender-specific standards with women’s pay 
expectations based on women’s standards and men’s on men’s standards. As women 
typically earn less than men, despite similar educational backgrounds and experiences 
(Levitan et al., 1971), women’s tendency towards same-gender comparison will result in 
lower pay entitlement (Major and Testa, 1989). 
However, the effect of gender alone cannot influence pay entitlement. Specifically, 
the influence of gender on pay entitlement disappears when individuals are only informed 
about the incomes of others and when information regarding the specific comparison group is 
not made available (e.g. Major et al., 1984). Bylsma and Major (1992) show that when 
providing individuals with information regarding the pay of others and their performance 
feedback, the individuals’ sense of pay entitlement was influenced by this information rather 
than the gender. More precisely, individuals with higher performance and individuals who 
learn that others receive relatively high pay tend to request higher pay for themselves, 
regardless of their genders. 
The tendency for individuals to compare their salary with their own historic salaries 
or with the salaries of those who have similar qualifications or who are in a similar role also 
leads to different comparison standards for high- and low-status groups. This, in turn, leads to 
differences in entitlement levels (O’Brien and Major, 2009; Hogue and Yoder, 2003). When 
income is evaluated by comparing it with past earnings or the current income of others in a 
similar role, low-status individuals tend to be satisfied with their pay even if it is considerably 
less than high-status individuals. Thus, low-status individuals have lower entitlement levels 
and believe that their outcomes are justified.  
However, in order to identify a person of a similar status who can act as a standard for 
comparison, individuals first need to know their own rank or position within society. Cook 
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(1975) argues that if such information is not available, individuals will not perceive the 
distribution of outcomes as unfair. Rather, they tend to believe that the outcomes they receive 
align with their rank or position.  
Additionally, it is suggested that social comparison information will affect the 
feelings of entitlement only when individuals believe the distribution of outcome is legitimate 
(Bylsma et al., 1995; Major, 1994). In other words, to infer that one should receive the same 
outcomes as others, it is necessary to believe that both current outcomes and the outcomes of 
the comparison standard are justified (Bylsma et al., 1995). Hence, unlike the concepts of 
want or expectation, which are influenced by comparisons regardless of legitimacy, beliefs 
about entitlement depend considerably on whether or not the outcomes are fair or just (Major, 
1994).  
Deciding whether something is legitimate can be determined in several ways, 
including whether or not an individual believes that the observed outcome distributions 
follow the norm of distributive justice such as equality, power, or need (e.g. Sampson, 1975); 
how much others contribute to their own outcomes (Gurin, 1985); and how much an 
individual’s input and attributes are translated into outcomes (Major, 1994). 
The process of deriving entitlement can be summarised by Moore’s (1991) theoretical 
model of entitlement. In this model, an individual receives an outcome, and then compares 
their outcomes with their own expectations (i.e. their past outcomes) and with the outcomes 
of others (Adams, 1963). If there is no difference between their outcome and the outcomes of 
others, then entitlement in this scenario hinges mainly on expectations (Cook, 1975). If there 
is a difference, the individual will attempt to determine whether or not it stems from a 
dissimilarity between themselves and others, and whether this dissimilarity is legitimate in 
the current situation. For example, if the dissimilarity is one of qualifications, it is generally 
accepted that the less qualified person should receive a lower outcome. No response is made 
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to legitimate differences. However, in a case where the outcome difference cannot be 
justified, feelings of anger and resentment may arise (Crosby, 1976). Individuals will then use 
a specific distribution principle in order to estimate or reallocate the appropriate amount of 
outcomes that they perceive as justified.  
Although other factors that influence income entitlement are not the focus of this 
research, it is worth noting that entitlement is also influenced by other factors, including the 
perceived value of inputs and outcomes (Adams, 1963), the economic ideals of a society (O’ 
Brien and Major, 2009), and a company’s recruitment process and performance appraisal 
(Fisk, 2010). 
2.5.2 The Effects of Entitlement 
Feelings of entitlement have been found to influence the way individuals evaluate 
outcomes and their attitude and behaviour concerning perceived differences in outcomes. 
Individuals with higher entitlement levels are more likely than those with lower entitlement 
levels to fall short of their expectations (Naumann et al., 2002), and are thus more likely to 
display dissatisfaction. For example, a higher entitlement level has been found to be 
associated with lower job satisfaction (King et al., 1993), lower pay satisfaction (Sweeney et 
al., 1990), higher absence rates (Huseman et al., 1987), and counterproductive behaviour at 
work (Fisk, 2010).  
Entitlement can also provoke feelings of resentment and deprivation (Major, 1989). 
Relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1976) considers entitlement to be one of the strongest 
causes of feelings of deprivation. If an individual’s sense of entitlement is violated, feelings 
of injustice and deprivation arise (Mikula, 1993). For example, executives who have been 
laid off and re-employed in a lower position at a lower level of pay often feel that they are 
entitled to a better post with higher earnings (Feldman et al., 2002). As a result, they are 
57 
 
likely to feel deprived, which subsequently leads to a negative attitude regarding their current 
work. 
Entitlement also increases the willingness to help others (Lerner, 1987). In a study 
conducted by Miller (1977), one group of participants was offered a temporary job on the 
condition that were it accepted, they would be paid $2 and an underprivileged family would 
receive $1. The second group of participants were told they would be paid $3. The results 
suggested that participants in the first group felt more incentive to work than those in the 
second group. However, the donation to the underprivileged family motivated individuals to 
work only when individuals felt the amount of pay they received was fair for their work. 
Once it fell below what they considered appropriate (i.e. they and the family each received 
$1), the incentive to help others was not sufficient to maintain the same level of commitment 
as those in the first group. In other words, if feelings of entitlement are not threatened, 
individuals are more willing to work to help the family than to keep all the pay for 
themselves. 
Perceptions of entitlement and social comparison also influence the amount of effort 
that workers put into their jobs. Cohn et al. (2012) discuss a situation where two workers, 
paid the same wage, worked as a pair but performed an identical task individually. They 
showed that when both had their wages cut, both of their performances were affected 
negatively. However, when only one worker had their wage reduced, that worker’s 
performance decreased by half, a considerably greater drop than when the group’s wage was 
cut, whereas the performance of the other worker remained at roughly the same level. Cohn 
et al. (2012) argue that the worker whose wage was cut was influenced by social comparison, 
which in turn influenced the effort they put into their work.   
A violation of feelings of entitlement can result in negative effects on employees, 
such as a poor attitude to work, job satisfaction and work effort. All of these factors go 
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against an organisation’s interest, as noted above. In order to minimise these negative 
consequences, it is necessary for organisations to understand how their employees’ 
entitlement develops.  
To date, the attempt to identify the antecedents of pay entitlement has been limited. 
Past research has mainly focused on gender differences, rather than performance feedback, as 
a determinant of pay entitlement (e.g. Pelham and Hetts, 2001; Major and Forcey, 1985). One 
exception is the work of Bylsma and Major (1992), who showed that pay entitlement was a 
function of performance feedback and social comparison. Specifically, individuals’ higher 
performance and the higher pay of comparative persons lead to higher pay entitlement. 
However, in their paper, information to help participants determine whether or not the pay of 
others is justified (e.g. the performance of the comparative persons) was omitted. As such, 
participants were likely to assume that the pay of others was justified, and demand their pay 
based on what others earned. The effect of others’ pay may have disappeared had participants 
learned about the performance of the person being compared. This is because the pay of such 
a person does not necessarily activate individuals’ sense of entitlement if they believe the pay 
is not justified (i.e. if the person being compared performs poorly performed but is highly 
paid). This research aims to fill this gap in literature by investigating how ranking feedback 
interacts with feelings of entitlement, as well as social comparison information, while 
controlling for the performance of the comparison person, all of which determine the pay 
request of an employee. 
2.6 Prospect Theory and the Framing Effect 
 Prospect theory suggests that individuals’ decision-making is influenced by its context 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In contrast to expected utility theory, one of the cornerstones 
of neoclassical economics, which posits that individuals choose the option that gives the 
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highest expected outcome regardless of the context, prospect theory proposes that individuals 
consider the situational context when making a decision. According to this theory, the initial 
process of decision-making is to restructure a problem and then simplify it. Each possible 
outcome of the problem is determined relative to a reference point, such as past outcomes, 
and is categorised as either a gain or a loss. This process is referred to as the editing stage. 
Subsequently, individuals enter the evaluation stage, where they determine the value of each 
outcome based on its prospect and chose the outcome that provides them with the highest 
value possible (Puto, 1987). 
More specifically, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed that prospect theory had 
four properties. First, an outcome is evaluated relative to a reference point. Individuals 
perceive any outcome higher than the reference point as a gain and any below the reference 
point as a loss. Since people tend to rely on their past experience to evaluate outcomes, the 
most influential reference point is perhaps the status quo (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). For 
example, the perception about one’s exam score is likely to be influenced by one’s past score. 
If the new score is higher (lower) than the past score, it will be viewed as a gain (loss). The 
second feature of prospect theory is loss aversion. Prospect theory posits that individuals 
perceive a loss to be more disturbing than an equivalent gain is pleasing; as such, a loss of 
£100 generates more dissatisfaction than the satisfaction gained by a win of £100. The third 
property is diminishing sensitivity. As the size of a gain or a loss becomes larger, its marginal 
value decreases. As a result, the value function of a decision maker exhibits a concavity when 
a gain is made while a loss reveals convexity. For example, the increase of £10 from £1000 is 
perceived to be lower than the same increase of £10 from £50. This “gain concavity” and 
“loss convexity” suggests that people tend to be risk averse when dealing with positive 
outcomes and risk-seeking when dealing with negative outcomes. For instance, people would 
choose a certain payoff of £100 over an alternative payoff of £200 with a 50% chance of 
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success. However, they would generally prefer a 50% chance of losing £200 to the alternative 
of a definite loss of £100. The fourth property is probability weighting. Prospect theory 
suggests that individuals use subjective, rather than objective, probabilities to calculate the 
utility of an outcome. They do so by transforming objective probabilities into subjective 
probabilities. Low probabilities are overweighted and high probabilities are underweighted, 
relative to objective probabilities.   
Prospect theory is often used to explain the framing effect (see Kuhberger (1998) for a 
review). The framing effect is a situation in which individuals have different preferences for 
choices that are the essentially the same but described differently. Consider, for example, the 
Asian disease problem (Tversky and Kahnema, 1981). People were informed about an Asian 
disease predicted to kill 600 people. The first group of individuals (the gain-frame condition) 
was asked to choose whether to adopt programme A, which would save 200 people, or 
programme B, which had a one-third probability of saving all 600 people, and a two-thirds 
probability of saving nobody. The second group of individuals (the loss-frame condition) was 
also told about the Asian disease, but was asked to choose whether to adopt programme C, 
which would let 400 people die, or programme D, which had a one-third probability that no 
one would die, and a two-thirds probability that everyone would die. In fact, the choices of 
these two conditions are identical, except that they are described differently: for A and C, it is 
guaranteed that 200 would be saved and 400 would die; for B and D, there is a one-third 
chance that everyone will survive, and a two-thirds chance that nobody will. Despite the 
identical outcomes of programme A and C, 72% of individuals in the first group chose 
programme A, but only 22% of individuals in the second group chose programme C. This 
finding can be explained by prospect theory, which suggests that individuals, manipulated by 
framing, evaluate an outcome as a gain or a loss relative to their reference point. Individuals 
in the gain-frame condition are risk-averse, and therefore perceive saving 200 lives as being 
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more attractive than the risky option with the equal expected value. On the contrary, 
individuals in the loss-frame condition are risk-seeking, and perceive the risky option to be 
more attractive. 
2.6.1 Types of Framing Effects 
 According Levin et al. (1998), there are three main types of framing effects. The first 
is risky choice framing, such as in the aforementioned Asian disease problem. This type of 
framing involves making a choice between a risk-free and a risky option with an equivalent 
expected value. The two options are described both in terms of gains (positive frames) or 
losses (negative frames). Positively-framed individuals tend to choose a risk-free option, 
whereas negatively-framed individuals tend to choose a risky option (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981). 
The second, and perhaps simplest, type of framing is attribute framing. For this type 
of framing, only one attribute in a particular context is manipulated. A plan, for example, can 
be described as having an 80% chance of success or 20% chance of failure. In attribute 
framing as opposed to risky choice framing, rather than asking individuals to choose between 
the risk-free and risky options, individuals are asked to evaluate a positive-labelling option or 
a negative-labelling option by, for example, rating their satisfaction. For instance, individuals 
might be asked to rate the quality (high or low) of ground beef which was labelled as 75% 
lean (positive frame) or 25% fat (negative frame) (Levin and Gaeth, 1988). In most cases of 
attribute framing, individuals tend to rate the positive frame alternative more favourably than 
the negative frame alternative (Levin et al., 1998). These findings, however, cannot be 
explained by prospect theory because the theory focuses mainly on the preference changes of 
options involving risk being framed differently, rather than changes in the evaluation of 
objects or attributes (Levin et al., 1998). Levin and Gaeth (1988) argue that the findings can 
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be explained by the difference in information encoding. Positive (negative) description of 
attributes leads individuals to encode information in a way that triggers favourable 
(unfavourable) associations in memory, resulting in a more favourable evaluation of a 
positive frame attribute than a negative frame attribute. This difference in information 
encoding may also direct individuals’ attention to positive or negative aspects of attributes, 
which in turn influence their evaluations (Levin et al., 1985). 
The third type is goal framing. For this type of framing, the descriptive information of 
the situation or goal is manipulated. Even though the ultimate goal is the same, a positively- 
framed goal directs one’s attention to its positive consequences or benefits of pursuing this 
goal, whereas a negatively-framed goal draws one’s attention to the negative consequences of 
not pursuing this goal. Goal framing is often used to evaluate whether a positive or negative 
frame is more effective in persuading individuals to act or not to act. For instance, the 
sentence “Research shows that women who do ‘Breast Self-Exam’ have an increased chance 
of finding a tumor in the early, more treatable stage of the disease” (Meyerowitz and 
Chaiken, 1987, p. 504) focuses on the positive consequence of taking an action. However, the 
sentence “Research shows that women who do not do ‘Breast Self-Exam’ have a decreased 
chance of finding a tumor in the early, more treatable stage of the disease” (Meyerowitz and 
Chaiken, 1987, p. 504) draws readers’ attention to the negative consequence of not taking 
action. It is suggested that the negatively-framed information was more powerful in 
persuading individuals to do a breast self-exam than the positively framed information 
(Meyerowitz and Chaiken, 1987). This effect can be explained by loss aversion: individuals 
perceive a loss as larger than the same amount of gain (Levin et al., 1998). Thus, information 
focusing on negative consequences of not taking an action has a higher impact on judgment 
than information stressing the positive consequences of taking an action.  
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2.6.2 Prospect Theory, the Framing Effect, and Social Decision Making 
One important field of research that is influenced by the effects of framing is social 
decision-making. Social decision-making refers to situations where individuals’ decisions not 
only affect their own outcomes but also the outcomes of at least one other person (Pruitt and 
Kimmel, 1977). The outcome can either depend solely on the decision of the individual (e.g. 
Poppe and Valkenberg, 2003) or on the decision of both parties (e.g. Neale and Bazerman, 
1985). If it is only the individual making a decision, they will typically be confronted with the 
dilemma as to whether to choose a lower but higher-than-other outcome or a higher but 
lower-than-other outcome. For instance, one may need to decide whether to cooperate with 
another person and receive a personal payoff of £30 and £40 for others, or not to cooperate 
and receive a personal payoff of £20 and £10 for others. In a situation where the outcome also 
depends on another’s decision, as in a negotiation, the individual is conflicted between 
choosing a risky option and a compromise option. While a better outcome may be obtained in 
the former, there is a chance that the offer will be rejected and they end up with nothing; for 
the latter, the outcome is typically lower, but the probability of ending up with nothing is 
lower as well. This type of situation is referred to as a social interdependent situation. 
In these situations, individuals develop their frames by comparing prospective 
outcomes with a reference outcome. For positive-frame situations, prospective outcomes are 
higher than a reference outcome, and therefore are perceived as gains. Individuals view a 
compromise or a concession, if any, as a decrease in their gains. On the other hand, for 
negative-frame situations, prospective outcomes are lower than a reference outcome, and are 
perceived as losses, leading individuals to perceive the compromise or the concession as an 
increase in their losses (Kahneman, 1992; Bazerman, 1983). 
The way that choices or situations are framed influences social decisions. For 
example, in a situation where the outcome is affected by the decisions of both parties, loss-
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frame individuals tend to become more argumentative, and are less likely to reach an 
agreement (Neale and Bazerman, 1985; Bazerman et al., 1983). Neale and Bazerman (1985) 
demonstrated that individuals negotiating profits (gain frame) perceived negotiation as an 
opportunity for profit maximisation and were less averse to making a concession. In contrast, 
even though the final outcomes were identical, individuals negotiating expenses (loss frame) 
viewed negotiation as an opportunity for expense minimisation, and tended to have higher 
demands for their shares, and an impasse was more likely to be reached (Bazerman et al., 
1983). Consequently, when negatively-framed individuals were paired with positively-framed 
individuals, and were asked to divide a certain amount of money between themselves and the 
other persons, negatively-framed individuals tended to obtained higher shares than their 
positively-framed partners (Bottom and Studt, 1993). 
McCusker and Carnevale (1995) also demonstrated the effect of framing on resource 
sharing. When individuals were asked to indicate how much of their private resources they 
would like to give to the public (loss frame), the indicated amount was less than when they 
were asked how much they would like to take from the public (gain frame). This effect was 
pronounced despite the fact that the give and take frames would have resulted in the same net 
outcome had individuals indicated the same amount.  
Gain- and loss-frame individuals are also different in their tendency to be influenced 
by the frames of others. Gain-frame individuals are found to be more sensitive to other 
people’s outcomes than loss-frame individuals (e.g. de Dreu, 1996; de Dreu et al., 1994a, 
1992a, 1992b). For example, de Dreu et al. (1992a) demonstrated that gain-frame individuals 
are more cooperative when others are in a loss frame than when they are in a gain frame. This 
is perhaps because gain-frame individuals want to decrease the frame asymmetry, or because 
it might be in their nature to be caring and helpful when others are in trouble. However, since 
loss-frame individuals are more own-outcome oriented than gain-frame individuals, they are 
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less likely to be influenced by the frame of others (de Dreu et al., 1992a). Therefore, 
cooperative behaviour is observed less often when individuals are in the loss frame.  
In addition, de Dreu et al. (1992b) argue that unlike a frame of loss-frame individual, 
a frame of gain-frame individual tends to be influenced by the frame which is communicated 
by the other person. Specifically, when the other person communicates his/her gain frame, the 
individual’s gain frame is reinforced. In addition, when the loss frame of the other person is 
communicated, the individual changes their gain frame into a loss frame. By changing the 
gain frame into a loss frame, the individual becomes less cooperative and more concerned 
about their own outcomes. As a result, an individual who was initially gain-framed demands 
less and concedes more when the other person communicates a gain frame rather than a loss 
frame (de Dreu et al., 1992b). However, for the loss-frame individual, the communication of 
the other person’ loss or gain frame does not influence the individual’s frame. Hence, loss-
frame individuals tend not to reach a concession, regardless of the frames of others. 
Additionally, gain-frame individuals are more concerned about outcome differences 
(de Dreu, 1996; de Dreu et al., 1994b). de Dreu et al. (1994b) demonstrate that gain-frame 
individuals tend to prefer having similar outcomes to others rather than better outcomes than 
others when they expect to cooperate with them in the future. However, if they do not expect 
future cooperation, having similar outcomes is as attractive as having better outcomes. Loss-
frame individuals, however, are less concerned about outcome differences. They tend to be 
more individualistic, meaning they choose options that maximise their own outcome, 
regardless of the outcomes of others (Poppe and Valkenberg, 2003). In sum, the findings 
from past literature suggest that loss-frame individuals tend to be more own-outcome 
oriented, less cooperative, concede less, and demand more than gain-frame individuals.  
Various mechanisms contribute to the behavioural differences of gain- and loss-frame 
individuals when making social decisions. First, Peeters and Czapinski (1990) argue that 
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individuals with a negative (loss) frame pay more attention to the stimuli (such as loss 
outcomes), and engage in more cognitive activities than individuals with a positive (gain) 
frame. As a result, loss frame individuals, compared to gain frame individuals, are more 
likely to focus on their own outcomes rather than on the outcomes of the other person (de 
Dreu et al., 1994b). Second, since individuals are more averse to a loss than they are attracted 
to an equivalent gain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984), the motivation to prevent a loss is 
stronger than the motivation to acquire the same size of gain (de Dreu et al., 1994b). As a 
result, in a negotiation when a situation is framed as a settlement of expenses, individuals are 
less likely to make a concession than when a situation is framed as a settlement of profits, 
because they are more motivated to protect their loss (Carnevale, 2008). Third, since 
individuals are risk-averse in a gain frame, they tend to prefer a sure outcome associated with 
a compromise option rather than a risky but better outcome, associated with a non-
compromise option. As such, they are generally more willing to compromise rather than 
risking non-agreement (Bazerman et al., 1983). Loss-frame individuals, on the other hand, 
are more tolerant to risk taking, and thus have a lower tendency to cooperate or make a 
concession (Carnevale, 2008). 
Even though the literature has shown that individuals with different frames make 
different social decisions, this thesis argues that their decisions also depend on their rank 
position. Specifically, this thesis shows how individuals from different ranks and in different 
situational contexts (loss vs gain) or situational frames (negative vs positive) make different 
social decisions. The social decision in this thesis is studied in the context of cooperation. 
More precisely, individuals were asked to decide whether or not to cooperate with their rivals 
in similar ranks. The cooperation decision affects both their own and their rivals’ outcomes. 
If individuals decide to cooperate, their outcomes will increase more than when they decide 
not to cooperate, but less than the outcomes of their rivals. However, if they decide not to 
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cooperate, their outcomes will increase by the same amount as their rivals. By examining 
when and why individuals decide to cooperate, this thesis aims to provide a better 
understanding of the interaction of rankings and frames on cooperation behaviours.  
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Chapter 3  
3 The Effect of Rankings on Aspiration Level 
 
3.1 Hypotheses 
Performance feedback is one of the main factors that individuals use to help them set 
their aspiration level. However, as individuals’ judgments are relative, and often influenced 
by social comparison (Festinger, 1954), others’ performance can also have an effect on an 
aspiration level. For example, previous research has demonstrated that individuals whose 
performance is above average are likely to set lower aspiration levels than those whose 
performance is below average (Festinger, 1942; Gould and Lewis, 1940). Similarly, rankings 
which show comparative performance relative to a whole group are likely to influence 
aspiration levels. Specifically, ranking feedback can help individuals see the potential to 
improve or worsen their performance through a comparison with, respectively, the top or 
bottom. Nevertheless, as feedback is usually a tool for performance improvement (Quaglia 
and Cobb, 1996), individuals possessing ranking feedback are likely to focus more on how 
much their performance can be improved rather than weakened. Evidently, Wheeler et al. 
(1969) demonstrated that when given choices, individuals seek to acquire information 
regarding the performance of the top person, rather than the performance of those who 
occupy similar rankings or those in low-ranking positions. This finding suggests that 
individuals are likely to compare themselves with the top-ranked person instead of the 
bottom-ranked. As the performance of the top-ranked person indicates the best performance 
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that can possibly be achieved, the distance between one’s own rank and the top rank relative 
to the group conveys one’s potential to improve. More precisely, as one gets closer to the top, 
it is less likely that they can perceive significant potential to improve. Consequently, I predict 
the following:  
H1: High-ranking individuals will perceive lower potential to improve compared to low-
ranking individuals.  
The room for improvement then serves as a basis in setting an aspiration level: 
individuals are likely to set an aspiration level that they think is possible to achieve 
(Campbell, 1982). This suggests that if individuals believe their performance will worsen, 
they are likely to set the aspiration level lower than their current performance, leading to a 
negative discrepancy between aspiration level and performance. On the other hand, if they 
perceive the potential to improve their performance, they are likely to set the aspiration level 
higher than current performance, resulting in a positive discrepancy. The absolute level of 
discrepancy, however, depends on how much individuals believe their performance can 
diminish or improve. For example, if individuals think that they have a relatively high 
potential to improve, the discrepancy is likely to be positive and high. Given that high-
ranking individuals perceive a lower potential for performance improvement than low-
ranking individuals (Hypothesis 1), I predict the following: 
H2: The discrepancy between the aspiration level and current performance of high-ranking 
individuals will be lower than that of low-ranking individuals. 
Without information about others’ performance, individuals will rely on their own 
performance in order to set aspiration levels. Since individuals in general are motivated to 
perform better, their aspiration levels tend to be slightly above their current performance 
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(Campion and Lord, 1982; Simon et al., 1954; Hertzman and Festigner, 1940). Hence, the 
discrepancy between their aspiration level and performance is likely to be positive but 
relatively low, similar to high-ranking individuals. Given that the discrepancy of high-
ranking individuals is lower than that of low-ranking individuals (Hypothesis 2), I predict the 
following: 
H3: The discrepancy between the aspiration level and current performance of individuals 
with no ranking information will be similar to that of high-ranking individuals, but lower than 
that of low-ranking individuals. 
The relationship between ranks and aspiration levels is likely to be moderated by self-
efficacy. Self-efficacy refers to the perception of “how well one can execute courses of action 
required to deal with prospective situations” (Bandura, 1982, p.122). Individuals with high 
self-efficacy levels tend to believe in their ability to succeed. As a result, whenever they see 
room for improvement, they will probably consider themselves able to improve the 
performance and set their aspiration level accordingly. On the contrary, low self-efficacy 
individuals tend not to believe in themselves or their own potential. Even though they see the 
significant potential of improvement (being at a low rank), they are unlikely to believe in 
their ability to achieve it. Consequently, they are likely to set low aspiration levels as when 
they see low potential to improve (i.e., being at high ranks). Taken together, I predict the 
following: 
H4: Self-efficacy will moderate the effect of rankings on aspiration levels such that high self-
efficacy individuals will set higher aspiration levels when their ranks are high as opposed to 
when their ranks are low, holding constant the performance in both situations. However, low 
self-efficacy individuals will set relatively low aspiration levels regardless of rank. 
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The Present Studies 
The four hypotheses were tested across four studies. Study 1 explored the relationship 
between rankings and aspiration levels using a numerical search task competition wherein 
participants were required to find two numbers in a matrix and complete as many matrices as 
possible in a timed period. However, since there was the possibility that the findings in Study 
1 could be influenced by a ceiling effect from the number of matrices given to participants, 
Study 2 addressed this shortcoming and also included a control condition where no ranking 
information was provided. Study 3 showed that information about the number of competitors 
is a necessary condition for rankings to influence aspiration levels. Finally, Study 4 showed 
how self-efficacy moderates the effect of rankings on aspiration levels.  
3.2 Study 1 
Participants 
A total of 120 students from two MBA classes at Chulalongkorn University in 
Bangkok participated in the study. Participants were approached twice after their classes. 
Design and Procedure 
The study consisted of two parts. In the first part, participants were asked to perform 
the matrix task, requiring them to find two numbers in a matrix that added up to 10. They 
were asked to first insert their student IDs on the cover page. Each participant was given 30 
matrices and asked to sequentially solve as many of them as possible in five minutes. They 
were also told that they would be informed about their scores and rank at the end of the next 
class. Participants received 50 Baht (equivalent to around one British pound) for 
participating, and an additional five Baht for each matrix solved correctly. The exact scenario 
was as described below. 
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This study consists of two parts. The first part will start shortly. The second part will start 
in the next class. 
In the first part, you will be competing with your classmates in a numerical search task. 
You will be given a set of 30 matrices (2 matrices per page). Each matrix contains 12 
numbers similar to the one shown below. For each matrix, your task is to find two 
numbers in that matrix that add up to 10. For example, the correct answers for the matrix 
below are 3.58 and 6.42. You can answer by drawing a circle around the correct numbers. 
 
9.38 6.74 8.17 
5.15 6.61 3.06 
9.71 0.91 4.88 
3.58 4.87 6.42 
 
Please sequentially solve each matrix, and do not move on to the next matrix until you 
have answered the current one. Your score will be measured based on the number of 
matrixes that are correctly solved in 5 minutes. Your score will then be compared and 
ranked with the scores of your classmates. You will learn your score and your rank in the 
second part of the study. 
You will earn 50 baht for participating in this study and 5 baht for each matrix you 
correctly solve. You payment will be made after you finish both parts of the study.  
In the second part of the study, your rank and score will be revealed and you will need to 
answer questions regarding your performance. The second part of the study will start at 
the end of the next class. If you have any questions, please raise your hand now. 
 
The matrix sheet was collected after five minutes. The experimenter checked the 
answers of each participant, and gave one mark to each matrix solved correctly.  After this, 
the experimenter ranked participants based on their scores. The first rank was assigned to the 
top performer. Participants with the same score were randomly assigned rank. For example, 
four participants who solved nine matrices were randomly assigned ranks from tenth to 
thirteenth. 
73 
 
In the second part of the study, participants were told about their score, their rank, and 
the number of participants. Specifically, they were informed, “You have correctly solved … 
matrices. There were a total of 60 students participated in this competition. Your rank is … 
(Rank #1 represents the best performer)”. 
They were then told that they were about to enter the same competition again. 
However, before the next competition started, they needed to answer a number of questions. 
Specifically, they were informed, “In the second part, your task is again to correctly solve as 
many matrices as you can in 5 minutes. Before the competition starts, please answer the 
questions below”. To measure the aspiration level, participants were asked, “How many 
matrices do you expect to solve in the next competition?” (minimum=0, maximum=30). To 
minimise the effect from the number of matrices given to participants they were also asked, 
“Please predict whether in the next competition, your performance will improve or worsen by 
how much percent?” (Participants chose whether or not their performance will improve (+ 
sign) or worsen (- sign), and then decided by how much percent). To measure the perceived 
potential to improve, participants were asked, “Please predict the maximum number of 
matrices you think you can solve correctly” (minimum=0, maximum=30), and “How many 
matrices do they think the most skilled person can solve correctly in five minutes?” 
(minimum=0, maximum=30). Finally, participants were asked, “To what extent do you think 
the score reflects your ability in the task?” (1=not at all, 9=very much). After the 
questionnaire had been completed by all the participants, they were given another set of 30 
matrices and were asked to sequentially solve as many matrices as possible in five minutes. 
Results 
Since there were 60 students in this study in each class, the top twenty performers 
were categorised as “high-ranking”, the bottom twenty as “low-ranking”, and the rest as 
“intermediate-ranking”. Eight students did not participate in the second part of the study. As 
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such, there was a total of 112 valid responses. The extent to which participants believed the 
score reflected their ability in the task was included as a covariate in all analyses. 
In both competitions, high-ranking participants performed significantly better than 
intermediate-ranking participants, who also performed better than low-ranked participants 
(First competition: F(2, 109)=197.869, p=0.000, 2=0.784; linear trend: F(1, 109)=393.102, 
p=0.000, 2=0.783; Second competition: F(2, 109)=9.670, p=0.000, 2=0.151; linear trend: 
F(1, 109)=17.415, p=0.000, 2=0.138). The Shapiro-Wilk test of normality was not 
significant in both competition (First competition: df=112, p=0.252; Second competition: 
df=112, p=0.298), suggesting that the performance scores of the two competitions were 
normally distributed.  
As predicted, the discrepancy between the number of matrices participants expected 
to solve in the next competition and their actual scores in the first competition decreased with 
rank, such that the discrepancy of high-ranking participants was lower than that of low-
ranking participants (F(2, 107)=4.032, p=0.021, 2=0.070; linear trend: F(1, 107)=5.157, 
p=0.025, 2=0.046). Additionally, the predicted percentage of performance improvement 
decreased with rank: high-ranking participants predicted their performance would improve 
less than low-ranking participants did (F(2, 105)=6.614, p=0.002, 2=0.112; linear trend: 
F(1, 105)=8.661, p=0.004, 2=0.076).  
Similarly, the discrepancy between the predicted maximum number of matrix and 
actual scores was a function of rankings, i.e. the discrepancy of high-ranking participants was 
lower than that of low-ranking participants (F(2, 107)=7.140, p=0.001, 2=0.118; linear 
trend: F(1, 107)=13.311, p=0.000, 2=0.111). Finally, the discrepancy between the predicted 
score of the most skilled person and their actual scores also decreased with rank: the 
discrepancy is lower for high-ranking participants than low-ranking participants (F(2, 
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108)=18.363, p=0.000, 2=0.254; linear trend: F(1, 108)=36.000, p=0.000, 2=0.025). Table 
3.1 shows the means and standard deviations of all dependent variables by rank. 
Table 3.1: Study 1’s Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by Rank 
Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. 
Average Scores in the First Competition 
Discrepancy between the Predicted Maximum Scores 
and Scores in the First Competition 
High (1-20) 15.51 2.16 High (1-20) 3.13 4.58 
Intermediate (21-40) 10.62 1.19 Intermediate (21-40) 5.78 2.84 
Low (41-60) 6.64 2.27 Low (41-60) 6.89 5.41 
Average Scores in the Second Competition 
Discrepancy between Predicted Scores of the Most 
Skilled Person and Scores in the First Competition 
High (1-20) 14.64 4.31 High (1-20) 8.56 4.32 
Intermediate (21-40) 13.92 3.90 Intermediate (21-40) 11.54 4.79 
Low (41-60) 10.86 3.46 Low (41-60) 16.83 8.15 
Discrepancy between Aspiration Levels and Scores 
in the First Competition 
Discrepancy between Scores in the Second and First 
Competitions 
High (1-20) 1.24 4.00 High (1-20) -0.87 4.08 
Intermediate (21-40) 3.19 2.17 Intermediate (21-40) 3.30 4.06 
Low (41-60) 2.94 3.22 Low (41-60) 4.22 3.55 
Predicted Percentage of Performance Improvement 
(%) 
Discrepancy between Aspiration Levels and Scores in 
the Second Competition 
High (1-20) 7.51 26.39 High (1-20) 2.18 4.86 
Intermediate (21-40) 26.19 21.70 Intermediate (21-40) -0.11 4.33 
Low (41-60) 24.59 25.57 Low (41-60) -1.28 4.57 
 
In terms of actual performance improvement, the level of score improvement (scores 
in the second competition minus scores in the first competition) of high-ranking participants 
was lower than that of intermediate and low-ranking participants (F(2, 108)=18.168, 
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p=0.000, 2=0.252; linear trend: F(1, 108)=31.535, p=0.000, 2=0.226). Specifically, the 
performance scores of high-ranking participants in the first and second competitions were not 
significantly different (F(1, 38)=1.781, p=0.190, 2=0.045). However, the scores of low-
ranking and intermediate-ranking participants in the second competition were significantly 
higher than their scores in the first competition (Low ranks: F(1, 35)=50.794, p=0.000, 
2=0.592; Intermediate ranks: F(1, 36)=24.391, p=0.000, 2=0.404). The findings suggest 
that the relationship between rank and actual performance improvement was in the same 
direction as the relationship between rank and aspiration levels.  
To test whether participants in each ranking condition set an appropriate level of 
aspiration (i.e. the level they are able to achieve), aspiration levels were compared with 
scores from the second competition. The results suggest that the aspiration level of high-
ranking participants was statistically higher than their actual performance (F(1, 37)=7.677, 
p=0.009, 2=0.172). However, the aspiration levels of intermediate- and low-ranking 
participants were not statistically different from their actual performance (Intermediate ranks: 
F(1, 36) = 0.023, p=0.880, 2=0.001; Low ranks: F(1, 35)=2.813, p=0.102, 2=0.074). 
Additionally, the results of a one-way ANOVA using the discrepancy between the aspiration 
levels and scores from the second competitions as the dependent variable, and ranks as the 
independent variable, suggested that the discrepancy increased with rank: the discrepancy 
was higher for high-ranking participants than low-ranking participants (F(2, 107)=5.575, 
p=0.005, 2=0.094; linear trend: F(1, 107)=10.678, p=0.001, 2=0.091). 
Discussion 
The results suggest that high-ranking individuals thought their potential to improve 
was low, as reflected in the discrepancy between predicted maximum scores and scores in the 
first competition, and in the discrepancy between the predicted scores of the most skilled 
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person and scores in the first competition. Consequently, high-ranking individuals formed 
their aspiration level close to their current performance. In contrast, low-ranking individuals 
believed that their performance could be significantly improved, and therefore set their 
aspiration level much higher than their current scores. The predicted percentage of 
performance improvement follows a similar pattern. 
Nevertheless, even though high-ranking individuals set their level of aspiration close 
to their current performance, their level of aspiration was still unrealistically high. This 
resulted in their future performance being lower than their level of aspiration. On the 
contrary, despite the fact that intermediate- and low-ranking individuals set their level of 
aspiration much higher than their current performance, this level of aspiration seemed 
appropriate, as reflected in the insignificant difference between their aspiration levels and 
scores in the second competition. 
In this study, the number of matrices provided to participants might be seen as a 
ceiling, thus restricting the aspiration level of high-ranking participants. Additionally, by 
asking, “How many matrices do you expect to solve in the next competition?” it could be 
argued that participants are encouraged to form an expectation about their future performance 
which may not precisely be their level of aspiration. Study 2 addresses these issues, and also 
includes the control condition, which provides participants no information about their rank. 
3.3 Study 2 
Participants 
A total of 89 participants participated in the study. Participants were approached in 
Green Park and Hyde Park in London and asked to voluntarily complete a one-page 
questionnaire.  
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Design and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three between-subjects conditions 
(control-no ranking information, high, and low ranks). Participants read the following 
scenario, and answered questions. Information about rank was omitted for participants in the 
control condition.  
Imagine that yesterday you participated in a matching card competition with 500 players. 
In the competition, each player was given the same set of cards on a computer screen. All 
cards were faced down. Players can see the face of each card by clicking on it. The task 
was to match sixteen pairs of two identical cards. After each pair of cards is matched, the 
matched cards will disappear from the screen, as illustrated below. Each player was 
required to match all the cards as quickly as possible. After the competition, each player 
was ranked based on the time spent on matching all the cards. The 1
st
 rank belongs to the 
one who spends shortest time. 
         
       All cards are faced down.         A pair of cards is matched.             The matched pair  
             disappears from the screen 
From the competition yesterday, you matched all the cards within 120 seconds, and you 
ranked the 3
rd
 (498
th
) out of 500 players. Today you will be participating in the same 
competition again.  
Participants then responded to the three questions: To measure the level of aspiration, 
participants responded to the questions, “How much time do you aim to complete the task (in 
seconds)?” (minimum=0, no maximum), and “How much time do you expect to match 16 
pairs of two identical cards (in seconds)?” (minimum=0, no maximum). To measure the 
perceived potential to improve, participants responded to the question, “How much time do 
you think most talented person can match 16 pairs of two identical cards (in seconds)?” 
(minimum=0, no maximum). 
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Results 
The aim to complete the task served as the level of aspiration. Since the performance 
of high and low-ranking individuals was held constant in this study, there is no need to 
subtract the relevant dependent variables (e.g. aspiration level) from the current performance. 
The results of one-way ANOVA with the dependent variable aspiration level, and the 
between-subjects factor rank showed that rank significantly influences aspiration level (F(2, 
86)=6.602, p=0.002, 2=0.133). More precisely, participants in the control condition set their 
aspiration level at a similar level to high-ranking participants, and both group set their 
aspiration level lower than low-ranking participants: the contrast -1 (control), -1 (high-
ranking), and 2 (low-ranking) was significant (F(1, 86)=12.975, p=0.001, 2=0.131). 
Similarly, rank influences performance expectation (F(2, 86)=6.618, p=0.002, 2=0.133). 
Participants’ expectations in the control condition were not significantly different from the 
expectation of high-ranking participants, and both groups expected lower future performance 
than low-ranking participants. The contrast -1 (control),   -1 (high-ranking), and 2 (low-
ranking) was significant (F(1, 86)=12.344, p=0.001, 2=0.126). The results of a within-
subjects ANOVA with two proxies of aspiration level (score aims and score expectations) as 
a within-subject factor indicated that participants generally set their aims lower than their 
expectations (F(1, 88)=27.247, p=0.000, 2=0.236).  
Additionally, rank influences the perceived potential to improve (F(2, 86)=9.279, 
p=0.000, 2=0.177). Participants in the control condition and high-ranking condition had 
similar predictions about the performance of the most talented person; however, the two 
groups predicted that the most talented person would perform worse than the low-ranking 
participants predicted. The contrast -1 (control), -1 (high-ranking), and 2 (low-ranking) was 
significant (F(1, 86) = 16.515, p = 0.000, 2=0.161). Table 3.2 shows the means and standard 
deviations of aspiration levels, and the predicted scores of the most talented person by rank. 
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Table 3.2: Study 2’s Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by Rank 
Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. 
Level of Aspiration (Aim) Predicted Scores of the Most Talented Person 
Control 97.93 17.81 Control 63.67 28.93 
High (#3 out of 500) 95.59 23.36 High (#3 out of 500) 73.72 31.79 
Low (#498 out of 500) 80.33 19.55 Low (#498 out of 500) 44.73 15.40 
Level of Aspiration (Expectation)  
Control 90.43 22.74    
High (#3 out of 500) 84.31 33.69    
Low (#498 out of 500) 67.00 19.23    
Note: The unit of the results is second. The lower numbers communicate better performance. Thus, the results 
need to be interpreted in a reverse manner. 
 
Discussion 
The results again show that rank influences the perceived potential for performance 
improvement, which in turn influences the level of aspiration. Specifically, low-ranking 
individuals perceived higher potential to improve their performance, and thus set their 
aspiration level higher than high-ranking individuals. Individuals without ranking information 
behaved similarly to high-ranking individuals, implying that, in general, individuals do not 
see a stronger possibility of improvement and therefore tend to be conservative when setting 
their aspiration level. This suggests that ranking information mostly benefits poor performers 
by helping them see their own potential to improve. 
Study 3 aims to show that the information about the number of competitors is a 
necessary condition for rankings to influence aspiration levels.  
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3.4 Study 3 
Participants 
A total of 280 participants, recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, participated in a 
between-subjects questionnaire study online in exchange for $0.20. 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions with the between-
subjects factor rank (high vs. low) and the between-subjects factor number of competitors 
(control-no information vs. 100 competitors). Participants read the following scenario and 
answered questions. 
Imagine that yesterday you competed in a competition which required you to solve 10 
numerical problems on the computer. Each problem was presented one after another, and 
participants cannot move on to the next problem unless they have correctly solved the 
current problem. After the competition, each participant was ranked based on the time he 
or she spent on solving all 10 numerical problems. The 1
st
 rank belongs to the one who 
spends the shortest time. 
Imagine further that, from the competition yesterday, you solved 10 numerical problems 
within 600 seconds, and you were ranked #9 (#9 out of 100 competitors, #90, #90 out of 
100 competitors). Today you will be participating in the same competition again. 
To measure the level of aspiration, participants responded to the question: “In the next 
competition, how much time do you aim to solve 10 numerical problems?” (minimum=0, no 
maximum). To measure the perceived potential to improve, participants responded to the 
question: “How much time do you think the most talented person will spend to solve 10 
numerical problems?” (minimum=0, no maximum). To test participants’ perception regarding 
their ranks, they were asked: “How do you perceive your rank? (1=very bad, 9=very good)”. 
To check the understanding in answering the questions, participants were also asked, “What 
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is your rank in the competition yesterday?” (minimum=1, maximum=100), and “How many 
competitors competed in the competition yesterday? (100, 500, 1000, 2000, and Unknown)” 
Results  
Twelve participants did not correctly answer the attention check questions and were 
discarded from the analysis. As in Study 2, the performance of high- and low-ranking 
individuals was held constant in this study. Therefore, there is no need to subtract the relevant 
dependent variables (e.g. aspiration level) from the current performance. The results of a two-
way ANOVA with aspiration level as the dependent variable, rank (high vs. low) and number 
of competitors (control vs. 100 competitors) as between-subjects factors indicated that low-
ranking participants set higher aspiration levels than high-ranking participants did (F(1, 
254)=4.190, p=0.042, 2=0.016). The main effect of number of competitors was not 
significant (F(1, 254)=0.054, p=0.816, 2=0.000). The interaction effect for rank x number of 
competitors was partially significant (F(1, 254)=3.028, p=0.083, 2=0.012). As shown in 
Figure 3.1, the aspiration level of high and low-ranking participants did not significantly 
differ in the control condition (F(1, 121)=0.050, p=0.823, 2=0.000). However, high-ranking 
participants adopted a significantly lower level of aspiration than low-ranking participants 
when they were informed about the number of competitors (F(1, 133)=6.887, p=0.010, 
2=0.049).  
 Similarly, the results of a two-way ANOVA with the perceived potential to improve, 
as represented by the predicted score of the most talented person as the dependent variable, 
and rank (high vs. low) and number of competitors (no information vs. 100 competitors) as 
between-subjects factors, indicated that low-ranking participants perceived a higher potential 
to improve than high-ranking participants did (F(1, 254)=17.626, p=0.000, 2=0.065). The 
main effect of number of competitors was not significant (F(1, 254)=0.024, p=0.877, 
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2=0.000). The interaction effect for rank x number of competitors was significant (F(1, 
254)=7.370, p=0.007, 2=0.028). As shown in Figure 3.2, the perceived potential to improve 
of high and low-ranking participants did not significantly differ in the control condition (F(1, 
121)=1.019, p=0.315, 2=0.008). However, when the number of competitors was provided, 
low-ranking participants perceived a significantly higher potential to improve than high-
ranking participants (F(1, 133)=25.814, p=0.000, 2=0.163). Table 3.3 shows the means and 
standard deviations of aspiration level, predicted performance of the most talented person, 
and the rating of rank perception by rank and number of competitors. 
Table 3.3: Study 3’s Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables  
by Rank and the Number of Competitors 
Rank 
The Number of Competitors 
Rank 
The Number of Competitors 
No Info 100 No Info 100 
Level of Aspiration  Rank Perception 
High (#9) 
437.38 
(114.56) 
461.72 
(125.61) 
High (#9) 
5.59 
(2.24) 
6.67 
(2.08) 
Low (#90) 
432.42 
(130.50) 
400.54 
(144.42) 
Low (#90) 
4.24 
(1.95) 
3.10 
(2.34) 
Predicted Performance of Most Talented Person  
High (#9) 
308.11 
(135.36) 
358.28 
(138.18) 
   
Low (#90) 
282.18 
(149.15) 
237.43 
(138.20) 
   
Note: The unit of the results is second. The lower numbers communicate better performance. Thus, the 
results need to be interpreted in a reverse manner. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 Finally, the results of a two-way ANOVA with rank perception as a dependent 
variable, and rank (high vs. low) and number of competitors (no information vs. 100 
competitors) as between-subjects factors indicated that low-ranking participants perceived 
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their rank to be worse than high-ranking participants (F(1, 254)=83.362, p=0.000, 2=0.247). 
The main effect of number of competitors was not significant (F(1, 254)=0.011, p=0.915, 
2=0.000). The interaction effect for rank x number of competitors was significant (F(1, 
254)=17.001, p=0.000, 2=0.063). As shown in Figure 3.3, rank perception of high- and low-
ranking participants was significantly different in both control and 100-competitor 
conditions; however, the statistical significance in rank perception in the 100-competitor 
condition was slightly stronger (Control-no ranking information: F(1, 121)=12.709, p=0.001, 
2=0.095; 100-competitor condition: F(1, 133)=87.533, p=0.000, 2=0.397).  
Figure 3.1: Mean Level of Aspiration  
by Rank and the Number of Competitors 
 
Figure 3.2: Mean Predicted Performance 
by Rank and the Number of Competitors 
 
Figure 3.3: Mean Rank Perception 
by Rank and the Number of Competitors 
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Discussion 
The results suggest that when individuals were not informed about the number of  
competitors, ranking information did not influence the perceived potential to improve, and as 
such the aspiration level.  Even  though  high-ranking  participants  in  both control and 100-
competitor conditions perceived their rank to be better than low-ranking participants, the 
difference in rank perception between high and low-ranking individuals was decreased when 
individuals were not told how many competitors there were as compared to when participants 
were provided with this information. This smaller difference was not strong enough to 
differentiate the perceived potential to improve and the aspiration level of high-ranking 
individuals from those of low-ranking individuals. Hence, in order for the effect of rankings 
on the level of aspiration to be made manifest, individuals need to be informed about the  
number of competitors. 
3.5 Study 4 
Study 4 aimed to test whether individual differences in self-efficacy moderated the 
relationship between ranks and the level of aspiration. 
Participants 
A total of 100 participants, recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, participated in a 
within-subjects questionnaire study online in exchange for $0.20. 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were asked to assume both a high rank (6 of 500) and a low rank (490 
of 500) in a counter-balanced within-subjects design. Half of the participants started with a 
high rank and the other half with a low rank. The exact scenario read:  
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Imagine that yesterday you competed in a competition which required you to solve 10 
numerical problems. After the competition, each participant was ranked based on the time 
he or she spent on solving 10 numerical problems. The 1
st
 rank belongs to the one who 
spends the shortest time. 
Imagine further that, from the competition yesterday, you solve 10 numerical 
problems within 600 seconds, and you are ranked #6 (#490) out of 500 competitors. 
Today you will be participating in the same competition again.  
Participants were then asked the following questions. To measure the level of 
aspiration, participants responded to the question, “In the next competition, how much time 
(in seconds) do you aim to complete the task?” (minimum=0, no maximum). To measure the 
perceived potential to improve, participants responded to the question, “How much time (in 
seconds) do you think the most talented person will spend to solve 10 numerical problems?” 
(minimum=0, no maximum). Next, participants moved on to the other condition, and answer 
the same questions. To check attention in answering the question, after participants 
completed the two conditions, they were asked “What is your latest rank in the competition?” 
(minimum=1, maximum=500). Finally, participants rated the 10-item general self-efficacy 
scale of Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) as follows (1=not at all true, 4=exactly true).  
1. I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough. 
2. If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want. 
3. It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals. 
4. I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events. 
5. Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations. 
6. I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort. 
7. I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping 
abilities. 
8. When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions. 
9. If I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution. 
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10. I can usually handle whatever comes my way. 
Results 
Participants who did not answer the attention check question correctly and did not 
answer all 10 items on the self-efficacy scale were discarded from the analysis. In total, there 
were 75 valid responses. As in Studies 2 and 3, the performance of high and low-ranking 
individuals was held constant. Therefore, there is no need to subtract the relevant dependent 
variables (e.g. aspiration levels) from the current performance. There was no significant order 
effect of rank (high/low vs. low/high) on the dependent measures (Aspiration level – high 
rank: F(1, 73)=3.815, p=0.055, η2=0.050;  low rank: F(1, 73)=2.735, p=0.102, η2=0.036; 
Predicted performance of most talented person – high rank: F(1,73)=2.027, p=0.159, 
η2=0.027; low rank: F(1,73)=0.008, p=0.929, η2=0.000), so the data was combined for the 
subsequent analyses. The results replicated the findings of the previous studies: high-ranking 
participants set their aspiration level lower than low-ranking participants (F(1, 74)=8.915, 
p=0.004, η2=0.108), and predicted that the most talented person will spend more time in the 
next competition than low-ranking participants (F(1, 74)=92.289, p=0.000, η2=0.555).  
The self-efficacy score was the sum of the rating of ten self-efficacy items. The 
Cronbach’s Alpha for the ten items was 0.856. Participants were categorised into high and 
low self-efficacy groups by a median split, with those whose scores were higher than the 
median placed in the high self-efficacy group and the rest in the low self-efficacy group. The 
results of a two-way ANOVA with the aspiration level as the dependent factor, self-efficacy 
level (high vs. low) as the between-subjects factor, and rank (high vs. low) as the within-
subjects factor suggested that there was a significant interaction effect for rank and self-
efficacy level (F(1, 73)=4.012, p=0.049, η2=0.052). The main ranking effect was significant 
(F(1, 73)=10.366, p=0.002, η2=0.124), and the main effect of self-efficacy was not significant 
(F(1, 73)=0.311, p=0.579, η2=0.004). As shown in Figure 3.4, high self-efficacy participants 
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set higher aspiration level when their ranks were low than when their ranks were high (F(1, 
33)=11.651, p=0.002, η2=0.261). However, the aspiration level of low self-efficacy 
participants was not significantly different in both ranking conditions (F(1, 40)=0.867, 
p=0.357, η2=0.021). Table 3.4 shows the means and standard deviations of aspiration level 
and predicted scores of the most talented person by rank and self-efficacy level. 
Table 3.4: Study 4’s Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables  
by Rank and Self-Efficacy Level 
Rank 
Self-Efficacy Level 
Rank 
Self-Efficacy Level 
High Low High Low 
Level of Aspiration Predicted Scores of the Most Talented Person 
High (#6 out of 500) 
489.71 
(110.13) 
467.20 
(191.99) 
High (#6 out of 500) 
417.21 
(131.28) 
363.32 
(162.66) 
Low (#490 out of 500) 
385.00 
(166.74) 
442.80 
(159.65) 
Low (#490 out of 500) 
236.47 
(179.99) 
196.85 
(117.21) 
Note: The unit of the results is second. The lower numbers communicate better performance. Thus, the results 
need to be interpreted in a reverse manner. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Mean Level of Aspiration 
by Rank and Self-Efficacy Level 
 
Figure 3.5: Mean Predicted Performance 
by Rank and Self-Efficacy Level 
 
 
The results of a two-way ANOVA with predicted performance of the most talented 
person as the dependent factor, self-efficacy level as the between-subjects factor, and rank as 
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the within-subjects factor suggested that there was no significant interaction effect (F(1, 
73)=0.154, p=0.696, η2=0.002), as shown in Figure 3.5. The main ranking effect was 
significant (F(1, 73)=91.137, p=0.000, η2=0.555). The main effect of self-efficacy level was 
not significant (F(1, 73)=2.526, p=0.116, η2=0.033).  
Discussion 
The results suggest that the effect of ranking on the aspiration level comes mainly 
from high self-efficacy individuals. The non-significant interaction effect for rank and self-
efficacy and the significant ranking effect on predicted performance of the most talented 
person suggest that both high and low self-efficacy individuals infer the potential to improve 
their performance from their ranks in a similar way; both groups perceived higher potential to 
improve when their ranks were high than low. However, only high self-efficacy individuals, 
who strongly believe in their own ability, set their level of aspiration according to their 
perceived potential. Low self-efficacy individuals, despite seeing the potential to improve 
when their ranks are low, do not believe in their own ability to improve, and therefore set 
relatively low aspiration levels regardless of their rank. 
3.6 General Discussion 
 Across the four studies, I showed that rankings influence individuals’ perception 
about their ability to improve, and that this perception influences their level of aspiration. 
Low-ranking individuals believe that the potential to improve their performance is higher 
than high-ranking individuals, and in turn set higher aspiration levels (Study 1). However, in 
order for low-ranking individuals to do this, they need to see that their rank is relatively low 
by referring to the number of competitors (Study 3). Only providing the ranking information 
paints a less clear picture of how good or bad their rank is, and therefore weakens the effect 
of rankings on the level of aspiration. The ranking effect is also moderated by individual 
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differences in self-efficacy, such that high-efficacy individuals set lower aspiration levels 
when their rank is high as opposed to when their rank is low, but low-efficacy individuals set 
a similar level of aspiration regardless of rank (Study 4). 
 Ranking feedback is useful particularly to poor performers as it helps them perceive 
their potential to improve. Without this information, individuals in general tend to perceive 
lower potential to improve and set a similarly low level of aspiration as high-ranking 
individuals (Study 2). However, even with a relatively low aspiration level of high-ranking 
individuals, they are less likely to achieve their goal whereas low-ranking individuals were 
able to achieve theirs (Study 1). 
These findings contribute to the growing literature on the influences of rankings on 
judgment and behaviour by identifying another factor, namely aspiration level, which can be 
affected by ranking feedback. The findings also contribute to the literature on aspiration 
levels by suggesting the potential to improve, inferred from rankings, as another antecedent 
of individuals’ aspiration level. In comparison to other antecedents such as average 
performance, rankings may be more effective in terms of motivating individuals to improve 
their performance. Since individuals tend to reduce the discrepancy between their 
performance and average performance (Festinger, 1942; Hilgard et al., 1940), there may be a 
case that individuals will set lower aspiration levels than their current performance. More 
precisely, if their current performance is higher than average, in order to reduce this 
discrepancy individuals are likely to set lower aspiration levels than their current 
performance, leading to a poorer future performance. Ranking feedback, on the other hand, 
creates a forward looking view by making individuals see the top rank as the limitation on 
their performance, and infer their potential to improve from this point of reference. As a 
result, everybody, with the exception of the person in the top position, tends to set aspiration 
levels higher than their current performance, thus leading to performance improvement.  
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From a practical point of view, the findings suggest that the use of rankings helps 
individuals infer their own potential to improve, and adjust their level of aspiration 
accordingly. Without ranking feedback, individuals with poor performance may not come to 
know that they have high potential to improve. As a result, they tend to set relatively low 
aspiration levels. Since the previous literature has suggested that individuals tend to adjust 
their effort to match the difficulty of aspiration level (Bryan and Locke, 1967), those with a 
higher aspiration level is more likely to achieve better results. Consequently, without ranking 
information, the low aspiration level of poor performers may result in them achieving a 
poorer performance than they should.  
The findings also suggest that low self-efficacy individuals, particularly those with a 
low rank, should be encouraged to set a higher level of aspiration. Alternatively, 
organisations may need to increase the level of individuals’ self-efficacy, which eventually 
leads them to set a higher aspiration level. This can be achieved by, for example, providing 
adequate training to improve individuals’ abilities to work on a task or providing strategies 
about how they can successfully tackle a task (Gist and Mitchell, 1992). 
In many situations, organisations set goals for their employees. Research has found 
that assigned goals will help improve performance only when individuals accept these goals 
(Erez and Zidon, 1984). If employees perceive the goals to be too hard, they may abandon 
them (Locke, 1968). As a result, assigned goals may not lead to an improvement in 
performance. By learning how employees with different performance levels set their goals, 
organisations can determine the appropriate goal levels that employees are likely to accept. 
As a consequence, an improvement in performance can be expected, which could help 
organisations plan more realistically.  
Future work could extend these findings in many important ways. For instance, it 
would be interesting to investigate how differently-ranked individuals adjust their aspiration 
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level over time. As competitions progress, low-ranked individuals who improve their 
performance and move closer to the top ranks may gradually lower their aspiration level. 
Additionally, those who are stuck at a low rank may discover they have low potential to 
improve and may also lower their aspiration level. As a result, as the competitions progress, 
individuals may rely less on ranking information. Furthermore, the present analysis focuses 
mainly on the positive aspect of the comparison between an individual’s own rank and the 
top rank, which helps lower-ranked individuals see their potential to improve. However, as 
low-ranked individuals perceive they are still far from the top, they may feel demotivated, 
which could potentially lead to feelings of lower self-worth (Crocker et al., 2003). Future 
work can also investigate this negative consequence. Additionally, future work could also 
examine whether or not rankings affect individuals’ effort and preparation level. Research 
(e.g. Bryan and Locke, 1967) has suggested that individuals tend to adjust their effort 
according to their aspiration levels, i.e. those with higher aspiration levels tend to exert more 
effort. Consequently, as the aspiration level of low-ranking individuals is higher than that of 
high-ranking individuals, the first group may put in more effort than the second group. 
However, it may still be possible that low-ranking individuals set high aspiration levels 
because they believe that their performance will increase by default. If this is the case, they 
may not try as hard as high-ranking individuals. This remains an open avenue for future 
research. 
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Chapter 4 
4 The Effect of Rankings on Predicted Winning Probability  
 
4.1 Hypotheses  
 In order to predict the likelihood of winning, individuals need to evaluate both their 
own capabilities and the capabilities of their competitors. These evaluations, however, are not 
straightforward: self-ratings tend to be enhanced, whereas the ratings of others are often more 
accurate (Epley and Dunning, 2000). For instance, individuals often overestimated the 
amount they were willing to hypothetically donate to charity: i.e. the actual donation was 
much less than the amount they predicted they would donate. However, the amount they 
predicted their peers would donate was only slightly less than the amount their peers actually 
donated (Epley and Dunning, 2000). 
The degree of self-enhancement, however, depends on the type of performance 
feedback. Poor performers are more likely than high performers to elevate themselves in 
relation to an objective measure, as acknowledging a poor performance generates negative 
feelings that poor performers seek to avoid (Gramzow et al., 2003). For instance, low-GPAs 
students are more likely than high-GPAs students to exaggerate their actual GPAs (Gramzow 
et al., 2003). By the same token, rankings, a particular form of performance feedback, are 
likely to influence the degree of self-enhancement: low-ranking individuals tend to be more 
self-enhanced than high-ranking individuals. Specifically, low-ranking individuals are likely 
to perceive themselves more positively than objectively warranted, whereas high-ranking 
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individuals tended to be more accurate. However, the two groups, when evaluating the 
performance of others, are likely to be accurate. As a consequence, when comparing their 
performance with commensurate performers, high-ranking individuals are likely to believe 
their competence to be close to similarly-ranked competitors’. However, low-ranking 
individuals are likely to judge their own capabilities as superior to similarly-ranked 
competitors. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: The differences in the perceived capability of self and commensurate competitors will be 
lower in high-ranking individuals than low-ranking individuals.  
Differences in the perceived capabilities of high and low-ranking individuals result in 
differences in predicted winning probability. High-ranking individuals, who view themselves 
as the equals of their similarly-ranked competitors, are likely to predict lower probabilities of 
winning. In contrast, low-ranking individuals, who overestimate their capabilities in relation 
to their competitors’, are likely to predict higher probabilities of winning. This suggests the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: High-ranking individuals predict lower winning probabilities than low-ranking 
individuals. 
The Present Studies 
 These two hypotheses were tested in four studies. Study 1 used field data from the 
Premier League from 2011 to show the effect of rankings on predicted winning probabilities. 
However, as findings from field data can be influenced by many factors in addition to 
rankings, Study 2 removed this limitation by experimentally manipulating rankings in a 
questionnaire study. Nevertheless, one may argue that when predicting winning probability, 
individuals may rely on their own beliefs about their skills instead of their ranks. Study 3 
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ruled out this alternative explanation, showing that the effect of rankings on predicted 
winning probabilities is still pronounced even when controlling for participants’ prior beliefs 
about their capabilities. The first three studies, however, did not explicitly show that the 
differences in predicted winning probabilities are in fact the result of perceived capability 
differences. Study 4 demonstrated this, and it also showed that the effect did not change when 
participants were paired with slightly higher- or lower-ranked competitors.  
4.2 Study 1 
Participants 
One hundred and one Premier League Football (US soccer) fans (50 Arsenal fans and 
51 West Ham United fans) were recruited for the study. The fans were approached before the 
start of two home games in Spring 2011. Only the fans wearing their team’s t-shirts or 
scarves were approached. 
Design and Procedure 
Arsenal and West Ham United were chosen because of their respective Premier 
League positions in week 38 of the season 2010/11. Arsenal had a high ranking, 3
rd
 out of 20 
Premier League teams, allowing them to compete for automatic promotion to the UEFA 
Champions League group stage, as the top 3 teams of the Premier League automatically 
qualify for the group stage of this prestigious competition. West Ham United, in contrast, had 
a low ranking of 20, requiring them to compete for position 17 to avoid relegation to the 
Football League Championship. Both London-based teams, Arsenal and West Ham United, 
faced opponents, who were ranked slightly above them. Arsenal’s game was against 
Manchester United, who were ranked 1
st
, and West Ham United faced the Blackburn Rovers, 
who were ranked 16
th
.  
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The football fans approached were asked to complete a short questionnaire, which 
took about three minutes. The questionnaire informed participants about the Premier League 
position of their supported team and the respective position of the away team. Participants 
were then asked to predict the winning probability of their team (minimum=0%, 
maximum=100%), the winning probability of the respective away team (minimum=0%, 
maximum=100%), the outcome (final score) of the upcoming game (minimum=0, no 
maximum), and the number of years of fandom (minimum=0, no maximum). 
Results  
 The number of years of fandom was included as a covariate in all analysis. The results 
of a one-way ANOVA, with the winning probability of the home (supported) team as the 
dependent variable, the relative rank of the team (high rank vs. low rank) as the independent 
variable and  the number of years of fandom as the covariate, indicate that fans of the lower-
ranked team (West Ham United) predicted a significantly higher winning probability for their 
team than fans of the higher-ranked team (Arsenal) (F(1, 96)=14.301; p=0.000;  2=0.130). 
Similarly, fans of the lower-ranked team predicted a significantly lower probability of an 
away team  victory compared to  fans of the higher-ranked  team  (F(1, 96)=16.191; p=0.000;   
Table 4.1: Study 1’s Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by Rank 
Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. 
Predicted Winning Probability of the Home Team (%) Score Difference (Supported team - Opponent) 
High (Arsenal) 56.63 19.19 High (Arsenal) 0.59 1.14 
Low (West Ham United) 70.06 18.38 Low (West Ham United) 1.84 1.27 
Predicted Winning Probability of the Opponent (%)  
High (Arsenal) 42.65 19.56    
Low (West Ham United) 27.98 17.49    
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2=0.144). Finally, fans of the lower-ranked team predicted that their team will win with a 
significantly higher goal difference than fans of the higher-ranked teams (F(1, 96)=25.124; 
p=0.000;  2=0.207). Table 4.1 shows the means and standard deviations of the predicted 
winning probabilities of the supported team, away team and score differences by rank. 
Discussion 
The results support the predictions: fans of the lower-ranked team predicted a higher 
winning probability than fans of the higher-ranked team. Fans of the lower-ranked team also 
predicted that their team’s margin of victory would be greater when compared with the 
predictions of fans of the higher-ranked team, suggesting that the perceived capability 
differences between self and opponent are higher for lower-ranked teams than higher-ranked 
teams. This study, however, has several limitations. First, it is possible that the objective 
winning probability of the lower-ranked team was higher than the corresponding probability 
of the higher-ranked team. Second, the characteristics of the fans of the two teams might have 
differed systematically, thereby affecting revealed predictions. Third, the relative importance 
of winning the game for the fans might have differed between the two teams, with the lower-
ranked team’s desperate attempts avoid relegation influencing fans’ perspectives. In the 
second study, these shortcomings are controlled by experimentally manipulating rankings. 
Study 2 also shows the robustness of the effect by varying the number of competitors. 
4.3 Study 2 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty students from various universities in London participated in 
the study. Participants were approached in cafeterias and asked to complete a one-page 
questionnaire. 
98 
 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four following conditions: 2 (rank: 
high vs. low) x 2 (number of competitors: small (10) vs. large (100)) between-subjects 
design. In the questionnaire, participants were asked to imagine that they were about to enter 
an annual numerical problem-solving competition with 10 (100) people. For those assigned 
the high-ranking condition, they were told that last year their rank was 3 (out of 10/100); in 
the low-ranking condition they were told their rank was 8 out of 10 (98 out of 100). 
Participants were then asked to rate their winning probability against a competitor ranked 
one-step above them (minimum=0%, maximum=100%) and a competitor ranked two-steps 
higher (minimum=0%, maximum=100%). To capture the participants’ views on their 
perceived relative capability, participants were asked to rate how hard it would be to win the 
competition against the competitor ranked one-step higher (1=not at all hard, 9=very hard). 
To capture the importance of winning, participants were asked to rate how important it would 
be for them to outcompete the competitor ranked one-step higher, and how important it 
would be for them to win (1=not at all important, 9=very important). 
Results  
The importance of winning was the average rating of the two questions: “How 
important would it be for you to outcompete the competitor ranked one-step higher?”, and 
“How important would it be for you to win?”. As shown in Figure 4.4, this importance of 
winning did not differ significantly between ranking conditions (F(1, 116)=0.091, p=0.763, 
2=0.001), and it was included as a covariate in all subsequent analyses. The results of a two-
way ANOVA, with winning probability (when competing with one-step higher-ranked 
competitors) as the dependent variable, rank (high vs. low) and the number of competitors 
(10 vs. 100) as between-subjects factors, and the important of winning as the covariate, 
indicate that low-ranking individuals predicted a significantly higher winning probability than 
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high-ranking individuals (F(1, 114)=4.140, p=0.044, 2=0.035). There was neither a 
significant main effect of the number of competitors (F(1, 114)=1.953, p=0.165, 2=0.017), 
nor a significant interaction effect for ranking x the number of competitors (F(1, 114)=0.155, 
p=0.694, 2=0.001), as shown in Figure 4.1. The results of the predicted probability of 
winning when competing with competitors ranked two-steps higher are similar, and the main 
ranking effect is even stronger (F(1, 113)=8.949, p=0.003, 2=0.073). Again, as shown in 
Figure 4.2, the main effect of the number of competitors and the interaction effect for ranking 
x the number of competitors were not significant (Main effect: F(1, 113)=1.855, p=0.176, 
2=0.016; Interaction effect: F(1, 113)=0.031, p=0.861, 2=0.000). Consistently, participants 
in the high-ranking condition expected that it would be harder for them to win as compared to 
participants in the low-ranking condition (F(1, 115)=13.551,  p=0.000,  2=0.105).  The main 
Table 4.2: Study 2’s Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables  
by Rank and the Number of Competitors 
Rank 
The Number of Competitors 
Rank 
The Number of Competitors 
Low (10) High (100) Low (10) High (100) 
 
Predicted Winning Probability with One-Step 
Higher-Ranked Competitor (%) 
Hard-to-Win Rating 
High (#3) 
41.11 
(15.84) 
46.32 
(16.13) 
High (#3) 
6.37 
(1.65) 
6.23 
(1.57) 
Low (#8/#98) 
47.71 
(16.85) 
52.34 
(20.64) 
Low (#8/#98) 
5.43 
(1.74) 
4.83 
(1.95) 
 
Predicted Winning Probability with Two-Step 
Higher-Ranked Competitor (%) 
Important-to-Win Rating 
High (#3) 
33.89 
(13.33) 
36.91 
(15.20) 
High (#3) 
6.45 
(1.53) 
5.98 
(2.08) 
Low (#8/#98) 
41.19 
(19.74) 
48.20 
(20.44) 
Low (#8/#98) 
5.45 
(2.04) 
6.77 
(2.15) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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effect of the number of competitors and the interaction effect for ranking x the number of 
competitors were not significant (Main effect: F(1, 115)=1.934, p=0.167, 2=0.017; 
Interaction effect: F(1, 115)=1.407, p=0.238, 2=0.012), as shown in Figure 4.3. Table 4.2 
shows the means and standard deviations of the predicted winning probabilities with one- and 
two-steps higher-ranked competitors, hard-to-win ratings, and important-to-win ratings, by 
rank and the number of competitors. 
Figure 4.1: Mean Predicted Winning 
Probability with One-Step Higher-Ranked 
Competitor by Rank and the Number of 
Competitors 
 
Figure 4.2: Mean Predicted Winning 
Probability with Two-Step Higher-Ranked 
Competitor by Rank and the Number of 
Competitors  
 
Figure 4.3: Mean Hard-to-Win Rating 
by Rank and the Number of Competitors 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Mean Important-to-Win Rating 
by Rank and the Number of Competitors 
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Discussion 
The results of Study 2 replicate the findings from Study 1. Low-ranking individuals 
overestimated winning probability compared to high-ranking individuals. That high-ranking 
individuals found it harder to win suggests that the perceived similarity in capabilities  
between participants and their imagined competitors is stronger for high-ranking individuals  
than for low-ranking individuals. 
 One possible explanation of the findings in studies 1 and 2 is that people may have 
preconceived ideas about their own ability and limited information about their competitors’. 
Consequently, they may rely on these preconceived ideas when predicting winning 
probability. People who believe that their skills are average, or slightly above average, may 
perceive a lower chance of winning when they occupy the higher rank and a higher chance of 
winning when they occupy the lower rank. To minimise this effect, Study 3 controls for the 
preconceived ideas about individuals’ ability. 
4.4 Study 3 
Participants 
A total of 95 participants, recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, participated in a 
between-subjects online questionnaire study in exchange for $0.60. 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two between-subjects conditions 
(high or low rank). Participants read, ‘Imagine that last week you competed in a competition 
that involved your reasoning skills. You occupied the 3
rd 
(98
th
) rank out of 100 competitors 
(The 1
st
 rank belongs to the best performer). Now you are about to enter a similar competition 
that also involves your reasoning skills. However, in this competition you will compete head-
to-head with a competitor who occupied the 2
nd
 (97
th
) rank from the last competition.’ 
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Participants were then asked to predict the winning probability (Between 0-100%), 
and rate the likelihood that they would win (1=not at all, 9=very likely). To capture the 
participants’ views of their perceived relative capabilities, participants were asked to rate how 
hard it would be to win (1=not at all hard, 9=very hard). Finally, to assess participants’ 
opinions about their actual abilities, they were asked to ignore the ranking information 
provided and give their own opinions regarding their actual reasoning skills (1=very bad, 
9=very good). To check their attention in answering these questions, participants were also 
asked to indicate their given ranking information. 
Results 
 Sixteen participants did not correctly answer the attention check question, and their 
responses were omitted from the analysis. The actual skill rating was included as a covariate 
in all subsequent analyses. The results of a one-way ANOVA with winning probability as the 
dependent variable, rank (high vs. low) as the between-subjects factor and the actual skill 
rating as the covariate, indicated that low-ranking participants predicted a significantly higher 
winning probability than high-ranking participants (F(1, 76)=9.687, p=0.003, 2=0.113). 
Similarly,  low-ranking participants  also perceived they  were more  likely to  win than high- 
Table 4.3: Study 3’s Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by Rank 
Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. 
Predicted Winning Probability (%) Hard-to-Win Rating 
High (#3 out of 100) 50.31 16.15 High (#3 out of 100) 6.36 1.44 
Low (#98 out of 100) 63.73 19.55 Low (#98 out of 100) 5.40 2.15 
Likelihood-to-Win Rating Actual Skill Rating 
High (#3 out of 100) 5.18 1.39 High (#3 out of 100) 6.67 1.51 
Low (#98 out of 100) 6.30 1.52 Low (#98 out of 100) 7.08 1.44 
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ranking participants (F(1, 76)=9.811, p=0.002, 2=0.114). Finally, higher-ranking 
participants expected that it would be harder for them to win in the competition with their 
similarly-ranked rival than lower-ranking participants predicted (F(1, 76)=4.608, p=0.035, 
2=0.057). Table 4.3 shows the means and standard deviations of winning probability, the 
ratings of the likelihood to win, hard-to-win, and actual skill by rank. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 3 show that the differences in predicted winning probability 
between high and low-ranking individuals were driven by rankings rather than by 
preconceived ideas about personal abilities. Thus far, the three previous studies did not 
explicitly ask participants for their perceived capabilities. This will be addressed in Study 4. 
4.5 Study 4 
 Study 4 showed the effect of rankings on the perceived differences in capability 
between self and opponent in high- and low-ranking participants, when competing with a 
one-step higher-ranked competitor (Study 4a) and a one-step lower-ranked competitor (Study 
4b). 
4.5.1 Study 4a 
Participants 
There were 57 students from a university in Birmingham who participated in the 
study. Participants were approached in libraries and cafeterias and asked to complete a two-
page questionnaire. 
Design and Procedure 
In this study, a within-subjects design is used to increase the reliability of judgment, 
as it is argued that individuals are more consistent in such designs (Camerer, 1995). To 
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reduce a potential carryover effect from one task to another, participants are categorised into 
two groups. In the first group, participants were asked to imagine that they were about to 
enter an annual numerical problem-solving competition with 100 people, and that last year 
they occupied the 3
rd
 rank. This year, they would compete head-to-head with the person 
ranked 2
nd
 in last year’s contest. Participants were then asked to rate (i) how talented they 
were, (ii) how talented their competitor was (1=not at all, 9=very talented), (iii) how 
outstanding their performance last year was, and (iv) how outstanding their competitor’s 
performance last year was (1=not at all, 9=very outstanding). On the second page of the 
questionnaire, participants were told that they occupied the 98
th
 rank and were about to 
compete with a person who occupied the 97
th
 rank. They were then asked to answer the four 
questions as they did on page 1. The second group started in the opposite position to group 
one: with the low-ranking condition, and then moved to the high-ranking condition.  
Results 
The perceived capability was the average rating of the two questions: “How talent 
are/is you/your competitor?”, and “How outstanding is your performance/your competitor’s 
performance?”. Difference in perceived capability was the difference between the perceived 
capability of self, and the perceived capability of competitors by self. Four responses of 
perceived capability difference were considered outliers, following the procedure of Hoaglin 
and Iglewicz (1987)
3
, and were omitted from the analysis. There was no significant order 
effect of rank (high/low vs. low/high) on perceived capability difference (high rank: F(1, 
51)=0.824, p=0.368, 2=0.016; low rank: F(1, 51)=1.614, p=0.210, 2=0.031), so the data 
was combined for the subsequent analyses.  
                                                 
 
3
 Any observations below FL – 2.2(FU – FL) or above FU + 2.2(FU – FL), where FL and FU are the lower and upper 
quartiles, are considered as an outlier. 
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As predicted, the results of a within-subjects ANOVA on the differences in 
capabilities as the dependent variable and ranks (high vs. low) as a within-subjects factor 
indicate that the difference in perceived capability is higher for low-ranking participants than 
for high-ranking participants (F(1, 52)=27.850, p=0.000, 2=0.349). As shown in Figure 4.5, 
for individuals in the high-ranking condition, the differences between their perception of their 
own and their competitors’ capabilities are partially significant (F(1, 52)=3.861, p=0.055, 
2=0.069).   High-ranking  participants  believed  their  competitors’  capability  was  slightly  
Table 4.4: Study 4a’s Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by Rank 
Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. 
Perceived Self-Capability Rating Perceived Capability Difference (Self-Opponent) 
High (#3 out of 100) 6.96 1.43 High (#3 out of 100) -0.25 0.94 
Low (#98 out of 100) 4.46 1.82 Low (#98 out of 100) 0.63 1.32 
Perceived Competitor’s Capability Rating  
High (#3 out of 100) 7.22 1.42    
Low (#98 out of 100) 3.83 1.82    
 
Figure 4.5: Study 4a’s Mean Capability Rating by Rank and Assessee 
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better than theirs. However, for the low-ranking condition, participants significantly perceive 
that their capabilities are better than their competitor’s (F(1, 52)=12.156, p=0.001, 2=0.189). 
Table 4.4 shows the means and standard deviations of perceived self-capabilities rating, 
perceived competitor’s capabilities rating, and perceived capability difference by rank. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 4a show that low-ranking participants perceived their relative 
capabilities to be higher than the capabilities of their competitors whereas high-ranking 
participants believed their capabilities are slightly inferior to their competitors’. This suggests 
that low-ranking individuals tend to be more self-enhanced than high-ranking individuals. As 
a consequence, the first group found it easier than the second group to win against their 
competitors as shown in previous studies. 
However, it may be the case that high-ranking participants perceive their rank 
difference (e.g. #2 vs #3) to be bigger than the rank difference of low-ranking participants 
(e.g. #97 vs #98). In this case, high-ranking participants may be as self-enhanced as low-
ranking participants. Specifically, high-ranking individuals may view themselves as superior 
to their competitors, but as the difference in rank between 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 place seems greater, 
they therefore rate their abilities as on par with their competitor’s. In contrast, as the 
difference between 97
th
 and 98
th
 place appears insignificant, low-ranking participants rate 
their abilities to be greater than their competitor’s. Study 4b controls for the perceived rank 
difference and also shows that the effect of rankings on perceived capability differences still 
manifests itself even when participants are paired with lower-ranked competitors. 
4.5.2 Study 4b 
Participants 
A  total of  55  participants,  recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk,  took part in a  
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within-subjects questionnaire study online in exchange for $0.60.  
Design and Procedure 
Similar to Study 4a, a within-subjects design is used to increase the reliability of 
judgment. To reduce a potential carryover effect from one task to another, participants are 
categorised into two groups. In the first group, participants were asked to imagine that last 
week they competed in a competition that involved their numerical skills, and that they 
ranked 3
rd
 out of 100 competitors. Now, they would compete head-to-head with a competitor 
who was ranked 4
th
. Participants were then asked to rate (i) how talented they were, (ii) how 
talented their competitor was (1=not at all, 9=very talented), (iii) how outstanding their 
performance last year was, and (iv) how outstanding their competitor’s performance last year 
was (1=not at all, 9=very outstanding). To control for the perceived rank difference, 
participants were also asked to rate how big the difference between their rank and their 
competitor’s rank was (1=very small, 9=very large). To check participant’s understanding 
and attention in answering the questions, there was one question that instructed them to 
simply skip a part of the questionnaire, and another question that asked participants to 
indicate the ranking information of their current competitor. On the next screen, participants 
were told that they occupied the 95
th
 rank and were about to compete with a person who 
ranked 96
th
. They were then asked to respond to the same questions as on screen 1. The 
second group of participants started with the low rank then the high rank.  
Results 
 Eleven participants did not answer the attention and comprehension questions 
correctly and were omitted from the analysis. The perceived capability was the average rating 
of the two questions: “How talent are/is you/your competitor?”, and “How outstanding is 
your performance/your competitor’s performance?”. Difference in perceived capability was 
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the difference between the perceived capability of self, and the perceived capability of 
competitors by self. Three responses of perceived capability difference were considered 
outliers, following the procedure of Hoaglin et al. (1986), and were omitted from the analysis. 
There was no significant order effect of rank (high/low vs. low/high) on perceived capability 
difference for the high-ranking condition (F(1, 42)=0.391, p=0.535, 2=0.009), but there was 
an order effect for the low-ranking condition (F(1, 42)=6.979, p=0.012, 2=0.142). Thus, the 
order was included as a covariate in the subsequent analyses.  
Table 4.5: Study 4b’s Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by Rank 
Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. 
Perceived Self-Capability Rating Perceived Capability Difference (Self-Opponent) 
High (#3 out of 100) 7.71 1.04 High (#3 out of 100) -0.04 0.53 
Low (#95 out of 100) 3.55 2.18 Low (#95 out of 100) 0.45 1.09 
Perceived Competitor’s Capability Rating Perceived Rank Difference 
High (#3 out of 100) 7.74 0.92 High (#3 out of 100) 2.00 1.70 
Low (#95 out of 100) 3.10 2.22 Low (#95 out of 100) 1.76 1.18 
 
Figure 4.6: Study 4b’s Mean Capability Rating by Rank and Assessee 
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There was no significant difference in the perceived rank difference between the high- 
and low-ranking groups (F(1, 40)=1.066, p=0.308, 2=0.026). Perceived rank difference was 
included as a covariate in all subsequent analyses. The results of a within-subjects ANOVA 
on the difference in capabilities as the dependent variable, ranks (high vs. low) as the within-
subjects factor, and perceived rank difference and order as covariates, replicated the findings 
of Study 4a. The difference in perceived capability of high- and low-ranking participants is 
partially significant (F(1, 38)=3.348, p=0.075, 2=0.081). As shown in Figure 4.6, the 
perceived difference between participant’s capabilities and their competitor’s capabilities are 
not significant in the high-ranking condition (F(1, 38)=0.000, p=0.993, 2=0.000). However, 
low-ranking participants perception of superiority over their competitors was partially 
significant (F(1, 38)=3.404, p=0.073, 2=0.082). Table 4.5 shows the means and standard 
deviations of perceived self-capabilities rating, perceived competitor’s capabilities rating, 
perceived capability difference, and perceived rank difference by rank. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 4b reaffirm that the difference in differential capability rating of 
high- and low-ranking participants is in fact because low-ranking participants are more self-
enhanced than high-ranking participants, rather than because low-ranking participants 
perceived the relative rank difference to be lower than high-ranking participants do.  
4.6 General Discussion 
 Across the four studies, this chapter has shown that rankings influence individuals’ 
perception of their own capabilities and of the capabilities of commensurate competitors, and 
that discrepancy in capability perception influences the predicted probability of winning a 
competition. High-ranking individuals, competing with similarly-ranked rivals, self-predicted 
a lower winning probability than low-ranking individuals competing with similarly ranked 
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rivals. The results were shown for field data (Study 1) and for experimental data (Study 2). 
The alternative explanation that the differential winning probability occurred because of 
differences in importance of winning between high- and low-ranking individuals was ruled 
out in Study 2. Likewise prior information about one’s ability was eliminated as a possible 
explanation in Study 3. It was shown in Study 4 that judgment about winning probabilities is 
based on perceived relative capabilities.  
The findings contribute to the growing literature on the importance of rankings and 
their influence on judgment and decision-making (Clark et al., 2010; Clark et al., 2009; 
Garcia and Tor, 2007) by investigating how rankings influence people’s perceptions of 
winning and relative capability. These are crucial judgments about important organisational 
and individual decisions (e.g. whether or not to enter a market or a competition). The findings 
also contribute to the broader literature on performance prediction (e.g. Kruger et al., 2008; 
Radzevick and Moore, 2008; Moore and Cain, 2007; Moore and Small, 2007; Moore et al., 
2007) by showing that the motivational factor, self-enhancement, can influence predicted 
winning probability, in addition to non-motivational factors that were widely demonstrated 
by past literature. Specifically, the findings show how people from different ranks can be 
self-enhanced and how this influences the prediction of competition outcome. 
From a practical point of view, the results suggest that rankings might signal 
capabilities. Individuals might use rankings to infer relative capabilities when information 
about absolute performance is unavailable or hard to collect. In these situations, our findings 
suggest that individuals make differential inferences about their capabilities: comparisons 
between low-ranking individuals are associated with relatively high subjective winning 
probabilities and pronounced differences in capabilities, whereas comparisons between high-
ranking individuals are associated with relatively low subjective winning probabilities and 
small differences in capabilities.  
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Even though this research presents several interesting findings, there are certain 
limitations which can serve as potential avenues for future work. First, there was no control 
condition in which individuals were not informed about rankings. Therefore, even though the 
findings show that there was a difference in predicted winning probabilities between high- 
and low-ranking individuals, it is still unclear whether or not the predictions of these two 
groups are different from the predictions of those without ranking information. Second, this 
thesis has focused mainly on individual decision-making. We know, however, that groups 
differ in many important ways from individuals (e.g. Charness and Sutter, 2012). As in many 
competitions, people compete in group, it is thus interesting to see whether the ranking effect 
on predicted winning probability extends to group decision-making. Third, it might be 
interesting to investigate how independent observers infer winning probabilities and 
capabilities of differentially ranked individuals, as many important decisions in organisations, 
such as hiring and promotion decisions involves judgment about the behaviour and skills of 
others (e.g. Harris and Schaubroeck, 1988). Fourth, it is also interesting to investigate how 
rankings influence other related aspects of confidence, such as betting and risk taking. 
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Chapter 5  
5 The Effect of Rankings on Pay Entitlement 
 
5.1 Hypotheses 
Pay entitlement relies heavily on social comparison. Individuals use the outcomes of 
others with similar jobs or qualifications to determine whether or not their pay is fair (Moore, 
1991; Major, 1989; Major and Forcey, 1985). However, even when individuals perceive a 
difference in outcome, they will feel entitled to the same outcome only if they consider it 
legitimate (Bylsma et al., 1995). Judging whether something is legitimate can be determined 
using various approaches, such as the contribution to outcomes (Gurin, 1985), or the extent to 
which an individual’s input is translated into outcomes (Major, 1994). 
Rankings, a signal of quality, can serve as a determinant of outcome legitimacy, 
which in turn influences pay entitlement. Since being near the top rank implies high 
competence, the outcomes of high-ranking individuals should be perceived by similarly-
ranked others as being more justifiable than the same outcomes of low-ranking individuals. 
All else being equal, those who perceive that the outcomes of similarly-performing others are 
justified are likely to feel entitled to similar outcomes (Bylsma et al., 1995), and demand 
similar outcomes when negotiating their pay. This line of reasoning implies that high-ranking 
individuals, when finding out the pay of their similarly-ranked colleagues, should feel entitled 
to the same pay and should demand that it be similar to their colleagues.  
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In contrast, as being at low ranks implies poor performance, the outcomes of low-
ranking individuals should be viewed as less legitimate than the same outcomes of high-
ranking individuals. Perceiving the illegitimate outcomes of others, individuals with similar 
performance are less likely to feel they should receive the same outcome (Bylsma et al., 
1995). Consequently, similarly-ranked individuals should feel less entitled to the same 
outcome, are less likely to be influenced by social comparison. As a result, they tend to 
demand lower pay than their colleagues. In short, when learning about the pay of similarly-
ranked others, individuals in different ranks should have different entitlement beliefs, which 
in turn lead to different pay requests. High-ranking individuals are likely to request higher 
pay than low-ranking individuals since the first group believes the pay of similarly-ranked 
colleagues is legitimate and feels more entitled than the second group. This leads to the 
following hypotheses. 
H1: Higher-ranked individuals will demand more pay than lower-ranked individuals, holding 
constant the pay level of similarly-ranked persons. 
H2: Rankings are expected to affect pay requests through their effect on personal entitlement. 
Without ranking information it is hard for individuals to determine the legitimacy of 
others’ outcomes. Those who believe that the outcomes are less legitimate, such as those in 
low ranks, will feel less entitled to – and are less likely to demand – the same outcomes. 
Those who believe the outcomes to be legitimate, which is more likely to be the case (Cook, 
1975), will feel that the outcomes received by others and their own outcomes align with 
performance. This suggests that they will be more tolerant to differences in outcome. As a 
result, when they learn about others’ pay, they are less likely to demand the same pay as 
others. Compared to high-ranked individuals, who tend to demand a similar level of pay as 
their similarly-ranked colleagues, and low-ranking individuals who tend to demand lower 
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pay, the pay requests of individuals who do not possess ranking information should be similar 
to that of low-ranking individuals. Taken together, I predict the following: 
H3: The pay requests of individuals who do not possess ranking information will be similar 
to that of low-ranking individuals, and will be lower than that of high-ranking individuals. 
As others’ outcomes decrease, differences in entitlement beliefs between high and 
low-ranking individuals should also decrease. Since being in a low rank confers 
incompetence, low-ranking individuals should feel that others’ outcomes are more justified 
and feel more entitled to similar outcomes as others’ outcomes decrease. As a result, they are 
likely to request similar pay when others’ pay is low rather than high. On the other hand, the 
high capability which is inferred from being ranked highly should lead high-ranking 
individuals to feel that the pay of similar others is justified, regardless of the amount. As a 
consequence, they should feel entitled to the same outcomes as similarly-ranked others and 
demand similar pay, regardless of others’ pay levels. Taken together, I predict that: 
H4: Outcome levels will moderate the effect of rankings on pay requests such that when the 
pay of similarly-ranked others is high, high-ranking individuals will request higher pay than 
low-ranking individuals. However, when the pay is low, the pay request of high and low 
ranking individuals will be similar.  
The Present Studies 
 The four hypotheses were tested across four studies. Study 1 investigated the effect of 
rankings on salary requests and showed how the effect is mediated by personal entitlement in 
a hypothetical situation of job change. Study 1 also showed that the effect of ranking was 
robust when comparing against the salary of both higher-ranked persons (Study 1a) and 
lower-ranked persons (Study 1b). However, one may argue the effect of ranking on pay 
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requests can be driven by differences in the perceived importance of having similar pay, since 
high-ranking individuals may feel it is more important to have similar pay to their similar-
ranked colleagues than low-ranking individuals do. As a result, the former demanded similar 
pay to their colleagues whereas the second group demanded lower pay. Study 2 ruled out this 
alternative explanation. Study 3 was a behavioural study which included a control condition, 
wherein no ranking information was provided. It showed how the ranking effect was 
moderated by the pay levels of the comparison person, and also showed that individuals from 
different ranks perceive the legitimacy of others’ outcomes differently. Study 4 showed that 
not only were individuals in requesting positions (e.g. candidates) affected by rankings, but 
also those in the offering positions (e.g. recruiters): the latter tended to respond in a similar 
way as the former. 
5.2 Study 1 
5.2.1 Study 1a 
Participants 
A total of 204 college graduates, recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
participated in a within-subjects questionnaire study online in exchange for $0.30. 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were asked to assume high rank (3 of 500) and low rank (498 of 500) 
in a counter-balanced within-subjects design. Participants in the first group started with the 
high-ranking condition, followed by the low-ranking condition. Participants in the second 
group started with the low-ranking condition, followed by the high-ranking condition. The 
exact scenario read: 
Imagine that you are an employee in a company. Your performance is ranked 3 (#498) 
out of 500 employees in the company (The 1
st
 rank belongs to the best performer). You 
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are looking for a new job. Your colleague, whose performance is ranked 2 (#497) in the 
same company, has just received an offer from a company, with a 20% increase in his/her 
salary. Another company has shown an interest in hiring you. You are negotiating a 
salary with them.  
Participants then responded to three questions. Requested salary was assessed by the 
question, “What is the minimum increase in salary (in percentage) that you are willing to 
accept? ______%.” (minimum=0, no maximum). Personal entitlement was the focus of the 
next question, “To what extent do you feel you deserve a 20% increase in salary from the 
new company?” (1=not at all, 9=very much). Finally, participants responded to the attention 
and manipulation check question, “What is your current rank in the imaginary company?” 
(minimum=1, maximum=500). 
Results 
Participants who did not answer the attention check question correctly were discarded 
from the analysis. Two participants completed both sets of questionnaires (high/low and 
low/high ranking conditions), and therefore their second responses were discarded. Two 
participants answered the minimum salary request in terms of salary amount (i.e. 50,000 and 
45,000), rather than with a percentage, and thus were also discarded from the analysis. This 
left a total of 164 valid responses for analysis. There was a significant order effect of rank 
(high/low vs. low/high) on dependent variables (Minimum salary request – high rank: F(1, 
162)=22.988, p=0.000, 2=0.124; low rank: F(1, 162)=3.809, p=0.053, 2=0.023; Personal 
entitlement – high rank: F(1, 162)=11.022, p=0.001, 2=0.064; low rank: F(1, 162)=10.274, 
p=0.002, 2=0.060). Thus, order was included as a covariate in the subsequent analyses. The 
results of a within-subjects ANOVA with the within-subjects factor rank (high vs. low), the 
dependent variable requested salary increase, and the covariate order showed that higher-
ranked individuals requested higher salary increases than lower-ranked individuals (F(1, 
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162)=33.881, p=0.000, 2=0.173). Table 5.1 shows the means and standard deviations of 
salary increase and personal entitlement as a function of rank.  
Table 5.1: Study 1a’s Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by Rank 
Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. 
Requested Salary Increase (%) Personal Entitlement Rating 
High (#3 out of 500) 18.95 6.74 High (#3 out of 500) 7.99 1.38 
Low (#498 out of 500) 12.66 6.34 Low (#498 out of 500) 5.16 2.60 
 
As predicted, the results also demonstrated the mediation effect for personal 
entitlement. The mediation analysis for a within-subjects design was carried out following 
Krull and MacKinnon’s (2001) procedure. All the regressions were controlled for order. First, 
rank (high vs. low) was a significant predictor of the outcome variable, i.e. requested salary 
increase (b=6.290, p=0.000). Rank was also a significant predictor of the mediator, i.e. 
personal entitlement (b=2.835, p=0.000). Finally, personal entitlement was a significant 
predictor of requested salary increase (b=1.493, p=0.000), controlling for rank. The drop in 
this coefﬁcient was signiﬁcant (Sobel z=8.133, p=0.000), which confirmed that requested 
salary increase was mediated by personal entitlement. 
5.2.2 Study 1b 
Participants 
A total of 204 college graduates, recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
participated in a brief within-subjects questionnaire study online in exchange for $0.30. 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were asked to assume high rank  (2 of 500)  and low rank  (497 of 500)  
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in a counter-balanced within-subjects design. Participants in the first group started with the 
high-ranking condition and then participated in the low-ranking condition. Participants in the 
second group started with the low-ranking condition, followed by the high-ranking condition. 
The exact scenario read: 
Imagine that you are an employee in a company. Your performance is ranked 2 (#497) 
out of 500 employees in the company. (The 1
st
 rank belongs to the best performer). You 
are looking for a new job. Your colleague, whose performance is ranked 3 (#498) in the 
same company, has just received an offer from a company, with a 20% increase in his/her 
salary. Another company has shown an interest in hiring you. You are negotiating a 
salary with them. 
Participants then responded to three questions: Requested salary was assessed by the 
question, “What is the minimum increase in salary (in percentage) that you are willing to 
accept? ______%.” (minimum=0, no maximum). Personal entitlement was the focus of the 
following question, “To what extent do you feel you deserve a 20% increase in salary from 
the new company?” (1=not at all, 9=very much). Finally, participants responded to the 
attention check question, “What is your current rank in the imaginary company?” 
(minimum=1, maximum=500). 
Results 
Participants who did not answer the attention check question correctly were discarded 
from the analysis. Four participants completed both sets of questionnaires (high/low and 
low/high ranking conditions), and therefore their second responses were discarded. This left a 
total of 180 valid responses for analysis. There was no significant order effect of rank 
(high/low vs. low/high) on the dependent measure, requested salary increase (high rank: F(1, 
178)=2.429, p=0.121, 2=0.013; low rank: F(1, 177)=0.418, p=0.519, 2=0.002), and no 
significant order effect on personal entitlement for the high-ranking condition (F(1, 
177)=0.633, p=0.427, 2=0.004). However, there was an order effect on personal entitlement 
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for the low-ranking condition (F(1, 177)=8.913, p=0.003, 2=0.048). Therefore, order was 
included as a covariate for the subsequent analyses. The results of a within-subjects ANOVA 
with the within-subjects factor rank (high vs. low), the dependent variable requested salary 
increase, and the covariate order replicated the findings of Study 1a: higher-ranked 
individuals requested higher salary increases than lower-ranked individuals (F(1, 177)= 
107.341, p=0.000, 2=0.378). Table 5.2 shows the means and standard deviations of 
requested salary increase and personal entitlement as a function of rank. Figure 5.1 compares 
the mean requested salary increase of Study 1a and Study 1b. Unsurprisingly, participants 
generally demanded higher salary increases when comparing themselves with lower-ranked 
colleagues than with higher-ranked colleagues. 
Table 5.2: Study 1b’s Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by Rank 
Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. 
Requested Salary Increase (%) Personal Entitlement Rating 
High (#2 out of 500) 22.58 6.86 High (#2 out of 500) 8.28 0.98 
Low (#497 out of 500) 14.26 6.85 Low (#497 out of 500) 5.05 2.63 
 
Figure 5.1: Mean Requested Salary Increase by Rank and Comparison Direction 
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The results also demonstrated the mediation effect for personal entitlement. First, rank 
(high vs. low) was a significant predictor of the outcome variable, i.e. requested salary 
increase (b=8.312, p=0.000). Rank was also a significant predictor of the mediator, i.e. 
personal entitlement (b=3.236, p=0.000). Finally, personal entitlement was a significant 
predictor of requested salary increase (b=1.409, p=0.000), controlling for rank. The drop in 
this coefﬁcient was signiﬁcant (Sobel z=7.792, p=0.000), which confirmed that requested 
salary increase was mediated by personal entitlement. Note that all the regressions were 
controlled for order. 
Discussion 
 Study 1 shows that performance rank is a better predictor of requested salary increase 
than the salary increase of a commensurate colleague. Even though the salary increase of the 
colleague can influence individuals’ salary requests through anchoring (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974) or social comparison processes (Festinger, 1954),  individuals tend to 
adjust their request based on their ranks,  with higher-ranked individuals requesting higher 
increases than lower-ranked individuals. Study 1 also shows that perceived entitlement 
mediated the effect of rankings on requested salary increase. High-ranking individuals, 
compared to low-ranking individuals, felt more entitled to increases in salary similar to their 
colleagues, resulting in the former requesting a higher increase in salary, regardless of the 
comparison direction. However, one possible explanation for the ranking effect on salary 
request is that individuals from different ranks may have different concerns regarding relative 
pay. Pride may be more important for high-ranking individuals, and they may be more 
defensive than low-ranking individuals (Sloman et al., 2003; Fournier et al., 2002). As a 
result, this first group may be less tolerant to pay differences, feeling it is more important to 
receive similar pay as their colleagues. Study 2 addresses this issue.  
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5.3 Study 2 
Participants 
A total of 150 college graduates, recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
participated in a between-subjects questionnaire study online in exchange for $0.15. 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three between-subjects conditions 
(high, intermediate, and low ranks). Participants were then informed about their performance 
rank as an employee of a large US corporation. The exact wording was as follows: 
Imagine that you are an employee in a large company in the US. Your performance is 
ranked 3 (#251, #498) out of 500 in the company. (The 1st rank belongs to the best 
performer). You are looking for a new job. Your colleague, whose performance is ranked 
2 (#250, #497) in the same company, has just received an offer from a company, with a 
20% increase in his/her salary. Another company has shown an interest in hiring you. 
You are negotiating a salary with them. 
Participants then responded to the three questions: Requested salary was assessed by 
the question, “What is the minimum increase in salary (in percentage) that you are willing to 
accept? ______%” (minimum=0, no maximum). To measure the concern about relative pay, 
participants responded to the question, “How important is it that the increase (in percentage) 
in your salary is no less than the increase in your colleague’s salary? (1=not at all important, 
9=very important)” Finally, to check participants’ attention and understanding of the task, 
participants were asked, “What is your current rank?” (minimum=1, maximum=500). 
Results  
Eight participants did not correctly answer the attention check question, and were 
discarded from the analysis. As predicted, the importance of receiving similar pay did not 
differ significantly between ranking conditions (F(2, 135) = 0.648, p = 0.525, 2 = 0.010; 
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linear trend: F(1, 135) = 1.287, p = 0.259, 2 = 0.009). The results of a one-way ANOVA 
with requested salary as the dependent variable, ranks as the independent variable, and 
importance rating as the covariate revealed that the requested salary increase increased 
monotonically according to the participants’ rank: higher-ranked individuals requested a 
significantly higher salary increase than lower-ranked individuals (F(2, 134)=3.102, p=0.048, 
2=0.044; linear trend: F(1, 134)=6.202, p=0.014, 2 = 0.044). Table 5.3 shows the means 
and standard deviations of requested salary increase and importance of similar pay rating as a 
function of rank. 
Table 5.3: Study 2’s Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by Rank 
Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. 
Requested Salary Increase (%) Importance of Similar Pay Rating 
High (#3 out of 500) 19.29 8.47 High (#3 out of 500) 6.09 2.57 
Intermediate (#251 out of 500) 17.40 5.64 Intermediate (#251 out of 500) 5.79 2.83 
Low (#498 out of 500) 15.29 6.32 Low (#498 out of 500) 5.40 3.21 
 
Discussion 
The results of Study 2 suggest that the effect of rankings on salary requests was not 
driven by the different level of concern about the relative pay of participants and their  
 
colleagues, but rather by the difference in entitlement beliefs as shown in Study 1a and 1b. 
It is suggested that the decision-making approach used in the previous studies served 
as a basis to examine the various effects of behavioural decision making research, and it is 
believed to be appropriate and legitimate (Garcia et al., 2006; Kuhberger et al., 2002). 
Additionally, research has suggested that the difference between hypothetical and real 
decisions will become manifest particularly in studies involving “visceral emotional changes” 
as opposed to ones involving financial incentives (Kuhberger et al., 2002), as in the studies in 
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this chapter. I, however, seek to confirm that the ranking effect found in previous studies also 
manifests itself given real financial consequences. In the next study, the ranking effect on pay 
entitlement is explored by letting participants ask for real financial payoffs, rather than 
hypothetical ones. It also includes the control condition, where no ranking feedback was 
provided. 
5.4 Study 3  
Participants 
A total of 159 college graduates (73 women, 86 men, average age 33) recruited from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk, participated in an online study in exchange for $1.00 plus a bonus 
payment which depended on the amount they requested, as explained below. 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions with the between-
subjects factor rank (control-no ranking information, high rank, and low rank) and the 
between-subjects factor comparative bonus request (high and low bonus requests of 
similarly-ranked  rival).  At the beginning of the task, participants were informed that they 
would be undertaking a timed numerical task, and would be paid a bonus in addition to the 
fixed payment. The exact scenario was the following: 
Welcome and thank you for participating in our study! 
The study will consist of a timed numerical task. After the timed task, you will answer a 
set of brief questions. To encourage you to perform as well as possible, we will pay a 
bonus in addition to the fixed payment stated in the HIT description. The currency units 
that we are using are denoted as ECU, where 100 ECU equals $1. 
 On the next screen, participants read the following task instructions. 
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The following is a timed numerical task that will be scored and compared to your peers 
who have also completed this task. The task will be scored according to how fast you are 
without compromising accuracy. 
On the next screens you will be given 5 matrices. Each matrix contains 12 numbers 
similar to the one shown below. For each matrix, your task is to find the two numbers that 
add up to 10. For example, the correct answer for the matrix below is 3.58 and 6.42. You 
can submit your answer by clicking on the corresponding cells and then press the button 
CONTINUE.  
 
9.38 6.74 8.17 
5.15 6.61 3.06 
9.71 0.91 4.88 
3.58 4.87 6.42 
 
Participants started their first matrix on the next screen. After they had completed the 
five matrices, they were randomly assigned to one of the ranking conditions: control (no 
ranking information), high (#2 of 196) or low (#122 of 196), and either a high (280 ECU) or a 
low (80 ECU) bonus request by another person (i.e. one who had already completed the task, 
whose rank was #3 or #123). Participants were then informed about their rank, the number of 
individuals who had completed the study before them, and the bonus request of the lower-
ranked person. Specifically: 
[Based on the results, you were ranked #2 (#122) out of 196 participants thus far.]  
For this type of task, we typically pay a bonus of 100 ECU [to a person who performs 
relatively well (poor)]. However, we allow you to request your own bonus. The 
participant who was ranked #3 (ranked #123, just before you) requested 80 (280) ECU. 
 
The sentences in square brackets were omitted in the control condition. Participants in 
the control condition were then asked “What bonus (in ECU) do you think you should be 
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paid?” (minimum=0, maximum=1,000). Participants in the high and low-ranking conditions 
were asked “You are ranked #2 (#122) out of 196. What bonus (in ECU) do you think you 
should be paid?” (minimum=0, maximum=1,000).  
On the next screen, all participants responded to five questions. The perceived 
justification of bonus requests was assessed by the questions: “To what extent do you feel it 
would be easy to justify 80/280 ECU?” (1=not at all, 9=very much). Participants were then 
asked to predict their own rank: “Disregarding the rank information that we gave you, what 
was your gut feeling about your own rank? Out of 196 participants, which rank did you 
expect?” Then, participants read the attention check question as follows: 
We are grateful to all the Amazon MTurks who participate in our studies. Indeed, you 
really help researchers like us tremendously. Sometimes when we ask questions, we are 
interested in what participants think, what their attitudes are, what their opinions are, etc. 
However, sometimes the questions can be quite long and oftentimes people do not take 
the time to read the entire question. In this question, we will ask you a question about 
which of the following spare time activities is most appealing to you. However, we do not 
want you to answer this question. Just skip this question entirely. We are using this 
question to make sure that people are reading the instructions carefully. 
Which of the following spare time activities is most appealing to you? 
☐ Video games ☐ Movies ☐ Sports ☐ Reading ☐ Hiking 
Finally, participants were asked about their gender and age. After completing the 
study, participants received the money for their participation and their bonus based on the 
amount requested. 
Results 
Seven responses were discarded from the analysis, constituting six participants who 
answered the attention check question and one who requested a bonus of $1,000, which, as  
 
per Hoaglin et al. (1986), was considered to be an outlier. 
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In all conditions, the performance of participants, i.e. total scores (the number of 
matrices correctly solved) and the average time spent on each matrix, was not statistically 
different, and was included as covariates in all subsequent analyses. The results of a two-way 
ANOVA with total score (i.e. the number of matrices correctly solved) as the dependent 
variable, and rank (control, high, and low) and comparative bonus request (high vs. low) as 
the between-subjects factors showed no main effect of ranking (F(2, 146)=0.401, p=0.670, 
2=0.005), of comparative request (F(1, 146)=0.240, p=0.625, 2=0.002), or interaction 
effect for rank x comparative request (F(2, 146)=0.200, p=0.819, 2=0.003). Similarly, the 
results of a two-way ANOVA with average answering time per matrix as the dependent 
variable, and rank (control, high, and low) and comparative bonus request (high vs. low) as 
the between-subjects factors showed no main effect of ranking (F(2, 145)=0.477, p=0.622, 
2=0.007), of comparative request (F(1, 145)=0.000, p=0.988, 2=0.000), or interaction 
effect for rank x comparative request (F(2, 145)=0.069, p=0.933, 2=0.001).  
The results of a two-way ANOVA with the between-subjects factors rank (control, 
high, and low) and comparative bonus request (high vs. low), the dependent variable 
requested bonus, and the covariates predicted rank, total score, and average answering time 
indicated that there were the significant interaction effect for rank x comparative bonus 
request (F(2, 142)=3.216, p=0.043, 2=0.043), the significant main effect of rank (F(2, 
142)=4.016, p=0.020, 2=0.054), and the significant main effect of comparative request (F(1, 
142)=188.326, p=0.000, 2=0.570). Specifically, when the comparative request was high, 
highly-ranked individuals requested higher bonus payments than low-ranked individuals and 
individuals without ranking information. The contrast -1 (no ranking information), 2 (high 
rank), -1 (low rank) was significant (F(1, 70)=8.515, p=0.005, 2=0.108). However, as shown 
in Figure 5.2, when the comparative request was low, the bonus requests of the three groups 
with the same contrast (-1, 2, -1) were not significantly different (F(1, 69)=0.463, p=0.499, 
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2=0.007). Table 5.4 shows the means and standard deviations of bonus request and 
perceived justification rating by rank and comparative bonus request. 
Table 5.4: Study 3’s Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables  
by Rank and Comparative Bonus Request 
Rank 
Comparative Request 
Rank 
Comparative Request 
High (280) Low (80) High (280) Low (80) 
Bonus Request   Perceived Justification  
Control 
255.22 
(110.16) 
85.33 
(40.15) 
Control 
5.78 
(2.65) 
6.46 
(1.91) 
High (#2 out of 196)  
317.96 
(89.12) 
98.92 
(41.22) 
High (#2 out of 196)  
7.15 
(1.88) 
7.15 
(1.91) 
Low (#122 out of 196) 
231.73 
(113.40) 
85.03 
(55.58) 
Low (#122 out of 196) 
4.88 
(2.27) 
7.16 
(2.30) 
   Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
The perceived justification of the bonus request was asked through the question: “To 
what extent do you feel it would be easy to justify 80/280 ECU?” Similar to the bonus 
request, the results of a two-way ANOVA with the between-subjects factors rank (control,  
high, and low) and comparative bonus request (high vs. low), the dependent variable 
perceived justification, and the covariates predicted rank, total score, and average answering 
time indicated the significant interaction effect (F(2, 142)=3.810, p=0.024, 2=0.051), the 
significant main effect of rank (F(2, 142)=3.534, p=0.032, 2=0.047), and the significant 
main effect of comparative request (F(1, 142)=7.509, p=0.007, 2=0.050). As shown in 
Figure 5.3,  high-ranking participants in the high comparative request condition  considered it  
easier to justify the bonus requested by the other person than participants in either the low or 
no ranking condition. The contrast -1 (no ranking information), 2 (high rank), -1 (low rank) 
was significant (F(1, 70)=11.156, p=0.001, 2=0.137). However, the same contrast in the low 
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comparative bonus request condition was not significant (F(1, 69)=0.016, p=0.899, 
2=0.000): participants in the three ranking groups did not differ in the justification rating.  
Figure 5.2: Mean Bonus Request 
by Rank and Comparative Bonus Request 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Mean Perceived Justification 
Rating by Rank and Comparative Bonus 
Request 
 
Discussion 
Study 3 introduced monetary incentives in order to demonstrate that the findings can 
be generalised to situations which are not hypothetical. Individuals rely on rank, in addition 
to other people’s requests, when requesting their own bonus. High-ranking individuals, in 
comparison to low-ranking individuals and those without rank, believed it was easier to 
justify the bonus request of the person in the comparison. Consequently, they felt more 
entitled, and requested a higher bonus than the other two groups. Once the bonus figure of the 
person in the comparison decreased, individuals in the low-ranking and no-ranking conditions 
considered it easier to justify the comparative bonus, and so were felt more entitled to a 
similar bonus amount. As a result, the ranking effect on the bonus request attenuates: the 
bonus requests of individuals in all ranking conditions were not different when the 
comparative bonus request was low. Study 3 also reveals that individuals without ranking 
information requested similar bonus amounts to those in the low-ranking conditions, 
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suggesting that ranking feedback helps those with high performance to justify their pay 
requests and demand higher pay. 
5.5 Study 4 
Participants 
A total of 308 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, participated in 
an online study in exchange for $0.35. 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions with the between-
subjects factor rank (control-no ranking information, high rank, and low rank) and the 
between-subjects factor role (candidate vs. recruiter). The exact scenario for the recruiter 
condition read:  
Imagine that you are recruiting a new staff for your company and have found one 
candidate whose profile matches with the requirements. You are considering offering this 
candidate a position in your company, and are negotiating with him/her the salary. 
[The candidate was ranked #3 (#283) out of 300 employees in his/her previous 
company (The 1
st
 rank belongs to the best performer).] You have learned from this 
candidate that his/her colleague [who was ranked #4 (#284)] in the same company has 
received an offer from another company with a 25% increase in salary. 
The words in the square brackets were omitted in the control (no ranking information) 
condition. Participants assuming the recruiter role then responded to five questions. The first 
question assessed offered salary by asking, “What is the percentage increase in salary that 
you are willing to offer to this candidate?  ______%.” (minimum=0, no maximum).  
Secondly, entitlement belief was assessed by the following, “To what extent do you feel this 
candidate deserves a 25% increase in salary?” (1=not at all, 9=very much) and “To what 
extent do you feel it would be easy to justify a 25% increase in salary?” (1=not at all, 9=very 
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much). Finally, participants responded to two attention and manipulation check questions. 
One question instructed them to simply skip a part of the questionnaire and the other question 
asked “What is the rank of this candidate in his previous company? (If unknown, please 
answer "unknown")” (minimum=1, maximum=300).  
The exact scenario for the candidate condition read:  
Imagine that you are an employee in a company. [Your performance is ranked #3 
(#283) out of 300 in the company (The 1
st
 rank belongs to the best performer).] You are 
looking for a new job. Your colleague [, whose performance is ranked #4 (#284) in the 
same company,] has just received an offer from a company, with a 25% increase in 
his/her salary. Another company has shown an interest in hiring you. You are negotiating 
a salary with them. 
The words in the square brackets were omitted in the control (no ranking information) 
condition. Participants assuming the candidate role then responded to the five questions: 
Requested salary was assessed by the question, “What is the minimum percentage increase in 
salary that you are willing to accept?  ______%.” (minimum=0, no maximum). Entitlement 
belief was assessed by the following questions, “To what extent do you feel you deserve a 
25% increase in salary?” (1=not at all, 9=very much), and “To what extent do you feel it 
would be easy to justify a 25% increase in salary?” (1=not at all, 9=very much). Finally, 
participants responded to the two attention and manipulation check questions discussed 
above. 
Results 
Participants who did not answer the attention and manipulation check questions 
correctly were discarded from the analysis. In total, there were 269 valid observations. The 
results of a two-way ANOVA with the dependent variable proposed salary, and between-
subjects factors rank and role showed that there was a significant difference between ranking 
conditions (F(2, 263)=19.322, p=0.000, 2=0.128). Specifically, high-ranking participants 
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requested/offered higher salary increases than low-ranking and no-ranking participants, as 
shown in Figure 5.4. The contrast -1 (no ranking information), 2 (high rank), -1 (low rank) 
was significant (F(1, 263)=31.774, p=0.000, 2=0.108). The main role effect and the 
interaction effect for rank x role were not statistically significant (Main effect: F(1, 
263)=0.128, p=0.720, 2=0.000; Interaction effect: F(2, 263)=0.998, p=0.370, 2=0.008). 
Table 5.5 displays the means and standard deviations of proposed salary increase and 
entitlement belief by rank and role. 
Table 5.5: Study 4’s Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables 
by Rank and Role 
Rank 
Role 
Rank 
Role 
Recruiter Candidate Recruiter Candidate 
Proposed Salary Increase (%) Entitlement Belief  
Control  
22.71 
(7.08) 
21.19 
(7.31) 
Control  
6.34 
(2.15) 
7.32 
(1.79) 
High (#3 out of 300)  
25.38 
(6.05) 
26.98 
(10.82) 
High (#3 out of 300)  
7.19 
(1.92) 
8.27 
(1.00) 
Low (#283 out of 300) 
17.92 
(9.10) 
18.90 
(6.96) 
Low (#283 out of 300) 
4.90 
(2.67) 
5.39 
(2.26) 
   Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Entitlement belief was the average rating of these two questions: “To what extent do 
you feel you deserve a 25% increase in salary?”, and “To what extent do you feel it would be 
easy to justify a 25% increase in salary?”. The Cronbach’s Alpha was 0.920. Similar to the 
proposed salary, the results of a two-way ANOVA with entitlement belief as the dependent 
variable, and rank and role as the between-subjects factors indicated the significant main 
effect of rankings (F(2, 263)=34.707, p=0.000, 2=0.209). Participants in the high-ranking 
condition felt that they (or their candidates) are more entitled to the similar salary increase as 
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the person in the comparison than participants in the low- and no-ranking conditions, as 
shown in Figure 5.5. The contrast -1 (no ranking information), 2 (high rank), -1 (low rank) 
was significant (F(1, 263)=42.371, p=0.000, 2=0.139). The main role effect was significant 
(F(1, 263)=11.619, p=0.001, 2=0.042), but the interaction effect for rank x role was not 
significant (F(2, 263)=0.524, p=0.593, 2=0.004).  
 
Figure 5.4: Mean Proposed Pay Increase 
by Rank and Role 
 
Figure 5.5: Mean Entitlement Belief 
by Rank and Role 
 
Discussion 
The findings of Study 4 replicate those of Study 3, showing that ranking influences 
both requesting and offering individuals. High-ranking candidates and recruiters 
requested/offered higher pay than those in the low- and no-ranking condition. Additionally, 
both candidates and recruiters tend to agree on the amount of salary increase, i.e. the offered 
salary tends to be close to the requested salary. Even though recruiters rated entitlement 
belief for their candidates lower than the candidates did, this difference was not strong 
enough to make the offered salary lower than the requested salary in all ranking conditions. 
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5.6 General Discussion 
 Across  the four studies  I  showed that  rankings  influence  individuals’  pay requests  
through entitlement beliefs. High-ranking individuals, when compared to low-ranking 
individuals, feel more entitled to the same pay as their similarly-ranked colleagues, and in 
turn demand higher pay (Study 1 and Study 2). This relationship between one’s rankings and 
pay request is moderated by the pay amount that similarly-ranked persons receive (Study 3). 
More precisely, as the pay amount decreases, the difference in pay requests of high and low-
ranking individuals attenuates. Additionally, without ranking information, individuals tend to 
behave like those with low ranks, such that they demand similar pay as low-ranking 
individuals, and lower pay than high-ranking individuals (Study 3 and Study 4). The effect of 
rankings on pay requests remains robust across both comparison directions: with a higher- or 
lower-ranked colleague (Study 1), and the roles of both candidate and recruiter (Study 4). 
The findings contribute to the literature on the influence of rankings on judgment and 
behaviour by showing how individuals use them to justify and negotiate their pay. The 
findings also contribute to the literature on pay entitlement, which has suggested that pay 
entitlement hinges predominantly on social comparison and focused mainly on gender, rather 
than performance feedback, as a determinant of entitlement. However, since pay is often a 
reflection of performance (Prendergast, 1999) and unfulfilled pay entitlement can lead to 
counterproductive behaviour (Paul et al., 2000), it is necessary to understand how 
performance feedback influences pay entitlement. The findings in this chapter shows how 
performance feedback, and ranking in particular, can be used as a determinant of legitimacy 
and pay entitlement, and is given priority over social comparisons.  
From a practical point of view, the findings help organisations learn about the pay 
entitlement of employees, and reduce the chance of unfulfilled entitlement, which could 
negatively influence employees’ behaviour and attitude. The findings suggest that individuals 
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use ranking information to infer competence and justify pay. Without ranking information, 
individuals tend to demand pay at a similar level to those with a low-ranking condition, and 
lower pay than those with a high-ranking condition. This implies that ranking feedback 
specifically helps high-ranking individuals justify their pay and demand pay which is as 
equally high as their colleagues’. Even though both high-ranking candidates and recruiters 
agree on the pay as shown in Study 4, the finding suggests that organisations may be at a 
disadvantage since they may need to pay (albeit voluntarily) high-ranking candidates more 
compared to when ranking feedback is not available.  
However, by abandoning performance feedback that differentiates poor, average, and 
high performers, or ranking feedback in particular, and adopting a flat pay plan, organisations 
may find that their employees lack the motivation to perform. Additionally, employees’ sense 
of entitlement may even be heightened (Fisk, 2010). Specifically, employees may expect to 
receive the same rewards as others without performing adequately, and such expectation can 
increase their feelings of entitlement (Fisk, 2010). Although Studies 3 and 4 show that 
employees without ranking information request lower pay than comparable others, suggesting 
that they feel less entitled to the same pay, in the longer term this unequal pay may create 
doubt and ambiguity as to which factors contribute to pay (Fisk, 2010). As a result, 
employees may turn to irrelevant performance factors such as age or gender and place too 
much value in these factors (Fisk, 2010). This behaviour may eventually boost their sense of 
entitlement (Naumann et al., 2002). Consequently, even though ranking helps high-ranking 
individuals justify their pay, which may put organisations at a disadvantage, it may lead to 
better overall results than overly-lenient performance feedback. 
The findings also help organisations make appropriate and attractive offers to 
potential candidates, based on their expectations. More precisely, the moderating role of 
comparative pay suggests that if organisations want a high-ranking candidate to accept their 
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offer, they will need to offer the candidate at least the same as his colleagues’ pay regardless 
of its level. For low-ranking individuals, however, the amount offered depends on whether or 
not the low-ranking individuals perceive their colleagues’ pay to be justified. If low-ranking 
individuals cannot justify their colleagues’ pay, they will not feel entitled to the same pay. In 
this case, organisations can make an offer lower than the comparative pay. On the other hand, 
if they perceive their colleagues’ pay to be justified, organisations will need to offer low-
ranking candidates similar pay. Hence, it may be beneficial for recruiters to find out about the 
rank of their potential candidates and the pay of their candidates’ colleagues. 
Future work can extend the present findings in several important ways. First, the 
present studies only consider entitlement as cash compensation. It would be interesting and 
important to see whether the ranking effect on entitlement extends to fringe benefits such as 
holidays or health insurance. Since fringe benefits are often undervalued (Wilson et al., 1985) 
and their perceived values varied markedly from one employee to another (Chiu et al., 2002), 
the ranking effect on benefits entitlement may not be as strong as on pay entitlement. Second, 
the present studies consider only one-way requests/offers of candidates/recruiters. It would be 
interesting to investigate the behaviour of the two parties in a negotiation. Since occupying 
high ranks implies high competence, high-ranking individuals may exert more confidence, 
and perhaps be more competitive, when negotiating their pay. Future work can also 
investigate whether or not the present findings can also be further explained by the law of 
demand and supply. Specifically, there are fewer candidates (supply) at the top than at the 
bottom. The limited supply may make recruiters be more willing to pay higher for those near 
the top than for those near the bottom. Similarly, it may make candidates feel more entitled 
and in turn request more pay when they are in higher ranks than lower ranks, as demonstrated 
in the present research. Finally, since high-ranking individuals request higher pay than low-
ranking individuals, and higher expectations are more likely to lead to disappointment (Bell, 
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1985), it may be worthwhile to explore whether high-ranking individuals are more likely than 
low-ranking individuals to experience disappointment and dissatisfaction. 
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Chapter 6  
6 The Effect of Rankings on Cooperation Decision 
 
6.1 Hypotheses 
When making social decisions, individuals need to not only consider their own 
outcomes but also the outcomes of others. These decisions can be influenced by the 
situational context since individuals tend to make different decisions when they are in a loss 
situation as compared to a gain situation. In a loss situation, individuals tend to be more 
individualistic: they maximise only their own outcomes (Poppe and Valkenberg, 2003) and 
are less concerned about relative outcome differences (de Dreu et al., 1994b). 
Individuals’ social decisions are also influenced by rank. Rankings create two 
meaningful standards: the top standard motivates high-ranking individuals as a goal whereas 
the bottom standard acts as an incentive for low-ranking individuals to desperately avoid. In a 
gain situation, these motivations lead individuals near the top and the bottom to try hard not 
to fall in rank. As a consequence, high- and low-ranking individuals tend to feel more 
competitive towards their rivals and are thus more concerned about relative outcomes than 
those far away from the standards. This means they are likely not to cooperate with their 
commensurate rivals if their rivals benefit more from the cooperation than they do (Garcia 
and Tor, 2007; Garcia et al., 2006). In other words, concern about others being surpassed in 
rank is more intense than the perceived benefits from cooperation.  
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However, when facing a loss situation, the cooperation decisions of high and low-
ranking individuals are likely to differ. Generally speaking, due to loss aversion (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1991), both groups of individuals are likely to perceive the same increase in 
cooperation outcomes as being more beneficial when facing losses than gains. However, 
since having a high ranking communicates success and creates pride (Sloman et al., 2003), 
when such individuals are in a loss situation they tend to be concerned about maintaining 
their reputation as a strong performer, and are likely to shift their focus from relative outcome 
differences to perceived benefit increases. Specifically, they are likely to focus less on 
relative outcomes difference from cooperation, and therefore feel less competitive towards 
their rivals. As a consequence, they tend to decide to cooperate when cooperation leads to 
superior performance. On the other hand, because low-ranking individuals are not reputed to 
be strong performers, it is not as necessary for them to maintain their good performance in a 
loss situation. Thus, even though they perceive higher benefits from cooperation in a loss 
situation, they are still concerned about relative outcome differences. As a result, low-ranking 
individuals should feel equally competitive towards their rivals and choose not to cooperate 
when they are facing a loss as well as a gain. This discussion thus suggests the following: 
H1: (a) High-ranking individuals are more likely to cooperate with a commensurate rival in 
loss as opposed to gain situations. (b) In both situations there is no difference in the 
cooperation decision of low-ranking individuals. 
H2: (a) High-ranking individuals feel less competitive towards a commensurate rival in loss 
as opposed to gain situations. (b) In both situations there is no difference in competitive 
feelings of low-ranking individuals. 
The cooperation behaviour of high- and low-ranking individuals should not be 
manifested only in real gain and loss situations. The literature on framing effects suggests 
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that individuals are also influenced by frames, tending to make different decisions when 
choices that are essentially the same are described differently (Kuhberger, 1998; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981). Individuals presented with a negative (positive) frame are likely to 
perceive outcomes as losses (gains), and make decisions as if they are presented with real 
losses (gains). Given that higher-ranked individuals are more likely to cooperate with a 
commensurate rival in a loss rather than a gain situation while lower-ranked individuals are 
more consistent in their cooperation decisions regardless of the situational context 
(Hypothesis 1), I predict the following:  
H3: (a) High-ranking individuals are more likely to cooperate with a commensurate rival in 
negatively-framed situations rather than positively-framed situations. (b) There is no 
difference in the cooperation decision of low-ranking individuals in both situations. 
The Present Studies 
 All three hypotheses were tested across three studies. Study 1 explored the 
cooperation decisions of high- and low-ranking individuals under gain and loss situations. 
Study 2 investigated how rankings and situational contexts influence individuals’ competitive 
feelings towards their rivals. Study 3 examined the cooperation decisions of high and low-
ranking individuals under two situations which have the same payoffs, but which were 
positively and negatively framed. 
6.2 Study 1 
Participants 
A total of 160 participants, recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, participated in a  
questionnaire study online in exchange for $0.15. 
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Design and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two between-subjects ranking 
conditions (high vs. low). In each ranking condition, participants were asked to assume the 
role of CEO and decide whether or not to cooperate with their rival in the counter-balanced 
loss and gain situations. The first group of participants started with loss then gain situations. 
The second group started with gain then loss situations. 
The exact scenario in the loss condition read:  
Imagine that you are the CEO of a company that is ranked #3 (#500) on the prestigious 
Fortune 500. This is the recession period, and it is likely that your company will be 
facing losses this year. To limit losses, you are thinking about a possible alliance with a 
rival company ranked #4 (#501, just off the list). The return will depend on whether or 
not you form an alliance.  
Strategy A: With an alliance, your company’s return will be -5% and your rival’s  
     return will be -1%.  
Strategy B: Without an alliance, your company’s return will be -6% and your rival’s  
     return will be -6%. 
Participants then responded to the question, “Which strategy would you choose?” A: 
Form an alliance, B: Not form an alliance. 
The exact scenario in the gain condition read:  
Imagine that you are the CEO of a company that is ranked #3 (#500) on the prestigious 
Fortune 500. This is the normal period, and it is likely that your company will have 
profits this year. To gain higher profits, you are thinking about a possible alliance with a 
rival company rank #4 (#501, just off the list). The returns will depend on whether or not 
you form an alliance.  
Strategy A: With an alliance, your company’s return will be 7% and your rival’s  
     return will be 11%.  
Strategy B: Without an alliance, your company’s return will be 6% and your rival’s  
                   return will be 6%. 
Participants then responded to the question, “Which strategy would you choose?” A: 
Form an alliance. B: Not form an alliance.  
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Finally, participants responded to the attention and manipulation check question, 
“What is your imaginary company’s rank?” 
Results 
Participants who did not answer the attention check question correctly were discarded 
from the analysis, which resulted in a total of 142 valid responses. There was no significant 
order effect of situational context (gain/loss vs. loss/gain) on the dependent measure (High-
ranking condition – gain situation: b=0.452, p=0.186; loss situation: b=-0.571, p=0.100; 
Low-ranking condition – gain situation: b=0.571, p=0.100; loss situation: b=0.336, p=0.320). 
Therefore, the data was combined for the subsequent analyses. As predicted, the results of the 
Generalised Estimating Equations (GEE), with cooperation decision as the dependent 
variable and situational context  (gain vs loss) as the independent variable,  showed that high- 
ranking participants decided to cooperate significantly more frequently when their company 
was facing a loss rather than a gain  (χ2(1) = 6.304, p = 0.012).  However, the decisions of 
low-ranking participants did not significantly change when they were facing a loss rather than 
a gain (χ2(1) = 1.081, p = 0.299). Figure 6.1 shows the percentage of participants who chose 
to cooperate by rank and situational context.  
Figure 6.1: Percentage of Participants Choosing to Cooperate  
by Rank and Situational Context 
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Discussion 
The results suggest that high-ranking individuals tended to maximise their return by 
cooperating with their rival more frequently when facing a loss rather than a gain. However, 
the decisions of low-ranking individuals were similar in both situations. Study 1, however, 
did not reveal what was motivating and driving the cooperation decisions. To decide whether 
or not to cooperate with commensurate rivals, individuals need to weigh their own benefits 
against the competitive feelings which arise when their rivals receive a higher payoff than 
them. It is possible that the cooperation decision of high-ranking individuals depends on a 
situational context whereas that of low-ranking individuals does not because 1) the difference 
in perceived benefits from cooperation between a gain or loss situation is lower in low-
ranking individuals than high-ranking individuals, or 2) the difference in competitive feelings 
between gain and loss situations of low-ranking individuals is lower than high-ranking 
individuals, or potentially both. Study 2 aims to investigate this.  
6.3 Study 2 
Participants 
A total of 380 participants, recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, participated in 
a questionnaire study online in exchange for $0.30. 
Design and Procedure 
As in Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of two between-subjects 
ranking conditions (high vs. low). In each ranking condition, each participant was asked to 
assume the role of a CEO, and to rate the perceived benefits from cooperation as well as their 
competitive feelings towards their rival in counter-balanced loss and gain situations. The first 
group of participants started with a loss, followed by a gain situation. The second group 
started with a gain, then followed with a loss situation. 
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The exact scenario in the loss condition read:  
Imagine that you are the CEO of a company that is ranked #4 (#495) on the prestigious 
Fortune 500. This is the recession period, and it is likely that your company will be 
facing losses this year. To limit losses, you are thinking about a possible alliance with a 
rival company ranked #5 (#496). The return will depend on whether or not you form an 
alliance.  
Strategy A: With an alliance, your company’s return will be -5% and your rival’s  
                   return will be -1%.  
Strategy B: Without an alliance, your company’s return will be -6% and your rival’s  
                   return will be -6%. 
Participants then responded to two sets of questions. The first set gathered their 
opinions about the benefits from cooperation (their perception about the payoff increase). The 
three questions in this set asked “How big is the difference in return between forming an 
alliance (-5%) and not forming an alliance (-6%)?” (1=not at all big, 9=very big), “How 
important is it for your company to face a loss as little as possible during the recession?” 
(1=not at all important, 9=very important), and “How much would you benefit from forming 
an alliance?” (1=not at all, 9=very much). 
The second set of questions analysed the participants’ competitive feelings toward 
their rivals. The three questions were, “To what extent would you be inclined to compare 
your return to your rival’s return?” (1=not at all, 9=very much), “How important is it that 
your rival’s return must not be higher than your return?” (1=not at all important, 9=very 
important), and “How competitive would you feel toward your rival during the recession?” 
(1=not at all competitive, 9=very competitive). 
The exact scenario in the gain condition read:  
Imagine that you are the CEO of a company that is ranked #4 (#495) on the prestigious 
Fortune 500. This is the normal period, and it is likely that your company will have 
profits this year. To gain higher profits, you are thinking about a possible alliance with a 
rival company rank #5 (#496). The returns will depend on whether or not you form an 
alliance.  
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Strategy A: With an alliance, your company’s return will be 7% and your rival’s  
                   return will be 11%.  
Strategy B: Without an alliance, your company’s return will be 6% and your rival’s  
                   return will be 6%. 
Similar to the questions in the loss condition, participants responded to the questions 
regarding the benefits from cooperation, which were “How big is the difference in return 
between forming an alliance (7%) and not forming an alliance (6%)?” (1=not at all big, 
9=very big), “How important is it for your company to have a profit as much as possible 
during the normal period?” (1=not at all important, 9=very important), and “How much 
would you benefit from forming an alliance?” (1=not at all, 9=very much). They also 
responded to the questions regarding competitive feelings towards their rivals, which are “To 
what extent would you be inclined to compare your return to your rival’s return?” (1=not at 
all, 9=very much), “How important is it that your rival’s return must not be higher than your 
return?” (1=not at all important, 9=very important), and “How competitive would you feel 
toward your rival during the normal period?” (1=not at all competitive, 9=very competitive). 
Finally, participants responded to the attention and manipulation check question, 
“What is your imaginary company’s rank?” 
Results  
Participants who did not answer the attention check question correctly were discarded 
from the analysis, which resulted in a total of 279 valid responses. The ratings of the three 
questions regarding perceived benefits were average, as were the ratings of the three 
questions regarding the competitive feelings. The Cronbach’s alphas of benefit rating in the 
gain and loss conditions were, respectively, 0.645 and 0.659. The Cronbach’s alphas of 
competitive feelings rating in the gain and loss conditions were, respectively, 0.841 and 
0.863. There was no order effect of situational context (gain/loss vs. loss/gain) on dependent 
measures except for the benefit rating of high-ranking individuals in a gain situation (Benefit 
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rating – high rank, gain situation: F(1, 132)=4.229, p=0.042, η2=0.031; high rank, loss 
situation: F(1, 132)=1.090, p=0.298, η2=0.008; low rank, gain situation: F(1, 143)=0.003, 
p=0.956, η2=0.000; low rank, loss situation: F(1, 143)=2.413, p=0.123, η2=0.017; 
Competitive feeling rating – high rank, gain situation: F(1, 132)=0.138, p=0.710, η2=0.001, 
high rank, loss situation: F(1, 132)=0.065, p=0.799, η2=0.000; low rank, gain situation: F(1, 
143)=0.380, p=0.539, η2=0.003, low rank, loss situation: F(1, 143)=0.187, p=0.666, 
η2=0.001). Order was included as a covariate in the subsequent analyses. 
The results of a two-way ANOVA with benefit ratings as the dependent variable, 
situational context (gain vs. loss) as the within-subjects factor, rank (high vs. low) as the 
between-subjects factor, and order as a covariate showed that there were no significant 
interaction effect for rank x situational context (F(1, 276)=0.043, p=0.837, η2=0.000), and no 
significant main ranking effect (F(1, 276)=0.041, p=0.839, η2=0.000). However, both high- 
and low-ranking participants rated higher perceived benefits for their own companies when 
facing losses rather than gains (F(1, 276)=15.305, p=0.000, η2=0.053), as shown in Figure 
6.2.  
The results of a two-way ANOVA with competitive feeling ratings as the dependent 
variable, situational context (gain vs. loss) as the within-subjects factor, rank (high vs. low) as 
the between-subjects factor, and order as a covariate showed that there was a significant 
interaction effect for rank x situational context (F(1, 276)=6.992, p=0.009, η2=0.025). 
Specifically, high-ranking participants felt more competitive in gain rather than loss 
situations (F(1, 132)=18.067, p=0.000, η2=0.120); however, low-ranking participants felt 
equally competitive towards their rivals in both situations (F(1, 143)=1.305, p=0.255, 
η2=0.009), as shown in Figure 6.3. There was no significant main effect of situational context 
(F(1, 276)=1.224, p=0.269, η2=0.004), and no significant main ranking effect (F(1, 
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276)=0.005, p=0.944, η2=0.000). Table 6.1 shows the means and standard deviations of 
benefit rating and competitive feeling rating by rank and situational context. 
Table 6.1: Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables  
by Rank and Situational Context 
Rank 
Situational Context 
Rank 
Situational Context 
Gain Loss Gain Loss 
Benefit Rating   Competitive Feeling Rating 
High (4 out of 500) 
5.58 
(1.60) 
5.91 
(1.59) 
High (4 out of 500) 
6.75 
(1.89) 
6.00 
(2.01) 
Low (495 out of 500) 
5.58 
(1.35) 
5.85 
(1.48) 
Low (495 out of 500) 
6.47 
(1.86) 
6.31 
(1.85) 
  Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Figure 6.2: Mean Benefit Rating 
by Rank and Situational Context 
 
Figure 6.3: Mean Competitiveness Rating 
by Rank and Situational Context 
 
Discussion 
The results show that the difference in cooperation decisions of high-ranking 
individuals between gain and loss situations is unlikely to be explained by the difference in 
perceived benefits. Both high- and low-ranking individuals perceived higher benefits from 
cooperation when they were presented with losses rather than gains. However, as shown in 
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Study 1, only high-ranking individuals decided to cooperate more in loss as opposed to gain 
situations. The difference is more likely to be influenced by competitive feelings. 
Specifically, high-ranking individuals felt less competitive towards their rivals when they 
were presented with losses rather than gains, whereas the competitive feelings of low-ranking 
individuals remained relatively the same in the two situations. This could possibly influence 
the decision to cooperate, i.e. whereas high-ranking individuals decided to cooperate more in 
loss rather than gain situations, the cooperation decisions of low-ranking individuals did not 
change significantly. 
In Studies 1 and 2, participants were asked to imagine facing real losses and gains. 
Study 3 aims to test whether the effects in Studies 1 and 2 still hold true when participants are 
manipulated by framing a payoff in positive and negative terms. 
6.4 Study 3 
Participants 
A total of 240 participants, recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, participated in 
a between-subjects questionnaire study online in exchange for $0.20. 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions with the between-
subjects factor rank (high vs. low) and the between-subjects factor situational frame (positive 
vs. negative).  
Participants in the negatively-framed situation were given the following scenario:  
Imagine that you are the owner of a car dealer. Your company is ranked #2 (#98) among 
100 car dealers in term of sales. You aim to sell 100 cars in the next quarter. Your rival, 
ranked #3 (#99), also aim to sell 100 cars. To reduce the chance of failure in achieving 
your target, you are thinking about a possible alliance with the rival ranked #3 (#99).  
Strategy A: With an alliance, your chance of failure will be 20%, and your rival’s  
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                   chance of failure will be 5%.  
Strategy B: Without an alliance, your chance of failure will be 30%, and your rival’s   
                   chance of failure will be 30%. 
Participants in the positively-framed condition were given the following scenario:  
Imagine that you are the owner of a car dealer. Your company is ranked #2 (#98) among 
100 car dealers in term of sales. You aim to sell 100 cars in the next quarter. Your rival, 
ranked #3 (#99), also aim to sell 100 cars. To increase the chance of success in achieving 
your target, you are thinking about a possible alliance with the rival ranked #3 (#99).  
Strategy A: With an alliance, your chance of success will be 80%, and your rival’s  
                   chance of success will be 95%.  
Strategy B: Without an alliance, your chance of success will be 70% and your rival’s  
                   chance of success will be 70%. 
Participants in all conditions responded to the question, “Which strategy would you 
choose? A: Form an alliance, B: Not form an alliance.” The attention and manipulation check 
was assessed by the question, “What is your imaginary company’s rank?” 
Results  
Participants who did not answer the attention check question correctly were discarded 
from the analysis, which resulted in a total of 167 valid responses. The results of a binary 
logistic regression, with cooperation decision as the dependent variable and situational frame 
(gain vs. loss) as the independent variable, showed that frame was a significant predictor of 
the cooperation decisions of high-ranking participants (b = 1.217, Wald = 7.054, p = 0.008) 
but not low-ranking participants (b = 0.448, Wald = 0.943, p = 0.332). Figure 6.4 shows the 
percentage of participants who chose to cooperate by rank and frame. 
Discussion 
The results suggest that the cooperation decisions of high-ranking individuals were 
influenced by how the situations were framed, unlike the decisions of low-ranking 
individuals. These findings are consistent with the findings in Study 1. 
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Figure 6.4: Percentage of Participants Choosing to Cooperate by Rank and Frame. 
 
 
6.5 General Discussion 
 Across three studies I showed that situational contexts (gain/loss) and situational 
frames (positive/negative) have different effects on high- and low-ranking individuals. High-
ranking individuals chose to cooperate more when they were facing a loss or negatively-
framed situation rather than a gain or positively-framed situation, whereas the cooperation 
decisions of low-ranking individuals remained the same in both situations (Study 1 and 3). 
The difference in cooperation decisions of high- and low-ranking individuals in gain and loss 
situations was not the result of the difference in the perceived benefit from cooperation but 
rather the result of the difference in competitive feelings: high-ranking individuals feel less 
competitive towards their rivals when they are facing losses rather than gains. However, the 
competitive feeling of low-ranking individuals remains approximately the same (Study 2). 
These findings contribute to the literature of how rankings influence competitive and 
cooperative behaviour. Even though the previous literature has suggested that individuals in 
high and low ranks are similarly competitive (Garcia and Tor, 2007; Garcia et al., 2006), the 
findings suggest that this may be the case only in gain or positively-framed situations. 
However, in loss or negatively-framed situations, high-ranking individuals tend to be less 
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competitive than low-ranking individuals. The findings also contribute generally to the 
literature of social decisions and prospect theory. The previous literature has shown that 
individuals make different decisions in gain and loss domains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The findings in this chapter suggest that the effect of the 
situational context may influence particular type of individuals more than others. High-
ranking individuals tend to be sensitive to situational contexts, and therefore are inconsistent 
in their decisions compared to low-ranking individuals.  
From a practical point of view, the findings suggest that ranking feedback may not be 
suitable in a situation where cooperation or teamwork is encouraged. The findings also 
suggest that the use of rankings leads to less negative impacts in loss as opposed to gain 
situations: in a loss situation, high-ranking individuals are less concerned about the higher 
payoff of their rivals, and in turn choose to cooperate more often than in a gain situation. 
However, since individuals are also influenced by situational frames, high-ranking 
individuals in a gain situation can increase the cooperation behaviour of their prospective 
partners by framing, if possible, the payoffs negatively rather than positively. The findings 
also suggest that organisation may need to promote particularly low-ranking individuals to 
increase their cooperation behaviour by, for example, letting them focus on improving 
themselves rather than competing with rivals (Poortvliet et al., 2009). 
Future research could extend the current studies in several ways. Firstly, the present 
analysis investigates only the scenario where individuals decide to cooperate with a lower-
ranked rival. Future work could investigate whether or not the results can be extended to the 
decision to cooperate with a higher-ranked rival. Note, however, that Garcia et al. (2006) has 
shown, in a gain situation, that individuals tend to be equally competitive and are consistent 
in their decisions regardless of the ranking positions of their rivals (one above/one below). 
Secondly, the present analysis did not include the control condition in which ranking 
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feedback is not provided. Future research could explore how individuals without ranking 
information behave compared to those with high and low ranks in both gain and loss 
situations. Third, the findings in this chapter are based on hypothetical situations. Even 
though the hypothetical decisions can serve as a starting point to study the ranking effect on 
cooperation behaviour, it is still important to further investigate whether or not the effect 
extends to a real life scenario. Fourth, the present analysis focuses mainly on the effect of 
ranking on cooperation decisions in a passive context, i.e. where individuals decide whether 
to cooperate or not based on predetermined payoffs. Nevertheless, in some circumstances 
there may be an opportunity for individuals to initiate actions to sabotage their rivals. 
Sabotage could help individuals protect their rank by reducing the payoff of their rivals. It 
would be interesting to see whether the ranking effect also influences this kind of behaviour. 
On the one hand, since individuals generally perceive action to be worse than inaction, given 
the same outcomes (Spranca et al., 1991), sabotage may be seen as something worse than 
simply deciding not to cooperate. As a result, the ranking effect may be less likely to 
influence sabotage behaviour. On the other hand, feelings of competitiveness may be so 
strong that it can lead individuals to sabotage their rivals. For instance, Charness et al. (2010) 
demonstrated that individuals are willing to sacrifice part of their pay just to reduce the 
performance of others. Hence, in this case, the ranking effect may also provoke sabotage. 
This remains a potential avenue for future research. 
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Chapter 7 
7 Discussion and Implications 
 
7.1 Overview 
Rankings facilitate comparison, and have become an increasingly popular form of 
performance feedback in many different fields, ranging from Premier League rankings in 
sport, box office rankings in entertainment, Fortune 500 company rankings and Forbes 
billionaire rankings in business to MasterCard destination city rankings in tourism. These 
rankings not only help us make decisions, but also influence the judgment and behaviour of 
those being ranked. For example, previous research has suggested that rankings affect life 
satisfaction (Boyce et al., 2010; Clark et al., 2009), interactions with others (Keltner et al., 
2003; Gilbert and Miles, 2000), and competitive behaviour (Poortvliet et al., 2009; Garcia 
and Tor, 2007; Garcia et al., 2006). However, despite this research, our understanding of the 
effect of rankings on our judgments and decisions is still limited. Given the ubiquitous use of 
rankings, such a lack of understanding could potentially lead to undesirable and unintended 
consequences. 
This research investigated how rankings influence four important areas of judgment 
and decision, namely individuals’ aspiration levels, predicted winning probabilities, pay 
entitlements, and cooperation decisions. Individuals’ aspiration levels and predicted winning 
probabilities are central judgments in the area of competition. The aspiration level influences 
future performance by motivating individuals to work harder (Heath et al., 1999) whereas 
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predicted winning probability is fundamental to many decisions, such as applying for a job 
and betting on a contest. Pay entitlement and cooperation decisions play a crucial role in 
organisations. Unfulfilled entitlement can lead to dissatisfaction and the counterproductive 
behaviour of employees. The lack of cooperation in the workplace potentially reduces 
productivity, which might eventually lead to business failure.  
Through a variety in scenarios, samples, and the originality of designs, this thesis 
revealed four main findings. First, rankings determine the potential to improve, which in turn 
influences individuals’ aspiration levels (Chapter 3). Higher-ranked individuals are associated 
with less potential to improve and lower aspiration levels (Study 1). This ranking effect is 
more pronounced for individuals with high self-efficacy than those with low self-efficacy 
(Study 4). Without ranking information, individuals tend to see low potential for 
improvement and as a consequence set relatively low aspiration levels (Study 2). Second, 
individuals use rankings to infer their relative capability compared to their competitors’ and 
predict winning probabilities based on these differential capabilities (Chapter 4). Higher-
ranked individuals believe their capabilities are similar to those of commensurate competitors 
and predict relatively low winning probabilities, whereas low-ranking individuals believe 
their capabilities are superior, resulting in relatively high predicted winning probabilities. 
Third, rankings influence pay requests of individuals through feelings of entitlement (Chapter 
5). Given the same pay of similarly-ranked others, individuals in high ranks, as compared to 
low ranks, perceived others’ pay to be more legitimate and thus felt more entitled to the same 
pay as others. Consequently, the first group requested higher pay (Study 1). However, as the 
pay of others in a similar position becomes lower, the differential feelings of legitimacy and 
entitlement between high- and low-ranking individuals diminish, and the ranking effect on 
pay requests attenuates (Study 3). Fourth, the cooperation decisions of individuals depend on 
rankings and situational contexts and frames (Chapter 6). Individuals in high ranks feel less 
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competitive towards their rivals and are more likely to cooperate in a loss or negatively-
framed situation than in a gain or positively-framed situation. However, low-ranking 
individuals feel equally competitive towards their rivals and do not change their cooperation 
decisions regardless of situational contexts or frames. 
7.2 Theoretical Contributions 
The findings provide a deeper understanding of how rankings can influence judgment 
and behaviour. Researchers have long recognised that individuals are concerned for status or 
ranks within a society, and this concern affects well-being (Boyce et al., 2010; Clark et al., 
2009) as well as various kinds of behaviour (e.g. Keltner et al., 2003; Fournier et al., 2002; 
Gilbert and Miles, 2000). However, it was only recently that research began to study the 
effects of rankings as a performance feedback device. This line of research argues that 
ranking feedback influences productivity (e.g. Kuhnen and Tymula, 2012; Tran and 
Zeckhauser, 2012; Blanes i Vidal and Nossol, 2011) and that the different positions within 
rankings activate different social comparison concerns, leading to unequal competitive 
feelings towards commensurate rivals (e.g. Poortvliet et al., 2009; Garcia & Tor, 2007; 
Garcia et al., 2006). In this thesis I extend this line of literature by showing how ranking 
feedback can be used as a tool to infer one’s potential to improve, relative capabilities, 
feelings of entitlement, and competitiveness. In turn, this influences, respectively, aspiration 
levels, predicted winning probabilities, pay requests, and cooperation decisions.  
By studying the influences of ranking feedback on these four factors, this research 
also contributes to other related fields. First, most prior work on aspiration levels has shown 
that individuals use performance feedback to determine aspiration levels by comparing their 
current performance with a reference point, which can be past performance, current aspiration 
level, or average performance (Lant, 1992; Vance and Colella, 1990; Cyert and March, 1963; 
155 
 
Festinger, 1942; Gould and Lewis, 1940). The discrepancy between the performance and the 
reference point then affects individuals’ aspiration levels. This thesis demonstrates how 
ranking feedback changes the way an individual uses their performance feedback to form an 
aspiration level, i.e. they infer how much they can improve from the feedback. This approach 
may be regarded as superior to the previous approach in terms of motivating individuals to 
perform better. By comparing one’s performance with a reference point, there may be a case 
where individuals set their aspiration levels below their current performance (e.g. Festinger, 
1942; Hilgard et al., 1940). For instance, individuals tend to lower their aspiration level when 
their performance is above average (Festinger, 1942; Hilgard et al., 1940). As a consequence, 
since individuals tend to adjust their effort in accordance with their aspiration level (Bryan 
and Locke, 1967), a lower aspiration level could lead to lower performance. However, 
rankings direct individuals’ attention to the rank difference between their ranks and the top, 
leading individuals to perceive their potential to improve. By seeing how much they can 
improve, they are likely to set their aspiration level higher than their current performance, 
leading to an improvement of future performance. 
Second, this thesis helps develop a better understanding of the way individuals view 
competitions. Previous work on comparative judgment has focused primarily on the role of 
non-motivational factors, namely people’s egocentric focus and differential information, 
when studying determinants of competition outcome prediction. However, considerable 
evidence has suggested that a motivational factor – self-enhancement – plays a key role when 
individuals estimate their relative skills (Brown, 1986; Alicke, 1985; Messick et al., 1985). 
This thesis contributes to this line of literature by demonstrating how this motivational factor 
influences the prediction of winning probabilities: individuals with different ranks vary in 
their self-enhancement and as a consequence predict different winning probabilities. 
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Third, this research contributes to the understanding of the factors determining 
employees’ pay entitlement. Previous work in this field has focused predominantly on how 
gender, rather than performance feedback, influences feelings of entitlement and pay 
allocation (e.g. Desmarais and Curtis, 1997). However, as pay is often tied to performance 
(e.g. Prendergast, 1999), and employees’ perception of pay entitlement influences the 
psychological contract, in turn influencing employees’ behaviour and work attitude 
(Naumann et al., 2002), it is important to learn how relative performance (i.e. rankings) helps 
to determine the legitimacy of outcomes and pay entitlement. This research fills this gap by 
demonstrating how individuals with differential ranks perceive different outcome legitimacy 
and pay entitlement. 
Finally, the previous literature on rankings and competitive behaviour has suggested 
that high- and low-ranking individuals tend to be equally competitive, and are less likely to 
cooperate with their commensurate rivals (Garcia and Tor, 2007; Garcia et al., 2006). My 
findings reveal that this is not always the case, with the cooperation decisions also depending 
on situational contexts (loss vs. gain) and frames (negative vs. positive).  
7.3 Practical Implications 
The findings offer several important insights for practitioners into how rankings 
influence judgment and behaviour. Organisations aiming to use ranking as a way to enhance 
employees’ performance, as well to reward and maintain high-performing employees so as to 
compete with their rivals, should consider the effects of ranking on the factors addressed in 
this thesis. This will help organisations fully exploit the use of ranking feedback, as well as to 
avoid the adverse effects of ranking, which may conflict with an organisation’s main 
objectives.  
157 
 
First, the findings in Chapter 3 suggest that rankings could help motivate low 
performers. Since low performers often lack the metacognitive ability to acknowledge their 
limitations (Kruger and Dunning, 1999), they may often believe that they are performing 
well, in a relative sense, and are less likely to perceive their potential to improve. These 
findings demonstrate how rankings could address this shortcoming of low performers, i.e. by 
enabling them to perceive their potential to improve and set relatively high aspiration levels. 
The findings also suggest that low self-efficacy individuals with low performance should be 
particularly encouraged to set higher aspiration levels or encouraged to increase their self-
efficacy through, for example, training and motivating (Gist and Mitchell, 1992). 
Additionally, in circumstances where organisations need to set goals for their employees, 
these findings could also help them estimate the appropriate goal levels that their employees 
are likely to accept. This would increase the likelihood of goal acceptance, subsequently 
increasing the effectiveness of goals in influencing performance (e.g. Erez and Zidon, 1984).  
Secondly, the findings in Chapter 4 suggest that even though rankings may be useful 
in signalling capabilities, they may have an unintended consequence on the perceived relative 
capabilities of individuals from different ranks. Lower-ranked individuals view themselves as 
more capable than their commensurate rivals, whereas higher-ranked individuals believe they 
are as capable as their competitors. As a result, the two groups of individuals perceive 
competition differently. Those in low-ranking positions believe they have a higher chance of 
winning than those in high-ranking positions.  
Third, the findings in Chapter 5 suggest that individuals rely more on their own rank, 
rather than the pay of similarly-ranked persons, to determine their pay entitlement. These 
findings help organisations reduce the chance of unfulfilled entitlements, which could lead to 
counterproductive behaviour of employees. In determining pay raises or bonuses, for 
instance, these findings show that it is important for organisations to pay high-performing 
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individuals at a similar level to those with similar performance. However, for low-ranking 
individuals, the amount of pay can vary, depending on whether low-ranking individuals 
perceive their colleagues’ pay to be justified. It is therefore recommended that the pay of 
highly-ranked individuals should be competitive and less variable than that of low-ranking 
individuals. Additionally, in determining a salary for a new employee, the findings suggest 
that it may be useful for recruiters to find out about the rank of potential candidates and the 
pay of the colleagues. In doing this, recruiters can make an attractive offer and increase the 
chance of a new employee accepting the offer. 
Fourth, the implementation of a ranking system may need to be implemented 
concomitant with the promotion of cooperative behaviour. The findings in Chapter 6 suggest 
how organisations could reduce the deleterious effect of rankings, namely the inhibition of 
cooperation intentions. The findings show that cooperation intentions of high-ranking 
individuals can be encouraged by framing payoffs negatively rather than positively. 
This thesis also provides several insights for those being ranked. First, the findings of 
Chapter 3 help low-ranking individuals to become aware that their similarly-ranked 
competitors tend to set relatively high aspiration levels. This implies that setting low 
aspiration levels may lead them to perform less well than their similarly-ranked colleagues, 
which may eventually lead to an even lower rank. The findings also suggest that high-ranking 
individuals may overestimate their capability to improve by setting unrealistically high 
aspirations. As a result, higher-ranked individuals may be more likely to experience 
disappointment. Secondly, the findings of Chapter 4 suggest that rank positions may lead to 
bias in predicting the outcome of a competition. The findings show that despite the same 
difference in ranks, low-ranking individuals overestimate their capability to outperform their 
rivals than high-ranking individuals do. This larger difference in perceived capabilities of 
lower-ranked individuals leads them to predict higher probabilities of winning. Third, the 
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findings of Chapter 5 help individuals learn how to allocate outcomes or rewards to group 
members when working as a team. Lower performing individuals are less likely than higher 
performing individuals to demand equal outcomes. Finally, the findings of Chapter 6 propose 
how high-ranking individuals can convince their similarly-ranked competitors to cooperate, 
i.e. by framing payoffs negatively rather than positively.  
7.4 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Even though this research offers various novel findings, there are certain limitations, 
which represent potentially interesting avenues for future research.  
Limitations and future research directions for each chapter 
Chapter 3 considers only the positive effect of the comparison between one’s rank and 
the top rank, i.e. to help low-ranking individuals see their potential to improve. However, 
since low-ranking individuals see that they are still a long way from the top, they may feel 
demotivated, thereby leading to lower self-worth (Crocker et al., 2003). Future research could 
examine this negative effect. It could also examine whether rankings influence individuals’ 
effort and preparation levels. On the one hand, since individuals tend to adjust their effort 
based on their aspiration level (Bryan and Locke, 1967), with all else being equal, high-
ranking individuals may put in less effort than low-ranking individuals because the aspiration 
level of the first group is lower. On the other hand, lower-ranked individuals may set higher 
aspiration levels because they assume that their performance will, by default, increase; 
consequently, they may not try as hard. 
In Chapter 4, the analysis on the predicted winning probability is limited to individual 
decision-making. However, in some competitions and sports, individuals work as a team. 
Since group and individual decision-making varies in many different ways (e.g. Charness and 
Sutter, 2012), future research could investigate how rankings influence the predicted winning 
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probability of group decision-making. In addition, the current analysis focuses only on self-
judgment and self-prediction, but in many circumstances, such as hiring decisions, 
individuals may need to compare and evaluate the skills of others. Future research could also 
explore how the rankings of the persons being evaluated influence the judgment of these 
independent individuals. 
In Chapter 5, my findings related to the ranking effect on entitlement are limited to 
cash compensation. In many instances, rewards or compensation packages consist of non-
cash benefits such as holidays, insurance, or childcare. Unlike cash, these benefits are 
perceived differently from one individual to another (Chiu et al., 2002), and are sometimes 
undervalued (Wilson et al., 1985). Future research could, for instance, explore whether or not 
the ranking effect extends to the entitlement of these benefits. Additionally, the current 
research has focused mainly on the entitlement feelings of requesters (e.g. employees). In 
fact, how responders (e.g. employers) feel as to whether requesters warrant a particular pay 
request is equally important because the unfulfilled request could lead to counterproductive 
employee behaviour (Paul et al., 2000) and sabotage in the workplace (Ambrose et al., 2002). 
Even though this research has shown that requesters and responders tend to agree on 
proposed pay (Chapter 5, Study 4), it has yet to explore the effect using monetary incentives, 
and in an interactive context. These remain an open avenue for future research. 
In Chapter 6, the analysis of the ranking effect on cooperation decisions focuses only 
on decision making in a passive context, where individuals only decide whether or not to 
cooperate. However, individuals may sometimes have an opportunity to initiate an action 
which sabotages their rivals, thereby reducing the rivals’ payoff and protecting their rank. On 
the one hand, since actions are often judged to be worse than inactions given the same 
outcomes (Spranca et al., 1991), one may feel uncomfortable sabotaging one’s rivals just to 
protect rank. Thus, the ranking effect may attenuate. On the other hand, the effects of ranking 
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may be so strong that it increases the chances of this behaviour. For instance, Charness et al. 
(2010) showed that when performance feedback was available, individuals were willing to 
give up part of their income in order to reduce the performance of others. Hence, the ranking 
effect may still manifest itself in sabotage. This could be a potential avenue for future 
research. 
One may argue that self-efficacy can be used as a moderator of every relationship 
between rank and main dependent variables of this thesis, in addition to the aspiration level. 
However, as self-efficacy is defined as the perception of “how well one can execute courses 
of action required to deal with prospective situations” (Bandura, 1982, p.122), it relates most 
directly to the ability to see their potential to improve, and subsequently the aspiration level. 
Specifically, one needs to judge his own ability to perform the task in order to set his 
aspiration level. Self-efficacy is less relevant to the other three factors (winning probability, 
pay entitlement, and cooperation decisions). To determine the winning probability, 
individuals need to estimate the relative capability, rather than just their own ability. To 
determine how much one should receive, he normally relies on his performance or the pay 
that similar others receive. The perception of his ability to do the task (self-efficacy) may 
influence pay entitlement when the information regarding his performance or others’ pay is 
not available. Finally, to determine whether or not to cooperate with rivals, individuals focus 
mainly on the benefits gain from cooperation and their competitive feelings, rather than their 
perceived ability to do the task. Hence, self-efficacy was not use as a moderator for the other 
three factors, but only for the aspiration level. 
Limitations and future research directions overall 
Almost all studies in the thesis compare the judgments or behaviours of individuals 
with absolute extreme ranks i.e. very close to the top and the bottom (e.g. #3 or #97 out of 
100), future work could explore whether or not the ranking effect extends to the judgments of 
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those in relatively high and low-ranking positions (e.g. #15 out of 100, which is still 
considered to be high rank but not extreme). For instance, future work can compare the 
difference in pay entitlement between individuals ranked #15 out of 100 and #86 out of 100.  
Additionally, the last three chapters explore the ranking effect on high- and low-
ranking individuals by making them compare themselves with a specific and commensurate 
rival. This study design serves as a starting point to investigate the ranking effect. By making 
individuals compare themselves to a specific person, we can direct and narrow individuals’ 
attention to just one rival, making it easier to observe the effect of that particular person on 
individuals’ judgments. In addition, by making individuals compare themselves to a 
commensurate rival, we can control for, or at least minimise, the variation in capabilities, 
enabling us to attribute the observed effects to the difference in rank. Based on the current 
design, future work could extend it in two different ways. First, future work could investigate 
whether or not the judgments of high and low-ranking individuals are still different when 
comparing themselves to a specific non-commensurate rival. Second, future work could also 
explore the ranking effect when individuals compare themselves to a group of rivals within 
rankings, rather than just a specific rival. 
Most of the studies in this thesis investigate the ranking effect based on a one-off 
event. As a result, individuals’ judgments could also be influenced by regression toward the 
mean. To minimise this side effect, future work could explore the ranking effect in a repeated 
scenario. Note, however, that by doing so, individuals’ judgments may also be affected by the 
sequence of their ranks. For instance, even though their latest ranks are the same, individuals 
initially ranked #5, #6, and then #7 in a repeated competition may feel more entitled than 
those initially ranked #9, #8, and then #7 because the former come from a higher rank. 
Additionally, as most studies in this thesis (except for Chapter 6) focus on judgments on an 
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individual level, future work could explore whether or not the ranking effect extends to an 
organisation level, i.e. when individuals made a decision for their organisations. 
Finally, a large number of participants in this thesis were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Even though MTurk participants produce results that are reliable 
and similar to students, the usual participants in decision-making research, in many different 
areas such as risk-taking behaviour and certainty effect, the first group tends to pay less 
attention to study materials, potentially reducing the statistical power (Goodman et al., 2012). 
In this thesis, this problem is carefully managed by including manipulation and attention 
check questions, and discarding all the responses that did not correctly answer these questions 
in the analyses. However, future research could also explore whether the findings in this 
thesis can be extended to other groups of participants, such as specialists or experts in related 
fields.  
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